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Abstract
How can we claim to know and even tenaciously hold in science what we 
might possibly doubt? Standard methodologies of science have not answered this 
question persuasively. They either propose an answer that misrepresents science or 
they propose an irrational approach to science. The reason for these two extreme 
positions is that the accounts of science in these methodologies are based on a false 
ideal of objectivism - an assumption that the success of science as a branch of 
human knowledge is based on it being objective in the sense of being impersonal.
Michael Polanyi propounds a theory of tacit knowledge, and I claim that this 
theory provides the best answer to the above question in that it represents scientific 
activity accurately and rationally. Polanyi rebuttals the false ideal of 
objectivism/impersonalism in scientific knowledge with a richer account of actual 
scientific practice. I show that he restores heuristics, and accounts for the role of 
skill without thereby succumbing to psychologism/subjectivism. I explore Collins 
and Pinch’s claim that controversy is central to scientific progress, and critically 
examine Mwamba’s book length study of Polanyi. I tackle the objections made by 
the Popperians (notably Alan Musgrave) to Polanyi’s theory and the alternative 
methodology provided by Imre Lakatos/Elie Zahar. I argue that Popperianistic 
methodologies present incomplete accounts of science. Instead, understanding the 
nature and functions of tacit knowledge provides a richer epistemology of science.
Further, the theory provides grounds for re-tackling the perennial problem of 
skepticism. In the theory, every act of knowledge is a skilful act and whenever we 
can point out that we know, we affirm our ways of knowing. Thus removed from 
the false ideal of objectivism, we are closer to resolving skepticism. The thesis is 
also an introduction to the still nascent philosophy of Michael Polanyi to analytic 
philosophy. It is akin to but not identical with Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of 
science.
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Part One: General introduction
9
Chapter Zero: Appraising the problem - epistemological and 
methodological issues in the philosophy of science 
0.0 Introduction
How can we claim to know and even tenaciously hold in science what we 
might possibly doubt? This is a reversal of the question that Immanuel Kant is 
dealing with in his Critique o f Pure Reason, (Kant, 1998/1781) when he seeks to 
establish the grounds on which we can arrive at abidingly true knowledge by means 
of fallible experience. And rather than take an abstract or idealistic approach, I 
intend to try and answer the question by taking into account what is typical in the 
experience of the scientist. I am not the first to take philosophical interest in how we 
know in science. On the one hand, enquirers into how we know have had science 
and all its comparative success at the back of their minds as they propound theories 
of knowledge or epistemologies. On the other hand, philosophers of science have 
written elaborate accounts or methodologies of how science functions, among which 
are such works as Logik der Forschung (Popper, 1969/1935), Structure o f Scientific 
Revolutions (Kuhn, 1962), etc. Other works have been specifically sociologies of 
science. Perhaps unintentionally, most of such approaches to knowledge in science 
(be they philosophical or sociological) have tended to make of science a unique kind 
of knowledge, separate and above all other forms of knowledge in terms of being 
objective and making comparative tangible progress in solving the problems it sets 
itself. I believe that a more complete account of how we know in science can go a 
long way in complementing foregoing efforts in epistemology, in methodology and 
in the sociology of science.
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What motivates my approach is what I perceive as a stalling of foregoing 
attempts to provide an answer. Very little is being produced today in terms of 
explaining how science works and how we know scientifically. And yet there is still 
no agreement on the nature of scientific knowledge in methodology. This lack of 
agreement, I opine, is based on the fact that epistemologies have been only partial in 
providing an understanding of the nature of knowledge as a whole. One way to try 
and re-ignite interest in this area would perhaps be to begin by overhauling 
epistemology to come up with a fitting definition of ‘knowledge’ before we can 
come up with a well founded methodology.
But this approach would not be practical because it would risk stalling on 
details of definitions in some midway step of the process. Besides, there is a 
possibility that epistemology could learn from methodology too since there is no 
logical priority of epistemology over methodology. The two areas of enquiry could 
be mutually beneficial. As an alternative to this approach therefore, I suggest that a 
more accurate account of the experience of a scientist in acquiring scientific 
knowledge be made, which would be a descriptive account. In turn this descriptive 
account could be extrapolated to cover relevant areas of knowledge in general. This 
latter part of the approach, I suggest, would then provide us with a normative or 
prescriptive account of knowledge.
On the one hand, a purely descriptive account of how science works would 
be lacking in philosophical interest. It would generate a descriptiveness fallacy that 
would put too much emphasis on the details that nothing general could be said about 
science. On the other hand, A purely normative account would most likely be too 
abstracted from and aprioristic to the actual activity of science to be of any use to 
scientists. This would be a normativity fallacy. Connected to this normativity
11
fallacy, in my opinion, foregoing standard attempts to answer this and similar 
questions (to the one I pose at the beginning) have started out with objectivist 
assumptions (where being ‘objective’ has the properties of being detached, 
impersonal and even indubitable) and then sought to describe scientific knowledge 
in the same objectivist light. In this view, the relative success of scientific 
knowledge is perceived as accruing from its being detached and impersonal. Not 
only have there been problems with objectivist theories of knowledge stemming 
from this normativity fallacy; there have been endless controversies with 
methodologies (and possibly with sociologies of science).
What my proposed approach could bring about is a bridge, the missing link, 
an element that weaves through the descriptive and the normative in methodologies 
of science, which could enlighten the debate in epistemology on the question of 
knowledge. In my opinion, the bulk of the standard methodologies in the 
philosophy of science on the question (e.g. verificationism, falsificationism, 
Kuhnian theory of paradigm shifts in revolutionary science, methodological 
scientific research programmes, etc.) has been committed to different kinds of 
methodologies informed by their respective epistemologies and mostly oblivious of 
actual scientific practice. Where the epistemologies have been incomplete they have 
helped generate incomplete methodologies. A brief outline of the general problems 
facing these approaches will suffice at this stage.
0.1 Partial epistemologies
0.1.1 Understanding knowledge
The literature on the debate about knowledge and the definition of
knowledge in epistemology shows that there is little progress being made towards a
12
conclusive definition of knowledge. In broad terms, on the one hand there is the 
traditional conception of knowledge defined as ‘justified, true belief. After 
Gettier’s counterexamples to this kind of knowledge, the response has mainly been 
geared towards buttressing the traditional conception of knowledge against such 
objections like the Gettier counterexamples. Examples of such responses have been 
the ‘causal theory of knowledge’ and a related form of this theory called the 
‘reliabilist theory of knowledge’1.
At this stage of my investigation, I think it is a fair observation to make about 
the debate, that both the traditional understanding of knowledge and the efforts to 
strengthen this traditional definition take into consideration only one aspect of 
knowledge, namely ‘knowledge that’ (Macintosh, 1979-1980). The motivation for 
such a (‘propositionalist’) take on knowledge seems to me to be to explicate 
prepositional knowledge, which would be most characteristic of the examples 
chosen in the debate. But the disadvantage is that the resultant definition of 
knowledge is one that puts a lot of emphasis on the one aspect of belief.
And yet knowledge has a wider reach than mere ‘knowledge that’. An 
interesting alternative would be ‘knowledge how-to’. Such knowledge cannot be 
defined in terms of belief. I may know how to ride a bicycle, but such knowledge 
would not be defined in terms of belief. Even if I were to write a manual on how to 
ride a bicycle, the propositions in the manual would not make me capable of passing 
on a belief that would make the reader leam how to ride a bicycle just by reading 
them. An adequate understanding of knowledge should be able to accommodate 
various kinds of knowledge. In an effort to give a more comprehensive
1 Both of these theories will be treated in greater depth in the next chapter, defining them here would 
lead me far afield.
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understanding of knowledge, N. Rescher outlines at least four kinds of knowledge 
broadly understood as having access to correct information. Thus far he points out: 
a) ‘knowledge that’, which is a knowledge of facts -  that something is the case; b) 
‘adverbial knowledge’, which includes ‘knowing what’, ‘knowing when’, ‘knowing 
how’, ‘knowing why’, etc; c) ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ which associates 
individuals or things (e.g. I may know Popper because I know the author of a given 
book by him); and d) ‘performatory knowledge’, or ‘how-to knowledge’, which is a 
knowledge of skills. (Rescher, 2003, pp. xiv-xv).
Now, I do not set myself the task of reaching a conclusive definition of 
knowledge understood comprehensively, for that would lead me far afield. It is 
enough to show that there are other kinds of knowledge not accounted for in this 
traditional definition of knowledge and in its more refined forms, which forms of 
knowledge could conceivably help make the traditional definition of knowledge less 
problematic as well as throw more light on how we know in science.2 Now, it is true 
that knowledge in science is at least in part composed of ‘knowing that’, but in 
addition to this there is substantial ‘knowledge how’ which goes into making up the 
whole body of scientific knowledge. And still an objection against the
<7
multiplication of ‘knowledges’ is valid.
The application of Occam’s razor in this area would be helpful in coming up 
with a helpful understanding of knowledge. But Occam’s razor becomes necessary 
only when the various forms of knowledge are either redundant or mutually
2 In fact, seen the other way round, some epistemologies have been built around a given conception of 
scientific knowledge as an example of human knowledge at its best. Kant’s Critique o f  Pure Reason, 
for example, in as far as it is a work in epistemology, takes for granted the success of Newtonian 
mechanics and the truth of Euclidean geometry to try to explain how we can come up with synthetic a 
priori knowledge.
Hilary Komblith seems to suggest an application of Occam’s Razor when he objects to the view of 
science as a special kind of knowledge that humans possess for reasons other than mere genetic drift 
or chance. (1999, p. 337).
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inconsistent. The various forms of knowledge ought to be informative of knowledge 
as a whole and they are to form a consistent and mutually complementing set. On 
this assumption, it seems like a viable effort to seek an insight in knowledge as a 
whole by proceeding from an adequate knowledge of a given form of knowledge, in 
my case, scientific knowledge. And so I hope that if I arrive at a greater clarity of 
how science works, and how we hold scientific knowledge, I will have hopefully 
persuasively (even if not conclusively) laid the grounds for explicating better the 
wider concept of knowledge.
0.1.2 Adamant scepticism
One of the most enduring influences on our understanding of knowledge has
been Rene Descartes’ reflection on knowledge, given in his First Meditation. 
(Descartes, 1641/1996) Descartes sets out on a path of methodological doubt with 
the intention of attaining ‘clear and distinct’ (indubitable) ideas. But he soon comes 
up with the idea of a malicious demon or an evil genius, who might be responsible 
for the ideas in our minds even when those ideas may seem clear and distinct. And 
so already then, in the reflections of Descartes, the link between the search for 
indubitable and thus objective knowledge (i.e. objectivity understood as an 
impersonal detached mental attitude by which indubitable knowledge could be 
attained) and the enduring presence of scepticism is apparent.
Modem expressions of this ‘Cartesian’ scepticism continue to use an 
equivalent to the evil genius, e.g. us being brains in a vat, or being manipulated by a 
treacherous scientist who has us linked to his computer, etc. The more we want to 
establish knowledge on sure grounds, the more persistent is the question of how sure 
the grounds are (i.e. scepticism). The same link has been pointed out, among 
others, by Thomas Nagel:
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“The two [objectivity and scepticism] are intimately bound together. The 
search for objective knowledge, because of its commitment to a realistic 
picture, is inescapably subject to scepticism and cannot refute it but must 
proceed under its shadow. Scepticism, in turn, is a problem only because of the 
realist claims of objectivity.” (Nagel, 1986, p.71)4
Whether scepticism is a problem akin to the realistic approach to the world is 
open to question, but the discussion of realism is one I would like to avoid given its 
vastness and complexity. I will make no conscious commitments to realism or anti­
realism of any sort. For the moment it is enough that the point has been made, 
namely that scepticism feeds on the search for indubitable knowledge and thus on 
objectivism. The search to understand knowledge is as exposed to scepticism as it is 
attached to an ideal of objectivism. The more we press for absolute, indubitable and 
objective truth, the more we end up with scepticism. The grander our ideals of 
objective, indubitable truths, the more entrenched is the attendant scepticism.5
The kind of scepticism I refer to here is different from Pyrrhonian scepticism 
which radically suspends any search for knowledge on the grounds that nothing can 
be known for certain.6 This latter form of scepticism is of very little epistemological 
interest, since in its being so extreme it simply puts an end to epistemological 
engagement. At the opposite end of the scale, elsewhere, Nagel can be understood 
as giving a counsel of despair when he suggests that even given the heroic
4 This view, that indubitability and scepticism are bound together is also shared by L.S. Carrier.
(1974, p. 147)
51 mention in passing here and very broadly indeed, that the efforts of Descartes and Kant are 
commendable as regards finding an answer to scepticism, but they do not rid philosophy of 
scepticism. Kant proposed a system in which we could have synthetic a priori knowledge, and he held 
the scientific axioms of his day (Euclidean geometry, Newtonian Mechanics, etc.) as examples of 
such knowledge. Perhaps the way forward, as we suggest here, is the other way around: to learn from 
the way science knows and then proceed inductively to the way we ought to know, rather than vice 
versa, holding a belief about how we ought to know and then seeking to fit scientific knowledge into 
the epistemological structures resultant from such belief.
6 There is no rationally permissible opinion, not even this very one. Scepticism purges all forms of 
opinions and arguments, including itself, like a purgative medicine that clears both the illness and it 
disappears. Such scepticism urges us to suspend any judgments or knowledge claims. We know 
nothing for certain. (Sextus Empiricus, 210/1990, Book II, par. 188).
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achievements of some ambitions of knowledge, a “pervasive scepticism or at least 
provisionality of commitment is suitable in light of our evident limitations. (Nagel, 
1986, p.69) Nagel downplays scepticism to a mere malaise that we should and could 
learn to live with while we hold on to our knowledge claims, given that we are 
limited in the means we have to arrive at indubitable knowledge. But this approach 
does not take scepticism seriously enough.
In similar vein, a few voices in epistemology have urged a lowering of 
expectations in the effort to resolve Cartesian scepticism or the scepticism that arises 
from seeking to achieve Cartesian standards of knowledge about the external world. 
(Fumerton, 2005) But areas of knowledge like science show us that it is possible to 
know what we can possibly doubt without thereby giving up the ideal of finding sure 
knowledge. A look at the history of science shows that it is normal in science to 
hold beliefs that can possibly be doubted. And so a closer look at scientific 
knowledge could be a way to include the hazardous character o f knowledge in the 
very conditions of knowledge without thereby being paralyzed by scepticism. In 
other words, we can proceed to find knowledge even in the face of the possibility 
that we may arrive at a half-truth or an illusion. There is a fiduciary aspect to 
scientific knowledge.
This is not to ignore scepticism; rather it is to choose not to be motivated by 
it. Scientific knowledge promises to provide a model for such a view of knowledge. 
In other words, for the moment I agree with A.J. Holland when he holds that 
scepticism is built on an assumption -  the assumption that knowledge requires 
“some special kind of assurance or ability to tell that what one professes to know is 
indeed the case”. (Holland, 1977, p.555) And so, one way out of this predicament 
is to drop the assumption. We are as exposed to scepticism as we are to a false ideal
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of objectivism. Dropping the false ideal, not just out of exasperation, but because 
we can show that science (held out as the model of knowledge) does not proceed 
according to this false ideal, is a plausible way out of scepticism.
Now, this is admittedly not a knock-out response to scepticism. The sceptic 
may point out that the evil genius could still be manipulating us to think that science 
has arrived at some knowledge and that scientists have had to proceed in a fiduciary 
manner, suspending doubt, until they arrived at this putative knowledge. A 
preliminary response to this sceptic would be to show that the kind of scepticism 
which points out that the evil genius is not only manipulating a few minds but all 
minds uniformly is a kind of meta-scepticism which is not harmful to the activity of 
science. As long as scepticism is kept at that abstracted level, it ceases to be a 
philosophical concern. But this response will have to be fleshed out by the way I 
proceed to show how we know in science what we could possibly doubt.
Concluding this section, I propose that the success of a theory of knowledge 
in providing a way out of perennial scepticism is a measure of the success of the 
theory itself. The efforts at defining ‘knowledge’ given at the height of the debate 
on the definition of knowledge have not been very fruitful in dislodging scepticism 
or even providing a viable way out of it. In addition, the philosophy of language has 
tried to find an answer to the perennial problem of scepticism (e.g. Putnam, 1981) 
In the linguistic approach, the problem is reduced to one of appropriateness of 
reference (in meaning) between propositions and what they refer to in the world etc, 
e.g. between ‘bottles’ and actual bottles. Responses to this approach have been 
given e.g. in Barry Stroud (1984). Similar or related theories suggested against 
scepticism would include the principle of charity, theories of verifiability, the causal 
theory of reference on which I hint, etc. (Nagel, 1986) But I make a pragmatic
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decision to steer clear of the linguistic and other related approaches while duly 
acknowledging their seriousness and complexity. The problem of scepticism seems 
to remain adamantly at the end of all these efforts to dispel it.
0.2 Problematic methodologies
0.2.1 The story of recent standard methodology and objectivism
Given the partial epistemologies on which standard methodologies of science
were developed, it is no surprise that neither of them considered on its own gives a 
complete picture of the way we know in science. Many of them have been proposed 
as a remedy to perceived weaknesses of foregoing ones. In very broad strokes, 
without pretending to present a strict chronological account, and without committing 
myself to mentioning all the particular philosophers,7 I give an outline of the history 
of the debate in order to emphasize the point that the reason for these successive 
failures is that each of the standard methodologies has taken a wrong starting point, 
principally the one of assuming that scientific knowledge is objective in being 
impersonal and detached from the scientist.
Thus far, falsificationism comes to correct the errors (mainly logical) of 
verificationism and its attendant logical positivism. Among the claims that 
falsificationism makes is that verificationism is not the logic followed by scientists. 
But falsificationism on its part comes with its set of attendant problems. In reality, 
scientists are not known to abandon their bold conjectures as soon as a 
counterexample has been found, and yet falsificationism left on its own cannot 
account for this apparent discrepancy.
71 choose to keep the report very general at this stage for pragmatic reasons. Mentioning names 
would call upon a little more detail in looking at all sides of the position of a given philosopher.
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Thomas Kuhn (1970) suggests a remedy according to which scientific 
knowledge grows by way of revolutions. Scientists holding on to older theories or 
positions only change their view in a revolutionary context. Between the revolutions 
there is a period of normal science and sooner or later, upcoming scientists find 
problems with the normal science and a revolution is fomented. The shift from one 
paradigm to a succeeding one is revolutionary, the two paradigms being 
incommensurable. The virtue of this approach by Kuhn is that it seemed to take into 
due consideration the actual history of science. However a general criticism levelled 
at it is that it places an irrational element right at the heart of progress in scientific 
knowledge. In other words, Kuhn’s methodology of science seems to explain 
progress in this apparently most successful area of human knowledge, using an 
irrational element. There is a quasi-religious conversion from one paradigm to 
another.
The question to be addressed then is: what then motivates this change 
between paradigms and thus accounts for apparent progress in science? There is an 
attempt to rehabilitate falsificationism by suggesting sophisticated falsificationism or 
a theory of methodological scientific research programmes. According to this 
proposed theory, scientists work inside a research programme and they work to 
protect a hard core using changeable theories, models, formulae, etc. around the 
unchanging hard core. What happens to effect the (rare) change from one research 
programme to another is that scientists find that an existing programme does not 
propose new problems and it solves existing problems only in an ad hoc fashion. 
Scientists then abandon the older programme for one that proposes new problems 
and solves existing ones without resorting to ad hoc methods.
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But here too, the question of why scientists choose one programme over 
another is not satisfactorily solved, at least not according to the standards of 
objectivity and rationality set by the standard methodologists themselves. It boils 
down to a whim, the way scientists decide that a given research programme is no 
longer coming up with new problems and solving old ones. The criteria are not clear 
on how much time is allowed before the decision is made, for some problems may 
take longer to solve than others, but they could still get solved within the same 
research programme.
In response to this problem and in view of foregoing failed attempts to 
propose a workable methodology of science, Dadaism is suggested according to 
which anything goes -  there is no methodology for science. In other words, science 
progresses precisely by not having a clearly outlined methodology. What the 
scientist is interested in is to arrive at the truth about the world, regardless of the 
method she uses. This latter too falls short of giving a useful account of how we 
know in science, for it blurs the distinction between, for example, science and 
magic. Anything goes, according to Dadaism.
There could be an element of the truth about scientific knowledge in most of 
the methodologies proposed. I argue that each of them does not stand to criticism 
because each is based on a partial epistemology that emphasizes ‘knowledge-that’ at 
the expense of other forms of knowledge on the one hand, as well as elevating 
objectivism to unsustainable levels on the other hand. On the matter of objectivism, 
H. Prosch roughly summarizes the objectivist position in methodologies of science 
thus:
“Scientific objectivism, in its most simple and straightforward sense, holds (1) 
that there are objective states of affairs, that is, that something is the case
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‘independently of our minds,’ which it is our business to come to know; and (2) 
that the method of careful and accurate observation of immediately given sense 
data, without reference to our personal participation, our wishes, wants, values, 
hopes, fears, or expectations, is of the utmost importance; and (3) that the final 
arbiter of scientific theory is a crucial experiment with all factors carefully 
controlled, an experiment that can subject our theory to an acid test because it 
results in the observations or lack of observation of sense data predicted on the 
basis of the theory.” (Prosch, 1986, p. 29)
A more detailed treatment of the accounts of the methodologies outlined 
above would show that they share some or all of these elements given by Prosch. 
Now the same objectivists many of whom form the protagonists of the standard 
methodologies hinted upon above would admit that in fact science does not follow 
these steps exactly. But at the same time they would find a way of insisting that 
logic had to remain logic and any so-called scientific activity that strayed from this 
norm had to be explained outside the philosophy of science -  in another branch of 
enquiry (e.g. psychology). Thus objectivity, even if it were not exactly followed in 
the actual practice of science, has to be pursued as an ideal (Musgrave, 1968), hence 
the description they have earned themselves of being objectivists.
Overall, a way forward towards giving a fuller account of scientific 
knowledge could be found in paying closer attention to actual scientific practice 
considered more globally than from an objectivist perspective. Some of the 
methodologies proposed give a more or less coherent story, but they lack an account 
of what scientists do and so they end up being aprioristic in approach. Some have 
addressed the matter of the fallibility of scientific knowledge and instead consigned 
this ideal of objectivity to a ‘third realm’. Briefly, this is a realm proposed by Frege 
and which is revived by the critical rationalists, but which comes with a problem of 
describing the metaphysical nature of this realm and our relation to it.
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0.2.2 Heuristics omitted
Standard methodologies have been concerned about letting the psychology of
discovery into accounts of how science functions. Part of this concern is founded, in 
the sense that by making psychological elements (e.g. personal tendencies or even 
personal value systems) a part of the methodology of science, it becomes difficult to 
weed out idiosyncrasies and the claims of charlatans from good science. Further, a 
well formalized logic of scientific discovery, construed in an objectivist approach 
could hardly account for such personal elements. And yet, judging from foregoing 
attempts in standard methodologies, what we are left with when we leave out all that 
these methodologies labelled ‘psychological elements’ is hardly satisfactory either.
Perhaps then a decision has to be made to include forms of criteria of the 
acceptability of knowledge claims that are not exactly formal or formalisable. It 
does not mean that existing logics of scientific discovery have to be entirely 
abandoned. There is a place for an enthymeme in logic. When other forms of 
criteria are allowed into the existing logics, then we could have a more complete 
picture, one that helps us get rid of the weaknesses of many standard epistemologies. 
And so the current formalizations could be rescued if they are considered 
enthymematic in character. And yet there would still be a problem with the ideal of 
formalization.
Even given the possibility that all the unformalised parts of the logical 
syllogism that accounts for scientific discovery were to be included in some 
syllogism, there would still be a problem namely that there is a discrepancy in 
conceiving of a deductive logic of discovery. If this were possible, then there would 
be no real discovery to speak of. Putative new knowledge would simply be a
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deducible (not discoverable) from the premises. And so I would argue for caution in 
taking a thoroughly logical-deductive approach.
0.3 Conclusion and a summary of what is to come
Alvin Goldman has claimed that the role of epistemology is to elucidate what
he calls our ‘epistemic folkways’. (Goldman, 1993) The wisdom in this approach is 
that it helps us avoid the trap of apriorism. It may not be fruitful to approach areas 
of knowledge (e.g. science) with an already made standard of objective knowledge 
against which we measure the given areas of knowledge. Rather, we may have to 
proceed inductively from epistemic activities (actual beliefs, specific knowledge, 
etc.) towards an understanding of epistemic concepts. I propose that we look first 
and as accurately as possible at an area of knowledge that has registered some 
success and from the way that area of knowledge functions we can say something 
more general about knowledge.
In the beginning this approach would be descriptive in presenting an accurate 
account of how we come to scientific knowledge, for example. But there could be a 
valid objection to the effect that a philosophical treatment of knowledge should not 
be tied to the merely descriptive. It cannot be imprisoned by the actual causal 
structure of the world. Philosophers ought to be able to propound a theory according 
to which knowledge ought to function -  a prescriptive theory. (Komblith, 1999, p. 
338) Even then, the prescriptive enterprise of philosophy would be meaningless if it 
went against the basic causal structure of the world. Certainly, reference to that 
causal structure in order to remedy the excesses of a mainly prescriptive approach is 
in order. In my approach, I explore the descriptive approach in order to come closer 
to a more exact and more useful understanding both of scientific knowledge and of
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knowledge as a whole. In this latter sense, my approach is prescriptive. In other 
words, I narrow the gap between the descriptive and the prescriptive. Thus far, I 
would suggest that we situate ourselves primarily in the descriptive approach of 
science in the hope of emerging with a normative view that corrects traditional 
methodologies as well as propose a wider view to correct areas of traditional 
epistemology.8
The usual focus of the philosophy of science is to present a 
normative/methodological, or historical/descriptive account of the workings of 
science. I claim that mainline accounts have ended up with an unrepresentative 
account. The portrait of science in many of the mainline accounts is either 
incomplete, or false. As a result, general philosophy itself misses the opportunity of 
learning from science. I attempt to turn that situation in the philosophy of science 
around and suggest that philosophy take a lesson from actual science. If science has 
succeeded very well in solving the problems it sets itself, it is not so much because 
of the special or objectivistic nature of scientific knowledge as because science has 
taken seriously and systematically our way of knowing -  skilfully -  has paid 
attention to skilful knowledge.
Basing myself on Michael Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge, I investigate 
the question: How or why do scientists hold on to knowledge that they know could 
later be changed or discarded? I come to the conclusion that scientists hold on to 
such knowledge based on tacit knowledge. In other words, to know in science is a 
skilful act. My investigation further shows that scientific knowing is continuous
8 Alvin Goldman claims that epistemology needs the features and findings of cognitive science. The 
product is what he calls scientific epistemology. Within cognitive science, he distinguishes between 
descriptive and normative scientific epistemology. (Goldman, 1993, pp. 272-273) I do not go into the 
analysis of his delimitations here, but I can already point out that the descriptive and normative 
branches of epistemology are not mutually exclusive.
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with other kinds of knowing in the sense that all knowing is based on skill. There is 
a pervasive tacit element in all knowing, and not just in scientific knowing. And so I 
suggest that the lesson that philosophy can draw from engaging with science in the 
philosophy of science is a revision of our understanding of knowledge in order to 
include the key aspect of skilful knowing. It is part of knowledge to appraise a 
problem that can be solved. And a problem which ends up solved attests to the skill 
of the appraiser. The appraiser has a skill in bridging the logical gap between the 
problem and the solution. This account of knowledge includes heuristics and 
originality.
Accordingly, this work situates itself neither entirely in the methodology of 
science, nor totally in the description of science. The theory of tacit knowledge as 
propounded by Michael Polanyi bridges die gap between the two areas. It corrects 
and fills in the lapses of both the methodological and the descriptive approach to the 
philosophy of science. Polanyi has diagnosed that the most important error of 
mainline methodological and descriptive accounts of science is the undue emphasis 
they place on objectivity understood as impersonal detachedness in scientific 
processes. I treat that as objectivism. And so the theory of tacit knowledge helps rid 
accounts of the workings of science, of objectivism. Now, to argue for the theory of 
tacit knowledge is not to introduce an obscure term that explains everything, itself 
remaining inexplicable. It is not a primitive term. While the work to explicate it is 
nascent, the argument for it is persuasive.
Mainline definitions of and approaches to knowledge have their limited 
success or strength in as far as they designate ‘knowledge that’. But scientific 
knowledge goes beyond the mere statement of ‘the facts’ to include the way the facts 
have been arrived at and to include even the controversies, discrepancies,
26
peculiarities, revolutions, etc. through which or by which the facts are arrived at. 
My argument, by which I have arrived at the above positions is spread over seven 
chapters grouped under four parts. In Part One, Chapter Zero, I set the stage upon 
which major epistemological questions are expressed and the urgent need for them 
to be answered is emphasized. I point out in this part and chapter that mainline 
epistemologies are incomplete. On the one hand, as a consequence, the age-old 
problem of skepticism is left unanswered. On the other hand, a false objectivism 
that goes hand in hand with such skepticism is promoted. Even more significant and 
specific for an account of the workings of science, heuristics are not philosophically 
accounted for.
In Part Two, I discursively elaborate the theory of tacit knowledge. In 
Chapter One, I present the theory of tacit knowledge as providing grounds for the 
epistemology of skill, a notion, I argue, that mainline epistemologies have 
overlooked. Relying on some experiments in animal psychology (e.g. Polanyi’s 
accounts of the way animals learn new tricks and which ways are similar to human 
learning processes), I set out to expand the notion of knowledge beyond human 
knowledge in order to show the tacit foundations of all knowledge, including 
articulate or formal knowledge. There is continuity between such animal knowledge 
of the most rudimentary type to the most formal human knowledge because of the 
persistent tacit roots of knowledge.
And thus any history of human formal knowledge that would overlook these 
tacit foundations would end up being merely anecdotal and erratic. Polanyi has 
borrowed from Gestalt theory in order to propose an active theory of perception. It 
is an organizational process. Data on the senses is organized to make sense of the 
animal’s surroundings. More skilful animals are rewarded with more understanding
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of the surroundings. There is an interest in surviving within those surroundings. 
The organization is a tacit process. It engages the individual animal and collectively 
it could have benefits on the species. It is useful in showing the constant reliance of 
articulate or formal knowledge on tacit or inarticulate foundations, itself being 
knowledge, to fill in gaps and make perceptions meaningful to the perceiver both 
human and non-human.
In Chapter Two, I discuss Polanyi’s example of how tacit knowledge 
functions. The way tacit knowledge functions, is such that it underlies skill, setting 
the standards of skilful practice and approving the results of the skill. To make an 
affirmation, e.g. a knowledge affirmation, is to appraise the act of affirming. There 
is a personal element as opposed to an objectivistic, impersonal or detached 
approach to making knowledge assertions or scientific assertions. Using the 
example of how we learn language (including our mother tongues and symbols e.g. 
in mathematical language) and eventually learn to use such language expertly. 
Language is such that to use it skilfully, there must be room for re-applicability of 
words in comparable situations. And this points to the discretion or judgment of the 
user. This works within the constraints of a fixed grammar upon which we agree. 
There is a gradual differentiation of the articulate from the inarticulate.
This differentiation necessarily remains incomplete in the end. But in 
language, the skilful user must know how to cooperate with the operational 
principles even at the risk of error. This is when language can open the skilful user 
to unforeseen knowledge. Examples are the speculations with initially vague terms 
in mathematics, like the irrational numbers, or negative numbers, etc. The skilful 
user of the language cooperates with the operational principles but there remains a 
risk of utter nonsense or sophistry. Judgment (i.e. personal and tacit) then comes to
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play a key role in deciding on how to adapt and what to adopt or discard. Thus far, I 
argue in line with Polanyi’s position, the highest level of articulation or 
formalization is never completely detached from its inarticulate, tacit or informal 
foundations.
This discursive investigation leads me to conclude in this chapter that there 
is a need to look again at the mainline understanding of epistemological terms like 
objectivity, rationality, truth and the inclusion of role of the knower in the activity of 
knowledge in an account of knowledge. The resulting understanding of knowledge 
would include heuristics. The role that tacit knowledge plays is the recognition of 
beauty and elegance. A further and more sociological but no less relevant role that 
tacit knowledge plays is to help in the organization of science. The scientific 
community is a community built around tacit knowledge within a given area of 
science. When a discovery is made, or an innovation arrived at, heuristic passion is 
useful in helping bring others on board.
Such heuristic passion is accounted for in the theory of tacit knowledge. 
Thus far, in science, ‘knowing that’ (i.e. propositional knowledge) and ‘know how’ 
(i.e. skilful knowledge) come very close to each other but without being logically 
reducible to each other. The way a scientific fact is established (through 
controversy, etc.) is crucial for it to be recognized as a fact or not. Scientific 
standards are set by scientists, and then they are vindicated or discarded in time, 
again by the scientists.
Part Three is made of three chapters: Chapters Three to Five. The part is a 
discursive examination of the reception that Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge has 
received in the philosophy of science. Some of the reception has been positive. I
29
discuss an example of such positive reception by looking at Tchafu Mwamba’s 
position on the theory. I argue to tighten loose ends and to correct positions of 
Mwamba that make the theory of tacit knowledge vulnerable to attack within 
analytic philosophy. In Chapter Four, I answer to the criticisms that Alan Musgrave 
makes towards the theory of tacit knowledge. I maintain that Musgrave represents a 
big section of the critical rationalists. He raises the objection of psychologism in the 
theory of tacit knowledge. I argue that the roots of such an accusation are in false 
objectivism. And so the critical rationalists as a whole are averse to any 
psychological explanation of the activity of science.
I argue that the aversion is misconstrued, and when in the end Musgrave 
realizes the weaknesses offset by the aversion, he only makes an inadequate 
admission of the weakness of his position. Chapter Five is an examination of the 
theory of the methodology of scientific research programmes as propounded by 
Lakatos and Zahar. This is the last sustained effort in methodology of this kind that 
was dominated by discussions on Popperian, Kuhnian Lakatosian and Feyerabendian 
methodologies. I argue that the theory of tacit knowledge supersedes even the 
Lakatosian/Zaharian approach.
These latter are still preoccupied by demarcation and they have an aversion 
towards a form of psychologism. Their account of the driving force in the progress 
of science remains objectivist and it further suggests to historians of science to re­
write the history of science in order to point out novel facts. Such novel facts would 
account for the phenomenon of discovery and scientific revolution where there is 
revolution. I argue that the weaknesses of the Lakatosian/Zaharian approach lie 
precisely in an unfounded aversion to the psychological and an overemphasis of 
objectivity/rationality understood as a deductive system. The Lakatosian/Zaharian
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approach does not succeed in holding both deductivism and accounting for creativity 
in science. The theory of tacit knowledge fills in the gaps left by their approach 
because it accommodates psychological elements.
Critical rationalism of the Lakatosian brand proposes a rational 
reconstruction of history. What the theory of tacit knowledge proposes is a rational 
reconstruction of methodology and the historical description of science. The 
reconstruction is based in the actual practice of science rather than on aprioristic 
principles of rationality. The role played by the scientist as a rational agent is 
restored. The skilled judgment of the scientist is showed as built into the rationality 
of science. And so the reconstruction that the theory of tacit knowledge suggests 
frees up space within methodology in the way that creativity, heuristics, and the 
indeterminate nature of science can now consistently be seen as part of scientific 
knowledge. Because knowing in science is a skill, more is known about science as 
science is actually done. And thus an attempt to draw general conclusions about 
how science works based on hitherto successful science is bound to be partial and 
even misrepresentative. An investigation of how science works that is willing to 
take seriously the role of tacit knowledge points towards a new epistemology -  an 
epistemology of skill.
In Part Four, Chapter Six, I make an evaluation of the theory of tacit 
knowledge, outlining its true virtues both for the philosophy of science and for 
epistemology in general. I argue that the theory of tacit knowledge does more 
justice to actual scientific practice for it is not aprioristic and it makes room for the 
indeterminate nature of scientific knowledge. I argue further that a study of the 
theory will open up more fertile fields for both methodology and epistemology of 
science and for epistemology in general. It is in this latter area that the theory of
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tacit knowledge could pave a new way to try and answer the age-old question of 
skepticism.
In order to better take on this task of opening up new possibilities for 
methodology and epistemology, the theory of tacit knowledge would have to work 
further on precision and definition of terms. Further, interconnections and 
relationships need to be studied between the theory and mainline analytic 
philosophy. Added to this, there could be an objection to the theory of tacit 
knowledge to the effect that it ushers in an autobiographical turn in methodology, 
i.e. too much is conceded to personal talent and the personal account of the 
individual scientist.
But this objection would be akin to the accusation of psychologism treated 
above. While it is true that the theory of tacit knowledge is the closest we come to 
an autobiographical turn in the methodology of science, the theory does not impose 
autobiographical limits on methodology. Instead, it is wider than autobiography in 
the sense that it suggests an element that is general or can be generalized about 
scientific autobiography. The scientist is restored as an important agent in the 
activity of science is restored to her position. She is active in making judgments and 
drawing up sketches about reality that remain open to further investigation, 
adaptation or outright discarding. Further, neither should the theory of tacit 
knowledge be understood as opposed to or replacing logical approaches. These too 
have a role to play. The theory of tacit knowledge fills in the gaps. The case for 
tacit knowledge as it stands so far is persuasive in the main, and that is a good 
starting point.
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Part Two: Elaboration of the theory of tacit knowledge
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Chapter One: Tacit knowledge -  towards an epistemology of 
skill 
1.0 Introduction
The debate on the definitions and analysis of the philosophical concept of
knowledge has slowed down before a conclusive argument for any of the contending 
positions has been reached. The literature shows that most of this debate raged 
around knowledge understood as justified true belief and Gettier’s counterexamples 
to this position. Standard definitions of ‘knowledge’ (e.g. knowledge as justified 
true belief, or a causal theory of knowledge, or even the reliabilist theory of 
knowledge) are not useful for understanding how we know in science because they 
only give a partial account of knowledge (i.e. propositional knowledge) leaving out a 
key element of how we know (i.e. tacit or implicit knowledge). Putting back tacit 
knowledge in the picture will go a long way in providing a more robust theory of 
how we know in science in that this more robust theory will eliminate the difficulties 
in standard methodologies.
1.1 Towards a more accurate theory of knowledge in science
1.1.1 Knowledge as justified true belief and Gettier's intervention
Edmund Gettier intervenes to show that the conditions that must hold for it to
be said of someone that he or she knows are neither sufficient nor necessary. Before 
Edmund Gettier’s counterexamples, the traditional theory of knowledge held that S 
knows that p  if and only if
(i) p  is true,
(ii) S believes that p, and
(iii)iS1 is justified in believing that p
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In this tradition, Ayer holds in conclusion to his discussion on the theory of 
knowledge that “the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing that something 
is the case are first that what one is said to know be true, secondly that one be sure of 
it, and thirdly that one should have the right to be sure.” (Ayer, 1956, p. 35) And in 
the same way, Chisholm, as quoted by Gettier (1963, p. 121) holds that S knows that 
p if and only if
(i) S accepts p,
(ii) S has adequate evidence for p, and
(iii)/? is true.
Without going into the details of Gettier’s intervention here, Gettier sets 
about to show that the conditions stated are not sufficient for the truth of the 
proposition: S  knows that p. And it is in response to Gettier’s objection that the 
causal theory of knowledge is propounded, and after this, the reliabilist theory of 
knowledge. Now, there could be two ways of interpreting Gettier’s critique of the 
definition of knowledge that was current at his time.
One way of interpreting this critique is the exclusivist approach in which 
Gettier can be understood as trying to exclude certain epistemic states from 
knowledge. In this approach, he is looking for a strict interpretation of knowledge. 
Most of the known responses to his critique that followed immediately on his 
critique (e.g. Goldman, 1993) may be understood to try to re-define knowledge in a 
strict sense so as to exclude epistemic states that may pose as knowledge. The other 
less usual interpretation of Gettier’s intervention could be that he is looking to widen 
the understanding of knowledge in such a way as to include a few more epistemic 
states in the realm of knowledge.
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Whichever of the two ways we may choose to interpret Gettier’s 
intervention, what is of value is that he made it possible to take a fresh look at our 
definition(s) of knowledge. Such a fresh look may help us expand our definition of 
knowledge to kinds of knowledge that are not propositional.
1.1.2 A causal theory of knowing
As a response to Gettier’s counterexamples, a causal theory of knowledge is
propounded according to which the justification of knowledge could be traced along 
a causal chain linking the proposition that is known to the knower. But as long as 
the causal theory of knowledge insists on a reconstruction of the causal chain that 
leads to some knowledge, the theory is too strong in the sense that should the 
knower falter in the reconstruction and seem to merely guess the elements of the 
causal chain, there is no knowledge. (Goldman A. , 1967, p. 363) Here I suppose 
that the knower needs to be able to retrace the causal chain of her knowledge, 
otherwise we would have cases in which people would not know that they knew, a 
case that Gettier brings up in one of his counterexamples.
But not all the links in the causal chain may be specifiable, just as not all 
knowledge is articulable. As an example, a scientist may discover a solution to a 
problem that has been nudging her for some significant amount of time. She may be 
able to declare at the moment of discovery that she knows the solution to the 
problem and yet not be able to justify the stages in her coming to this knowledge. 
With time, she may be able to ‘reconstruct’ a way in which such knowledge may in 
general be arrived at, and from then on, the causal chain is articulable. But this does 
not mean that knowledge only begins to exist at the moment when the articulation of 
the causal chain is made. It was no less knowledge at the moment of discovery.
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Let us grant for the sake of argument that the knower sets out to give a causal 
chain for her knowledge. A further problem would still remain: How exhaustively 
does the knower go about outlining the links in the chain? Can the knower account 
for all the relevant causal elements? Probably aware of this problem, Goldman lays 
out his analysis thus:
“S knows that p  if and only if
the fact that p is causally connected in an ‘appropriate’ way with S ’s believing 
P-
“Appropriate,” knowledge-producing causal processes include the following:
(1) perception
(2) memory
(3) a causal chain, exemplifying either Pattern 1 or 2, which is 
correctly reconstructed by inferences, each of which is warranted (background 
propositions help warrant an inference only if they are true)
(4) combinations of (1), (2), and (3)” (Goldman, 1967, pp.
369-370)
In these terms, the explication of Goldman’s theory of knowledge is weaker 
and more inclusive of kinds of knowledge that may at the moment be inarticulate or 
inarticulable. He points out here that this rendering of the theory leaves room for 
cases of knowledge in which the knower cannot state the justification of her belief. 
The problem with the latter rendering, however, is that it becomes too weak. 
‘Appropriate’ knowledge is explicated by being a result of memory or perception or 
combinations of the two. It becomes difficult to isolate what claim to knowledge 
gets left out in such a rendering.
Let us imagine I dream of a unicorn standing in my neighbour’s garden. 
Does that mean that I have knowledge of the unicorn? At least the idea of the 
unicom is a result of a combination of memories of various perceptions. It is not a
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totally original idea in its parts. In this case of the unicorn, the conditions that 
Goldman sets out for ‘appropriate’ knowledge seem to be fulfilled, and yet I cannot 
in my wakeful state claim that I have knowledge of a unicorn. In other words, 
Goldman’s rendering of a causal theory of knowledge does not go far enough in 
explicating what knowledge is.
Goldman is aware that his theory with the clause of ‘appropriate’ causal 
processes opens up to ‘some presently controversial causal processes that we may 
later deem ‘appropriate’ and therefore knowledge-producing”. (Goldman, 1967, p. 
371) He cites extrasensory perception as an example. But perhaps the investigation 
of knowledge does not have to be carried so far to such exotic forms that would be 
difficult to defend philosophically. An example that would be less problematic to 
defend philosophically, yet one which brings out the same point would be one of 
young mathematical prodigies who may habitually arrive at solutions to difficult 
mathematical problems without thereby being able to articulate the methods by 
which they arrive at the solutions.
One cannot claim that those children are ignorant of the solution.9 I believe a 
more committed enquiry into how we know, grounded in specific areas of 
knowledge (e.g. scientific knowledge) could help us to learn more about knowledge 
without having to open up to classifying extrasensory perception as an appropriate 
causal link in how we come to know. An adequate theory of knowledge should 
allow for the case where (for example) a body of expert scientists, basing on their 
long experience in choosing between competing theories, and backed by their track 
record o f successes, are able to pick out a promising or fruitful theory in a short time 
or to back a research project that ‘seems’ more feasible among many that are being
9D. S. Mannison cites this example as well. (1976, p. 145)
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proposed. The very same scientists may not be able to justify their knowledge rather 
than insist that they know it from experience, which statement in turn they may not 
be able to explicate. Other scientists may believe in the positions taken by the expert 
scientists, basing their belief on the foregoing successes of the expert scientists.
There are examples in the history of science to back this position. And so 
looking both at experience and successes, the scientists and those around them could 
claim that they have knowledge in a given area even when the experts cannot 
exhaustively justify how they have come to such knowledge. On a similar point, 
Mannison argues: “If [ones] knowing how to & is in that in which [one] knows that 
p, it is not necessary for [one] to know that [one] knows how to & for it to be true 
that he knows that p.” (Mannison, 1976, p. 146) And still all that is not to deny that 
there is a causal explanation. Perhaps someday the scientific experts themselves, or 
others steeped in the methodology of science, can come up with a causal 
explanation. The point is that such an articulated causal explanation is not necessary 
for the scientist to be able to claim knowledge.
And so, in order to avoid cases of knowledge like the unicorn above, it is 
necessary to look more closely at how we make knowledge claims. It is necessary to 
clarify that not all our knowledge is articulable all the time, and that this is not a 
weakness. Perception is a conscious effort in which the mind makes sense of what is 
perceived, sometimes (unconsciously) filling in the gaps from background 
knowledge. This opens knowledge to so many hazards, but without it the mind 
would hardly ever be able to come to any knowledge. The sense data would only be 
patches and noises and sensations patched together with no meaning at all.
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1.1.2 Reliabilist theory of knowledge
Another line of response to Gettier’s counterexamples is the reliabilist theory
of knowledge or reliabilism. Reliabilism attempts to show that the beliefs in Gettier 
examples are actually not knowledge. (Nozick, 1981) It picks up from the causal 
theory of knowledge and is an improvement thereof. Nozick, for example, finds that 
the causal theory of knowledge is an ‘inhospitable environment’ for mathematical 
and ethical knowledge. Further, it does clarify the kinds of causal connections it is 
dealing with. The example he uses is one in which a person floating in a tank has 
his brain manipulated to make him believe he is floating in a tank. That person 
would not be in a position to know the cause of her belief even though it is essential 
to the causal chain that forms her knowledge. (Nozick, 1981, p. 172)
And so, Nozick and others propound a reliabilist theory of knowledge. As 
defined by Hilary Komblith, Reliabilism “... is the view that knowledge is reliably 
produced true belief, and thus that justified belief is reliably produced belief. ... A 
belief-producing process is reliable just in case it tends to produce true beliefs in 
actual situations as well as in counterfactual situations that are relevant alternatives 
to the actual situation. A belief is justified just in case the process responsible for its 
presence is reliable.” (Komblith, 1980, p. 609)
In this light, Nozick’s rendering of reliabilism is a truth tracking account. 
According to Nozick, “To know is to have a belief that tracks the truth. Knowledge 
is a particular way of being connected to the world, having a specific real factual 
connection to the world: tracking it.” (Nozick, 1981, p. 178) Reliabilism seems to 
be most compatible to how we know in science, looking at the way scientific facts 
are generated, published and established, at least in an objectivist approach. Before 
the facts are established, it is important to be able to clarify how the claims to the
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truth were established. In addition to this, there is a community of scientists who 
approve of the methods used and whose duty it is to welcome new scientific 
knowledge. But that is in as far as scientific knowledge is concerned.
The claims of reliabilism go beyond mere scientific knowledge. They 
purport to say something about knowledge in general. And so an enduring weakness 
of reliabilism is to specify who sets the standards of reliability. There are several 
possibilities including a community or even some objective standards against which 
reliability can be measured. And still, at the end of all this process, reliabilism does 
not offer a sure antidote to scepticism. The objection that Nozick makes against the 
causal theory of knowledge, in which he uses a version of the Cartesian evil demon, 
can also be applied to reliabilism.
It is possible (for example) that both the person claiming to know and the 
community that checks the reliability of the claims to knowledge, are under the spell 
or control of the Cartesian evil demon. In this case, where there is systematic reason 
why checking has no connection with improving knowledge claims, neither the 
person nor the community would ever have good grounds for believing the person is 
tracking, so the idea of tracking becomes otiose. A final and even more important 
weakness with the reliabilist theory of knowledge is that it too (like foregoing 
theories) addresses propositional knowledge.
Yet knowledge is not limited to what is phrased in absolutely certain 
propositions. (Carrier, 1974, p. 148) The reliabilist theory of knowledge does not 
take into consideration the knowledge of skills. How would we track the truth of the 
knowledge of skills? A viable theory of knowledge should be able to include all that 
is called knowledge. As long as such a theory has not yet been established, it
41
remains misleading to base a methodology of science (e.g.) on it. I find that in the 
tradition of propounding a theory of knowledge in response to Gettier’s 
counterexamples, Keith Lehrer has made the most interesting (because most 
sophisticated) proposal for my purposes.
1.1.4 Lehrer's sophisticated response to Gettier
Keith Lehrer’s is a sophisticated response to Gettier’s counterexamples. He
holds that a viable theory of knowledge would be such that:
S  knows that p  if and only if:
(i) p  is true,
(ii) S believes /7,
(iii)S is completely justified in believing p, and
(iv)If S is completely justified in believing any false statement h 
which entails (but is not entailed by) p, then S  would be completely 
justified in believing p  even if S were to suppose that h is false. (Lehrer, 
1965)
Lehrer’s analysis of knowledge brings out the fact that we do not have to 
believe what we suppose to be true. Further, our suppositions do not have to be 
treated as evidence for what we believe in. And yet those suppositions we do not 
believe can still serve to prevent us from appealing to evidence that we have in 
justifying our beliefs. (Lehrer, 1965, p. 175) In other words, we can be said to 
know, even if we are working on suppositions when we arrive at that knowledge 
provided our suppositions are fully justified.
The reason I find this rendering of a theory of knowledge interesting is that it 
seems to lay the grounds for a fallibilist approach to knowledge which is in some 
aspects applicable to scientific knowledge.
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Now, it is true that Lehrer is specifically trying to answer to specific 
objections raised by Gettier. But it is still valid to point out that some problems 
persist even with Lehrer’s analysis of knowledge when we try to apply it to areas of 
knowledge e.g. science. First of all, it still remains to be specified what is meant by 
‘truth’ in science. The history of science is riddled with examples of notions that 
were once considered to be true and were later given up (or improved upon) as either 
false (or only partially true). And so the very first condition given by standard 
analyses of knowledge and repeated by Lehrer (i.e. ‘p  is true’) needs to be further 
explicated. A second problem is linked to the notion of belief that is central to this 
and similar analyses.
The second condition of the analysis is: S believes p. A closer look will 
reveal that the kind of knowledge that is dependent on belief is only prepositional 
knowledge. But, as I have already urged, knowledge can be dissociated from 
belief.10 Inexplicable knowledge, e.g. knowledge of skills, does not require belief as 
would prepositional knowledge. And so it is clear that this and similar analyses are 
geared towards understanding only one section of knowledge -  prepositional 
knowledge. Little in these analyses would help us understand the knowledge of 
skills which forms part of scientific knowledge.
In relation to scientific knowledge, such analyses are then only partially 
useful, for scientific knowledge is broader than the knowledge of scientific 
propositions. A third problem with this and similar analyses is that they are 
retrospective. They address knowledge after or according to the fact of knowledge,
10 D. S. Mannison argues for the same point. (1976, p. 140) J. J. Macintosh too picks a cue from the 
fact that we never ask ‘why one knows’ but rather ‘how one knows’ and ‘why one believes’ rather 
than ‘how one believes’. On second thought, this is valid across many languages. He hopes to use 
this distinction (among others) to dissociate belief from knowledge. (1979-80, pp. 175-176)
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i.e. when some subject has been said to know.11 This is not of itself a problem until 
the analyses are applied to scientific knowledge in the effort to come to a 
methodology or epistemology of science. In retrospect, methodologists of science 
can afford to pick and choose among the theories of science that have endured (i.e. 
successful science) and use these to propose a methodology of science. In other 
words, Lehrer’s and the standard analysis of knowledge can be prefaced with the 
phrase: “When it is said of a subject S  that she knows p . .”
In a context of scientific knowledge, a retrospective analysis of this kind is 
often not fully descriptive. Informed by such an approach to knowledge, resulting 
methodologies can afford to place an emphasis on the normative aspect of 
methodology at the expense of a full description of how science works. 
Methodology has thus often ended up with well argued accounts that fail to 
represent the full picture of how science works. Examples of such methodologies 
are verificationism, falsificationism, and methodological scientific research 
programmes.
1.1.5 The possibility of knowledge in non-human animals - a 
broader perspective
Hilary Komblith suggests that epistemology should not be limited to our
(human) concept of knowledge but should be widened to investigate the concept of 
knowledge itself whether human or animal. He suggests that it should be 
investigated in much the same way as we investigate other natural phenomena. He 
goes on to suggest that knowledge is a ‘natural kind’. I do not go into the 
implications of treating knowledge as a natural kind. Nevertheless, I agree with
11 Richard Robinson claims that knowledge is a state and not an act, event, a kind of thinking, 
process, capacity nor disposition. Without going into the discussion of the various consequences of  
considering knowledge as any of the other attributes, we shall for now adopt Robinson’s view.
(1971, pp. 17-18)
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Komblith as long as this widening of the concept of knowledge may lead to a better 
understanding of the narrower concept of human knowledge. In other words, 
understanding how animals know may enlighten the understanding of how humans 
in particular know. But at the same time, Komblith may be motivated by an 
objectivist view of science in this proposition to view knowledge as a natural kind. 
If the latter is true, then Komblith’s approach leads to an objectivist understanding 
of knowledge similar to the standard one. As I argue in this entire research, science 
should not be held up in such objectivist light as to overshadow the tacit, implicit or 
skilful element of scientific knowledge.
Nevertheless, the rest of Komblith’s argument is useful for my purposes of 
dislodging the objectivist approach to knowledge. He points out that many others 
including philosophers and cognitive ethologists have attributed intentional states 
and beliefs to non-human animals. He takes the extra step from attributing beliefs to 
attributing knowledge to non-human animals, encouraged by the effortless use of the 
word ‘knowledge’ by cognitive ethologists, who are more rigorous in using the word 
‘belief of the same animals. (Komblith, 1999, p. 329) As an illustration to 
Komblith’s argument for attributing knowledge to animals, of animals tending 
towards knowledge, Komblith cites the work of Louis Herman and Palmer Morrel- 
Samuels as they address the issue of knowledge attribution to animals directly. 
According to him:
“Receptive competencies support knowledge acquisition, the basic building 
block of an intelligent system. In turn, knowledge and knowledge-acquiring 
abilities contribute vitally to the success of the individual in its natural world, 
especially if that world is socially and ecologically complex, as is the case for 
the bottle-nosed dolphin ... Among the basic knowledge requisites for the adult 
dolphin are the geographic characteristics and physiographic characteristics of
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its home range; the relationships among these physical features and seasonal 
migratory pathways; the biota present in the environment and their relevance as 
prey, predator, or neutral target; the identification and integration of 
information received by its various senses, including that between an 
ensonified target and its visual representation; strategies for foraging and prey 
capture, both individually and in social units; the affiliative and hierarchical 
relationships among members of its herd; identification of individual herd 
members by their unique vocalization and appearance; and the interpretation of 
particular behaviours of herd members ... This is undoubtedly an incomplete 
listing and is in part hypothetical, but is illustrative of the breadth and diversity 
of the knowledge base necessary to support the daily life of the individual 
dolphin. Similar analyses could be made of knowledge requirements of apes or 
other animal species, but the underlying message is the same: extensive 
knowledge of the world may be required for effective functioning in that world 
and much of the requisite knowledge is gained through the exercise of receptive 
skills.” (Komblith, 1999, p. 330)
And so knowledge acquisition is attributed to these animals on the grounds 
that the animals cannot survive merely by receiving information passively, but must 
also have strategies to understand the complex environment. This would point 
towards a sophisticated processing of information that enables the animal species as 
a whole to carry out successful behaviour and in turn result in species fitness. But 
an objection to this apparent suppression of difference between human and animal 
knowledge would be that it is clear that humans are capable of self-reflection while 
other animals do not seem capable of it, even granting that they may be capable of 
beliefs.
The response Komblith gives to this objection is that indeed there is a 
difference, but it is based in the fact that the knowledge of other animals, rather than 
exclude this capacity, does not require it. What matters for the ethologists is that the 
animal has true beliefs that have been (reliably) acquired. On top of that, many 
human beliefs are arrived at unreflectively, and so the difference between humans
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and animals in this aspect loses its significance. The difference that remains is one, 
not of kind, but of degree of sophistication. (Komblith, 1999, pp. 335-336) The 
virtue of Komblith’s position is that it expands knowledge beyond propositional 
knowledge to include kinds of knowledge that may be inarticulate or tacit. Such 
knowledge is acquired in the animal’s effort to cope with its surroundings -  to be fit 
and survive. It is plausible that at the animal level, humans do share these ways of 
acquiring tacit or inarticulate knowledge. Komblith assumes that the reliabilist 
theory of knowledge is true, and as I have pointed out on treating reliabilism, this 
approach seems to concur with the way scientific knowledge is established in not 
being entirely objectivist.
1.2.0 A view of knowledge in science
An objectivist view of knowledge may have contributed to an objectivist
view of science. But scientific knowledge is far from being objectivist. In fact, 
together with the question: What do we know in science, is bound the question: How 
do we know what we know in science? The question of epistemology is linked to 
the question of methodology. On its own, this claim does not rid our view of science 
of an objectivist approach. An objectivist view could still impose itself by insisting 
on objective methods in order to guarantee true scientific knowledge. I propose that 
looking at concrete examples of how scientific knowledge is established will help 
clarify our understanding of scientific knowledge. H. Collins and T. Pinch have 
done some work (1998) in this area which is adequate to help me appraise the point 
that the epistemology of science is bound to the methodology of science in a way 
that is not objectivist.
Using many examples from what they admit is a non-standard and in many 
ways (admittedly) incomplete history of science, sociologists H. Collins and T.
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Pinch point out that controversy in science is interesting and of key importance. 
They break away from the classical misrepresentation of science as marked by 
simplicity, objectivity, repeatability of experiments, and success. More often than 
not, controversy precedes the establishment of scientific knowledge. Published or 
publishable results of experiments come at the end of long and painstaking efforts in 
laboratories.
Few significant experiments are simple and straightforward. In order to 
settle for a given set of results, therefore, statistics are used. And with the 
interpretation of statistics comes the skill of the experimenter. But skilled practice in 
turn tends to be more experimenter-specific, and so different experimenters may 
tend to get different results of a purportedly similar experiment. This sets into 
question the whole emphasis on the repeatability of experiments in some accounts of 
methodology (e.g. verificationism, falsificationism). So-called ‘golden-hands’ that 
make a particular experiment work are more frequent than the case is reportedly 
attested. Collins and Pinch illustrate this with the example of the ‘bioassay’ in 
pharmacology. (Collins & Pinch, 1998, p. 9) Typically, a bioassay is a technique 
that is difficult to transfer from one scientific group to another because it depends to 
a great extent on skill and practice. How then do scientists in a different group to the 
one carrying out a bioassay check the results of a bioassay? They may have to rely 
on the skill of the group that carries out the bioassay. The repeatability of the 
experiment (at least by another or controlling group of scientists) is no longer of 
great importance in this case. But there is a possible objection here to the effect that 
‘skill’ can easily be used as an opaque concept and one that blocks a critical 
approach. In order to dispel the fears of an ad hoc use of ‘skill’ as a primitive 
concept, this concept needs to be explicated at least to some extent.
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Elaborating more on the nature of controversy in science, Collins and Pinch 
point out that unlike a logic of experiments which is clear and simple and even at 
times apparently compelling (cf. attempts by the classical methodologists), 
controversy drags on for long. At the end, what has been proved remains unclear to 
the protagonists. On top of that each experiment demands many trials and a 
statistical analysis. The results are not always definitive. Enduring controversy 
brings with it an increase in the number of so-called ‘important’ variables that could 
affect an experiment. Such variables are termed ‘important’ as experimenters try to 
justify the validity of their experiments. All this is for proponents a further emphasis 
on the need for skill if the experiment is to be repeated successfully. But at the same 
time, the same argument is nothing but an ad hoc effort in the eyes of the critics of 
the results.
To the critics, the proponents can be seen as only masking the unrepeatability 
of their experiments. (Collins & Pinch, 1998, p. 12) In fact in scientific controversy 
or where findings are unorthodox, the weight and number of experimental 
replications is not enough to sway the unbelieving critics. The ensuing sets of 
results can serve to entrench either side of the controversy in its position, believers 
as well as sceptics. And even at times a single counter example from a renowned 
and reputable critic (i.e. skilful and experienced) is enough to ‘disprove’ many 
results of an unorthodox scientist. The scientific community looks beyond the 
methods to the skill involved. In yet different conditions, a controversial question in 
so-called fringe science is given up not because it has been proved fruitless or 
misleading, but simply because researchers are either tired of it or because 
proponent experimenters have lost credibility in another related area of research, or 
even because the question does not interest contemporary imagination.
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1.2.1 Two illustrations of arriving at 'scientific knowledge'
The Michelson-Morley experiment was not designed to test relativity but to
test the speed at which the earth drifted in ether. Yet after the publication of 
Einstein’s papers, the experiment was retrospectively reconstructed as a proof of 
relativity -  to the effect that it showed that the speed of light is the same in all 
directions. The original goal of the Michelson-Morley experiments was carried 
further in spite of the many failures to register a result that showed a difference in 
the speed of light in different directions. Later, the experiments were carried out by 
Morley and Dayton Miller, and in 1925, Miller received the ‘American Association 
for the Advancement of Science’ award for finding that the earth experiences a shift 
in ether at about 10 km per second. This was an experiment carried out by a 
physicist of renown and it was encouraged by Einstein. It disproved the theory of 
relativity. It could have been held out as a crucial experiment. Instead, Miller’s 
results were ignored as a mere anomaly -  the interest of the scientific community 
was in other areas, namely in relativity.
It was in this vein, that Arthur Eddington undertook to take photographs 
during a solar eclipse in 1919 in order to compare his findings with the predictions 
made by Einstein about the deflection of the light from the stars. Two locations 
were set up, and Eddington went to one of them. In the discussions that followed 
Eddington’s findings, it slowly emerged that Einstein’s predictions were confirmed. 
About this process, Collins and Pinch point out that when Einstein derived the 
maximum apparent deflection of light rays, it could have been perceived as 
problematic in the modem understanding of how science works. Those who were 
less gifted than he was at calculating the answer were confused. It turned out then, 
as in many delicate experiments, that the calculations, even though they were hardly
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understood at the time, were only seen as correct after the observations had 
‘verified’ the calculations.
This, for Collins and Pinch, goes to show that the claim that science proceeds 
by having clearly stated predictions which then get falsified or verified is not 
accurate. In fact, theory and measurement go subtly hand in hand. We accord 
validity to our theories in as far as we can make measurements. (Collins & Pinch, 
1998, p. 44) It happens then that one takes a theory and separates from it the 
prediction that is derived from it. When the results of the experiment concur with 
the prediction, not only is the prediction confirmed, but the theory too. Thus 
Eddington’s experimental results confirmed both the prediction and the theory of 
relativity.
Collins and Pinch report further that Eddington’s results were not all of them 
a perfect fit with Einstein’s predictions. Some were even in conflict with each other. 
So Eddington chose which ones to keep as data and which ones to discard. To do 
this, he used Einstein’s prediction. In their turn, Einstein’s predictions were 
accepted because of Eddington’s findings. So, observation and prediction were 
linked in mutual confirmation and were not distinct stages. Collins and Pinch call 
this ‘an agreement to agree’. (Collins & Pinch, 1998, p. 45)
When Eddington performed the experiment, he did not just look through the 
telescope. Rather, he made a whole set of assumptions -  e.g. how to estimate the 
known spurious effects (of changed focal length of the telescope, etc.); how error is 
statistically distributed in the plates, etc. He had to make calculations, 
interpolations, etc. This happens even with clear and sharp images or photographs. 
Eddington ended up with inconclusive results and then a controversy ensued about
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how to interpret the results. To Collins and Pinch, the resolution of the controversy 
in a meeting chaired by Sir Joseph Thomson the then Astronomer Royal on 6 
November 1919 involved recourse to authority. Sir Thomson is reported to have 
claimed: “It is difficult for the audience to weigh fully the meaning of the figures 
that have been put before us, but the Astronomer Royal and Professor Eddington 
have studied the material carefully, and they regard the evidence as decisively in 
favour of the larger value for the displacement”. (Collins & Pinch, 1998, pp. 50-51) 
Now the larger value was nearer to Einstein’s predictions. The observations could 
have justified a Newtonian displacement (lower value) or an Einsteinian 
displacement (almost double that of Newton). Nothing was inevitable about them. 
But Eddington chose those that justified the latter. It was a decision or choice. 
Looking back, the decision or choice seems to have been a correct one. Reducing 
this to ‘authority’ is not helpful for understanding how science works. What is the 
nature of the authority that Sir Thomson points to?
At least two elements are involved here which, I claim, are related. On the 
one hand, the view of a quasi-logical deduction that goes from prediction to a clear 
observational test is not accurate. Instead, theory and experiment are intertwined, 
licensing and being a consequence of each other simultaneously. Observations are 
carried out because of a given theoretical outlook, and the theory is corroborated 
when the observations match the expectations. (Collins & Pinch, 1998, p. 52) There 
is always a choice involved in choosing to see data as providing evidence that backs 
a given theory. On the other hand, the resolution of the controversy is based on a 
choice of whose ‘evidence’ to take as more convincing or persuasive. The 
Astronomer Royal appeals to more than just the authority of Eddington. He appeals 
to a profundity, an elegance or beauty in Eddington’s side of the story. The choice
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made by the Astronomer Royal is a corroboration of the judgment of Eddington as 
this latter makes choices between which data to keep, while conducting the 
experiment as well as in the rhetoric he uses in persuading the scientific society of 
the ‘truth’ of his position. (Collins & Pinch, 1998, p. 97) Crucial experiments and 
an inexorable logic play a very minimal role if any in coming up with what science 
considers today to be an accurate description of the world -  relativity. Both 
elements are related by the activity of choice or judgment.
This last point about judgment is illustrated in another case that Collins and 
Pinch bring forward: the case of the non-detection of gravitational radiation by 
Joseph Weber from 1969 to 1975. Weber claimed to have evidence of big amounts 
of gravitational radiation. This claim sparked off controversy and many experiments 
were conducted to find out whether his claims could be confirmed. The results of 
the counter-experiments carried out to test Weber’s claims were themselves 
inconclusive. And so the central question was: What is the correct outcome?
Collins and Pinch suggest that in fact knowledge of the correct outcome may 
not be helpful in resolving the controversy. In the case of the gravity waves, it is not 
clear whether the correct outcome is the detection or the non-detection of gravity 
waves, for the existence of the waves is itself the issue at stake. They note, 
succinctly: the putative ‘correct outcome’ depends on the actual existence of gravity 
waves that can be detected. In order to establish this latter fact, there is a need for a 
good detector. A good detector in turn depends on whether it establishes the right 
outcome. This process goes on into an infinite regress. What may even complicate 
the matter more is the fact that even so-called ‘standard techniques’ for a given 
experiment might have to be done in a special or highly specific way to achieve 
useful outcomes of the experiment. This reality undermines ‘identical experiment’
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argument i.e. the insistence that experiments must be repeatable in order to ensure 
objective results.
And so there are at least two ways to break the impending experimenter’s 
regress. First, the scientists must have a clue of the quantitative range of the 
outcome. This would then act as a universally accepted experimental quality 
control. Otherwise, another criterion, independent of the outcome of the experiment 
must be sought. This opens the debate to a whole range of strategies, some of them 
more rationally acceptable than others. Most of those evaluating the experimenters 
will judge them on their prior reputation, connectedness with other researchers, 
knowledge therefore, skill, personal dedication to the experiment and the apparatus, 
and qualification to deal with the apparatus and experience.
All the while, the process of deciding who is a good experimenter and what 
is a good experiment, is part and parcel of the whole process of determining the 
correct results of the experiment in question. A good experimenter is one who, 
using a good experiment, can arrive at good results e.g. detect gravity waves when 
they exist, or not detect them if they do not exist. To Collins and Pinch, the way to 
avoid the experimenter’s regress is to view together the scientific and the social 
aspects of the process of establishing scientific facts. (Collins & Pinch, 1998, p. 
101) And so it happens that in the example of gravitational radiation, as in a few 
other cases of controversial science, experimenter’s regress is at times resolved by 
an avalanche of negative reports against a said experimental result. There is a 
‘critical mass’ of such negative reports which ensures that the experimental report is 
stopped.
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In the case of gravity waves, that critical mass or avalanche was triggered by 
Garwin’s clearly negative and outwardly unhesitating report. Garwin had started out 
by not believing in Weber’s report. He went on to express his disbelief very clearly 
and ingenuously in his own report. But generally, scientific controversies focus 
attention on the competence of the protagonists. The questions at stake are 
inextricably bound to the competence of the individuals involved. And as effort is 
made to describe the details of the situation in which a scientific position is taken, 
science comes across as similar to other day to day activities that require skill. 
Controversy brings out the usually hidden processes. In the end, the facts are 
usually inseparable from the skill used to produce them. (Collins & Pinch, 1998, p. 
116) In the end, what imposes a restraint on scientists not to think the ‘unthinkable’ 
is more the scientific culture than Nature itself. We seem to make our science as we 
like to. (Collins & Pinch, 1998, p. 138)
It is apparent that in order to get a fuller understanding of how science 
works, we need to understand both the science that succeeds and the science that 
fails. Some standard methodologies have tended to rely on the science that succeeds 
to make a universal conclusion about how science works. These methodologies do 
acknowledge that the transition from one general scientific position (be it a bold 
conjecture or a paradigm or even a methodological research programme) to the next 
is often turbulent. What the methodologies do not acknowledge is that what actually 
goes on in the details and the dynamics of the turbulent transition is essential to 
understanding what goes on in the science that succeeds and to understanding how 
science works. Such an approach is more helpful than trying to come up with a 
logic of scientific discovery, for example. A more global approach that includes an 
account of the dynamics of controversy shows that science is more about expertise
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than certain knowledge. This more global approach shows why scientific 
knowledge is contestable. For a given position to be adopted as the acceptable 
scientific view, experts have to agree.
1.2.2 The anecdotal nature of histories of science in a 
methodological context
Now, a few contrasting histories of relativity have been written, and this
position by Collins and Pinch is certainly not immune to the criticisms levelled at 
any history of science in a context of the methodology of science. One such 
criticism is that histories like these tend to pick and choose among events in order to 
underline or highlight a given position. In fact Collins and Pinch have dealt with 
criticism i.e. that they misrepresent science, e.g. in the case on the relativity debate. 
And yet Collins and Pinch respond by emphasizing that their work is not a work of 
the history of science in the standard sense of the term. They assert that the only 
claim they have to writing history is in contributing to what they call ‘interpretative 
history of science”, which according to them depicts the complexities with which the 
scientist grapples in her search and establishment of facts, complexities that depict 
the contentious nature of science rather than present science as marked by simplicity 
and success. And so they do not pretend to give a complete history.
Even the interpretation of the historical facts, they admit, is affected by the 
way history unfolds. The success of a theory can influence the way histories of that 
theory are written. To them, the history of science consists in at least five other 
kinds of history, besides ‘interpretive history’. First is textbook history -  which is 
science presented in historical style; second is official history -  written long after the 
events and to suit the victor’s story; third is reviewers’ history of science -  which 
contributes to science by sorting out the chaos; fourth is reflective history -  which
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aims to improve science by building collective wisdom; fifth is analytic history of 
science -  which is the one written by social scientists in their attempt to understand 
the workings of science, and which philosophers use to make ‘rational 
reconstructions’ in which history is aligned to scientific ideas.
To Collin and Pinch, controversial science and its treatment in interpretive 
science has its undeniable value. In the event of scientific controversy, the potential 
to reinterpret the meaning of an experiment is realized. Consensus is lost and 
experiments are not accepted uncritically, even though experiments continue to be 
an essential part of doing science. (Collins & Pinch, 1998, pp. 175-176) Appeal is 
then made to the judgment of the scientists involved in the controversy and to their 
audience in agreeing on the way forward. This judgment is in turn rooted in 
expertise and experience. This is what saves science from some kind of 
‘experimenter’s regress’, in which experiments would be contrived to test results of 
earlier experiments ad infinitum.
Concluding from this survey, ‘to know’ has both a propositional and a 
procedural sense. We can ‘know that’ and we can also ‘know how’. The way the 
distinction or the relationship is drawn between these two aspects of knowledge has 
been at the core of the controversies in methodology and epistemology of science. 
In science, these two aspects of knowledge come very close to each other. The way 
a scientific fact is established is important in determining whether or not it is a fact. 
Science is that branch of knowledge where the standards are set by scientists and the 
product of the process is a vindication (or condemnation) of the procedures or the 
standards. The two elements are mutually important. A more complete account of 
how science works cannot emphasize one of the elements at the expense of the 
other. And due acknowledgment of the tacit process at work in both elements points
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us to the same tacit process in animal knowledge and learning as a whole. This will 
become clearer soon.
1.3.0 Clues of tacit knowledge from animal learning
Relying on the published results of contemporary experiments in human and
animal psychology at his time, Polanyi holds that there is a striking parallelism or 
similarity between the early intellectual development of a child and a chimpanzee. 
In the experiments, a series of intelligence tests is passed by both the child and the 
chimpanzee. A difference begins to occur when the child, responding to adults who 
talk, begins to understand speech and to speak. The child then gains capacity for 
sustained thought and inherits the cultural heritage of human society. Polanyi 
reaches three conclusions from these experiments. First of all, the use of language is 
a major factor in the human intellectual superiority over animals; secondly, linked to 
the first observation, but even this distinguishing mark between people and other 
higher primates, Polanyi argues, is founded in inarticulate capacities that people 
share with animals, for language itself is based in inarticulate powers of the intellect. 
And thirdly, short of the linguistic clues, people are not a lot better than animals at 
solving the problems we set for animals.
Polanyi relied on reports in animal behaviour by Kohler (1925). The results 
were corroborated by later experimenters like J. Doehl (1966). Captive 
chimpanzees were reported to have ‘solved problems’ like accessing food from 
behind wire netting or hanging out of reach by the use of sticks as tools or by 
standing on boxes they piled up. Robert Hinde reports that the previous experience 
and familiarity of the chimpanzees with the objects they used as tools must have 
been of help. Also the repertoire of movement patterns that the chimpanzees 
possessed, including those they may have imitated from humans, did play a role.
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The results of the experiments are now open to testing against results of 
chimpanzees studied in a free environment. (Hinde, 1966, p. 450)
Kohler had not been isolated in his research on animal intelligence. Before 
him, Leonard Hobhouse had carried out studies (albeit in general inconclusively) 
about the intelligence of animals. This latter began the movement to show that 
animals did not act out of sheer habit, but were capable of some kind of purposive 
behaviour or practical judgement. Around the time of Kohler, Robert Yerkes (in the 
United States) carried out experiments with apes, and so did Ladygin Kohts (in 
Moscow). For a number of reasons, Kohler’s results were not positively received by 
the mainstream psychologists especially in the United States. Robert Boakes points 
out at least three. First of all, Kohler had chosen to interpret the results of his 
experiments (mainly simply carried out) in a subjective way, meaning that he 
ascribed a purpose to the behaviour of the animals rather than interpret the same 
behaviour as meaningless. This, for his critics, meant that Kohler was ascribing 
some kind of non-material mind to the subjects of his experiments. Kohler tried 
unsuccessfully to explain the behaviour using field theories.
The second reason Boakes points out is that Kohler’s experiments brought 
about an unfamiliar theory through a methodology that was not objective according 
to his critics. In other words, it was not clear what empirical questions he sought to 
answer and could answer within the framework he set himself. His critics could not 
see how Kohler’s results about problem-solving could help further research in a 
productive way. Later on, Kohler is reported to have admitted that the same 
questions could have been investigated through a more orthodox experimentation. A 
third reason that Boakes gives is that the critics of Kohler saw in his use of Gestalt 
theory to explain the purposefulness of ape behaviour a promotion of
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hereditarianism. Thus far, the apes were being described as superior in intelligence 
to other species because they had it in their genes. The critics transferred this 
possibility unreflectively to the human sphere and out of the fear of the prospects, 
chose to reject Kohler’s views. (Boakes, 1984, p. 203)
Meredith P. Crawford has also carried out experiments to test the cooperative 
ability among captive chimpanzees to solve problems set for them. His aim is to 
distinguish between human language and animal communication. The problems are 
set in such a way that their solution requires cooperation among the captive 
chimpanzees. Some kind of communication that involved solicitation, directing the 
counterpart to a goal (by a cry or a push), etc. was observed between the animals. 
But no evocative behaviour (of a speaker-hearer relation type) was observed, what 
could be termed as language. Neither did the animals have the capacity to point out 
an object to another nor resort to a symbolic or representational use of language. 
(Crawford, 1969)12
Looking more closely at animal psychology current at his time, on the 
manifestations of the animals’ inarticulate intelligence, Polanyi makes a difference 
between instinctive actions and actions which do not belong to the native repertoire 
of animals. He calls the latter learning, and learning is a sign of intelligence 
compared to instinctive actions which he calls sub-intelligent. He borrows three 
classes of learning in animals from animal psychology. The three classes that 
Polanyi borrows are: A: trick learning (e.g. when a mouse learns to obtain a food 
pellet by depressing a lever), B: sign-leaming (e.g. when a dog learns to expect food 
at the gong of a bell), and C: when an animal “reorganizes its behaviour to serve a
12 A more detailed version o f the report of the experiment is given in Meredith P. Crawford, (1941).
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purpose by exploiting a particular means-end relationship” (Polanyi, 1958, p. 73) or 
a sign-event relationship. The first two classes are rooted in the motility and 
sentience of animals while the third includes these two functions in an implicit 
operation of intelligence. In the first two classes, the animal sets up a time sequence 
either contrived or observed. In class C, the animal achieves a “true understanding 
o f a situation which had been open to inspection almost entirely from the start.” 
(Polanyi, 1958, p. 74)13 The animal in class C has leamt something that it can show 
in various and unpredictable ways. This has been called “latent learning” by the 
same psychologists. Thus the:
“... capacity of deriving from a latent knowledge of a situation a variety of 
appropriate routes or alternative modes of behaviour amounts to a rudimentary 
logical operation. It prefigures the use of an articulate interpretative framework 
on which we rely as a representation of a complex situation, drawing from it 
ever new inferences regarding further aspects of that situation. Latent learning 
is transformed into pure problem-solving when the situation confronting the 
subject can be taken in by it from the start, at a glance. This reduces 
exploration to a minimum and shifts the task altogether to the subsequent 
process of inference. Learning becomes then an act of ‘insight’, preceded by a 
period of quiet deliberation ....” (Polanyi, 1958, p. 74)
In the process by which latent learning shifts to being a guide to problem­
solving, it reaches beyond itself as an ingenious process of inference that is relying 
on (sometimes) faulty assumptions. The process is as precarious as it is important. 
This evolution of inferential powers is always at the risk of inferential error. The 
same risk can also sometimes be seen in the transposition of practical problems into 
verbal terms. Thus far, we can see inarticulate behaviour gradually developing and 
approximating and finally achieving an articulate form. Piaget has studied this 
development in children and is reported by Polanyi to have inaccurately labelled this
13 Emphasis in the original.
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a development of the intelligence in children. But for Polanyi, this is rather an 
increased mental discipline which is attained through the establishment of a fixed 
interpretative framework of growing complexity. This distinction is important in 
order to keep the flow from inarticulate behaviour to articulate behaviour smooth 
and continuous. It is already at this stage an antidote to objectivism about science in 
the sense that what we achieve in science is rooted in the same tacit procedures as 
what we achieve in many other areas of human culture without the necessity of a 
break that introduces an objectivist view that is held by some methodologists about 
science.
Already in the learning process displayed here by the animals, the distinction 
becomes clear between the heuristic part of the learning process and the formal part 
of the same process. What is heuristic is learnt once and for all and cannot be 
repeated, while the formal can be retraced to its origins and repeated -  it is 
reversible. An objection to this position may point out that in standard propositional 
logic, if I infer p, we cannot work back to the premises exactly. It could for example 
be as a result of a conditional sentence in which the antecedent is affirmed; or it 
could be the result of a conjunction, or even the result of a disjunction in which the 
consequent is denied (modus tollens). But the answer to this objection would be that 
it is important that the list of possible premises to which we try to retrace the 
conclusion is not infinite or unidentifiable. We may not be sure of the exact single 
one, but at least there is a finite set of identifiable possible premises. Compared to 
the heuristic part of the learning process, it is difficult to retrace the conclusion (i.e. 
the fact that has been learnt) back to a set of premises. As Polanyi notes, what is 
learnt heuristically may be as a result of a systematic exploration with an 
interpretative framework being gradually built; or it may be a result of puzzled
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contemplation of the situation in question before arriving at a solution by way of a 
sudden insight, etc. (Polanyi, 1958, pp. 75-76)
Thus far, the actual learning takes place in the heuristic, irreversible part of 
the process. The second part of the process which the animal can repeat is routine in 
character. Polanyi points out that the different kinds of learning above show 
different heuristic acts. The heuristics in A are contriving; the heuristics in B are 
observing and the heuristics in C are the act of understanding. Likewise, each of the 
types has a routine part. Thus die routine in A is the repeating of the trick; the 
routine in B is the continued response to a sign, and the routine in C is the solving of 
a routine problem.
For Polanyi, this points to two kinds of intelligence. The one intelligence 
achieves innovations, irreversibly. The second intelligence operates a fixed 
framework of knowledge, reversibly. And these operations at the inarticulate level 
of intellectual life prefigure what happens at the articulate level of intellectual life. 
Further, these three kinds of learning in animals have counterparts at a more highly 
developed intellectual level in humans. Type A learning in animals (trick-learning) 
corresponds with invention in humans; type B learning (i.e. sign-learning) 
corresponds with observation; and type C learning in animals (i.e. latent learning) 
corresponds with interpretation.
A general criticism about Polanyi’s use of the findings of psychology is that 
like all nascent sciences (nascent at his time), the results of animal and child 
psychology should not be taken in uncritically, and especially they should not be 
used to draw such far reaching conclusions. And yet the response to this criticism is 
conceivable. First of all, Polanyi does make up his mind about the results of
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experimental psychology. He is not uncritical in adopting the findings of this 
nascent science. Rather, what he does is to rely on the results of these nascent 
sciences hypothetically while he seeks to make sense of the activities of science in 
general. This approach is consistent with what Polanyi suggests should be the 
approach to science (i.e. not objectivist). On this count, Polanyi is consistent in his 
approach. He does not have to commit himself to the results of this nascent science; 
rather he is willing to use them as a crutch to reach even more profound conclusions.
These more profound conclusions are a more robust methodology and a 
better epistemology. The more robust methodology will better fill in the gaps left by 
standard methodologies. The better epistemology may provide a more sustainable 
response to scepticism. Now, the consistency of Polanyi’s approach lies in the fact 
that even though the results of this science could legitimately still be under 
investigation, yet they help explain other areas of knowledge. In the pragmatism of 
Polanyi’s approach, this could be seen as an indicator that these results are fecund 
(revealing more than they are initially intended to), and thus with a link to the truth 
as defined by Polanyi, namely that which has the capacity to reveal more about the 
world than what is seen at the moment of its propounding.
1.3.1 Introducing Polanyi’s view of Gestalt Theory on perception
Polanyi decidedly embraces Gestalt theory in the hope that it could help
explain how we come to scientific knowledge in a non-objectivist way. According 
to Gestalt theory, there are three qualities relevant to perception by adults. Where 
there is a perception, the first thing to be perceived is the ‘figure’ as distinct from the 
‘ground’ (i.e. a given object in relation to its background). The perceiver focuses on 
an object and uses the background within which the object stands in order to 
perceive the object. But the two, (i.e. figure and ground) are interchangeable
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depending on what the perceiver focuses on. The perceiver switches from one to the 
other depending on which contours she chooses to observe. Without this stage, there 
can be no perception. And so, before a form can be perceived, this stage of 
distinguishing the figure from the ground takes place.
Secondly, there is a tendency in perception to organize what is being 
perceived into configurations in such a way the perception may at times not be an 
accurate representation of the external stimulus. A certain kind of organization takes 
place according to which the configuration is as much as possible clear, impressive 
and stable. This could be achieved by simplification, which in turn could be 
achieved through an increase or filling in of symmetry and regularity, closure, 
continuity, inclusiveness and good articulation all geared to making the stimulus into 
a unified whole. At times proximity and similarity are used to associate parts of the 
resulting whole. (Vernon, 1970, pp. 34-39) And so, rather than analyse the stimuli 
or the responses of perception into their constituent elements, Gestalt theory takes a 
holistic approach to perception.
One may ask whether Gestalt theory offers just one of many possible 
interpretations of perception. What are the virtues of Gestalt theory over an 
analytical approach to perception? The immediate answer to this objection is in the 
end result of any given perception. It must be pointed out first of all that the 
understanding of perception based on Gestalt theory is not proposing an automation 
of perception. Two different observers of the same stimuli do not have to end up 
with the same results of perception. The perceivers are actively involved in shaping 
the end result of a perception. Their past experiences of how certain ways of 
perceiving similar stimuli has impacted on their lives matters in their choice of 
which contours to concentrate on as forming the figure and which as forming the
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ground. It matters that the study of Gestalt theory is carried out among adults, 
because these latter have leamt over a more protracted period than infants, either 
personally or from the experience of others, how to choose between figures and 
grounds. In the end, because experiences differ, there is room for difference in 
perception. And yet because experiences are comparable within given contexts, the 
perceptions may be similar or comparable.
In comparison, the analytical approach to perception produces as an end 
result patches of perception counter-imposed on one another. The role of the 
perceiver to organize and integrate her perception is not accounted for. A perception 
according to the analytical approach would thus be a juxtaposition of different 
colours, sounds, temperatures, tastes, smells etc or any combination of these. The 
question would remain unanswered: What gives meaning to all these sensations? 
The analytical approach to perception locates the meaning entirely in the stimuli and 
in the shared view of a given community that responds to the stimuli. What the 
Gestalt approach adds is the personal participation of the perceiver in according 
meaning to the stimuli. There is a personal contribution. But this contribution is not 
entirely a product of deliberation on the part of the perceiver. It is tacitly 
undertaken. It is driven by the desire to make meaning of the surroundings of the 
perceiver. It can be well informed, partially informed or even misinformed in which 
case the perceiver makes totally false interpretation of the surroundings.
Seen in this light, this tacit element which is responsible for organizing data 
is shared between humans and animals. It is the guiding element in the exploratory 
movements and appetitive drives of all animals. In all animals, it can be detected as 
a self-moving and self-satisfying impulse that enables learning. In humans, it is 
more highly organised into intellectual powers, articulate knowledge and science,
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perhaps with the aid of language and culture. Overall, therefore, perception can be 
understood as an activity that sets its own standards, actively goes about organizing 
the data, giving its assent when the standards are met. The muscles of the eye, for 
example, adjust the thickness of the lens with a goal of producing the sharpest 
possible image on the retina and thus the eye presents to the perceiver a ‘correct’ 
picture of the stimulus object.
In the same way, claims Polanyi, we strive to understand data and to satisfy 
our desire for understanding by framing conceptions of the greatest possible clarity. 
(Polanyi, 1958, p. 96) Polanyi gives an example from experimental psychology in 
which when a ball is shown to us, whose size is being inflated, we see the ball as 
changing its distance from us -  drawing closer to us. In our development from 
childhood, we have leamt to assume that objects all around us retain their sizes. We 
have leamt to accept this as the normal thing, the correct way to see, the coherent 
thing about the world around us, more coherent than balls inflating themselves. And 
even though the closing of distance by the ball would normally make us see double, 
our perceptual apparatus is ready to make this adjustment of disobeying the evidence 
of our retinal images. We do intervene actively by visual accommodation. What 
matters in this intervention is to establish a coherence over all the clues of visual 
perception in such a way that our subsidiary awareness shall confirm us as having 
understood the things seen.14
An objection to this view by Polanyi would be that it situates a tacit element 
of volition in the senses. Alternatively, this view seems to attribute to the will of the
14 In footnote 1, Polanyi talks of a case in which we could be given spectacles that invert images we 
see so that they are upside down. We see them as such for some time, but after some time -  a few 
days -  we learn to see them right way up. And when we remove the spectacles, the images we see 
are upside down again. And again, after a few days we learn to see them right way up.(1958, p.97)
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perceiver what is carried out perhaps spontaneously in the sense organs. But in fact 
Polanyi’s claim is not situated at the level of the sensation. This latter would be a 
collection of colours, sounds, etc. Rather, Polanyi’s claim is situated at the level of 
perception -  what is made of the data that the senses gather. If perception were 
conflated with sensation, it would be difficult to explain the possibility of error in 
perception where the sense organs have correctly gathered the data. The perceiver 
does make a contribution to the perception. Concerning perception in animals, the 
contribution of the perceiver is evident here too. Polanyi observes that the way to 
engender the intellectual interest of an animal, e.g. in a sign-learning experiment, is 
by making the animal aware of a problem that can be solved by straining its powers 
of observation. After that, the animal’s intelligence is spontaneously alive to the 
problem of making sense of its surroundings, even when the mechanisms to get the 
animal interested (e.g. through reward) have been withdrawn.
One may object about the latter illustration that in an experiment to teach an 
animal, what is termed engendering the intellectual interest of an animal, is a 
subjective interpretation. Humans (i.e. experimenters) intervene in the animal’s 
process of perception, directing the animal towards a given goal, and the results are 
interpreted according to human modes and frameworks. Polanyi’s claim could 
survive this criticism if it provides a persuasive answer to the question of how 
individual animals (rather than whole species) survive through changes in their 
surroundings. There must be a coping mechanism that works. Sensory actions are 
indeed strivings on which we rely and which we share (humans and animals). In 
humans, they are geared to helping us make sense of our world according to 
standards of rationality we set ourselves. They contribute to the tacit components of 
articulate knowledge.
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This point can be conceded without making commitments about the proper 
understanding of ‘rationality’ among non-human animals. It is enough to observe 
that perception for humans and non-human animals guides the efforts to satisfy a 
drive and when the drive is satisfied, something has been known and some kind of a 
‘fact’ has been added to a conception of the world. And in all these efforts, the goal 
is self-satisfaction. The individual animal (human or not) itself tacitly sets the 
standards for success and tacitly accredits the actions taken to achieve them. 
(Polanyi, 1958, p. 100)
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Chapter Two: How tacit knowledge functions (A Polanyian 
perspective) 
2.0 Introduction
Describing how tacit knowledge functions, is a sure way to come closer to
defining and structuring it. I examine Polanyi’s description of the function of tacit 
knowledge, its role in heuristics and in the organisation of scientific communities. 
On the whole, tacit knowledge is inarticulate knowledge, but parts of it can be 
rendered articulate. A privileged area in which to examine the function of tacit 
knowledge is in language -  how we leam to use language skilfully. By ‘language’, 
Polanyi designates “... all forms of symbolic representation ...” ranging from 
natural languages (e.g. Kiswahili and English) and including writing, mathematics, 
graphs and maps (Polanyi, 1958, p. 77) Language construed in this way is a 
privileged area because it shows how an inarticulate hunch, thought or idea can 
eventually be made articulate and even formalized. All the while, there is a tacit 
coefficient that manages the process. At another dimension, the tacit coefficient 
governs the modifications we make about language in order to express ourselves. 
The same inarticulate coefficient or capacity manages heuristics -  by recognising 
beauty and elegance and directing intellectual passion. Ultimately, the same tacit 
powers are at work in the way scientific communities are organised to ensure that 
science is done.
2.1 Insights from learning the skilful use of language
The way we leam and skilfully use a language is a privileged process for 
showing the function of tacit knowledge. A lot has been written in the area of the 
philosophy of language, but no clear theory emerges. Language can be understood
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as being representative, expressive evocative, etc. The field is still turbulent. Like 
Polanyi, I steer clear of (mainly objectivistic) philosophy of language debates and 
pick those areas of language that reveal the function of tacit knowledge. As 
exemplified in Polanyi’s treatment of language, I claim that science is one such area 
where scientific knowledge includes an inarticulate or tacit element (especially in 
the heuristic phase of developing scientific knowledge) which element evolves into 
articulate and formal knowledge as well as enable and regulate this evolution to take 
place. Of course, science takes place at a more specialised and formalised plane 
than most of language (e.g. ordinary language), but the mechanisms by which the 
inarticulate in science is made articulate are similar to those that take place in 
language. In fact the same mechanisms are at work in animal learning and animal 
knowledge.
At this point it is clear that in treating language, we are considering 
specifically human activity as distinguished from animal behaviour. Experiments in 
animal psychology (cited above) have come to the conclusion that while non-human 
animals may exhibit behaviour in which they communicate, there is still no proof of 
language comparable to ordinary human language. Animals do not seem to agree on 
meanings and a grammar of their modes of communication among themselves. In 
that light, it is fitting to refer to the kind of tacit element at work in language as 
specifically personal in nature, where ‘personal’ represents the human. On the same 
note, Polanyi claims that “... language is primarily and always interpersonal and in 
some degree impassioned; exclusively so in emotional expression (passionate 
communication) and imperative speech (action by speech), while even in declaratory 
statements of fact there is some purpose (to communicate) and passion (to express 
belief).” (Polanyi, 1958, p. 77) Humans differ from non-human animals in that
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humans have got language, but we share with non-human animals those underlying 
tacit or skilful mechanisms which in humans enable us to use language. The way 
these tacit mechanisms function according to Polanyi is such that:
“If, as it would seem, the meaning of all our utterances is determined to an 
important extent by a skilful act of our own -  the act of knowing -  then the 
acceptance of any of our own utterances as true involves our approval of our 
own skill. To affirm anything implies, then, to this extent an appraisal of our 
own art of knowing, and the establishment of truth becomes decisively 
dependent on a set of personal criteria of our own which cannot be formally 
defined. If everywhere it is the inarticulate which has the last word, unspoken 
and yet decisive, then a corresponding abridgement of the status of spoken truth 
itself is inevitable. The ideal of an impersonally detached truth would have to 
be reinterpreted, to allow for the inherently personal character of the act by 
which truth is declared.” (Polanyi, 1958, pp. 70-71)
Here, the obvious problem with Polanyi’s approach at this stage is that he 
seems to take too narrow an approach to utterances, including only true utterances or 
at most only those made with the purpose of eliciting belief. Yet there can be 
utterances, even in the area of science, made with a deliberate goal to distort the 
truth. Such deceitful utterances in the area of science could be motivated by vain 
glory, for example. Besides, there are also utterances made in a doubting state of 
mind. These two cases are no less utterances. But this problem is not a devastating 
one for Polanyi’s position because even if a deceitful utterance were made within the 
context of science, no science would be done for in actual fact no description of the 
world is being made. Likewise for the doubting mind, if the doubting holder of an 
utterance goes out to make it public in the context of a publication or a conference, 
what she is passing on as science is not the doubtfulness but the utterance in the 
hope that it describes the world and can be believed. In each case, the person of the 
one who makes a putative scientific statement is linked to the ‘truth’ they utter. This
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takes place in the process of judgment involved in language even in scientific 
language.
No amount of articulation or formalization destroys the inarticulate element 
that accompanies the process of articulation. An account of scientific knowledge 
that skirts the inarticulate (or personal) element that governs the skill of knowing in 
science is a merely partial or incomplete representation of scientific knowledge. 
Such a partial account has so far been given by standard methodologies of science 
that put an emphasis on objectivity understood as detachedness at the expense of this 
very implicit, tacit or personal element in scientific and all forms of knowledge. 
Looking more closely at how this tacit element operates in language will provide the 
needed insight into the function of tacit knowledge in general.
2.1.1 The operational principles of language: Language-learning 
and language-use
What then are the operational principles of language that enable articulate
expression to emerge from inarticulate efforts at expression? Language and 
articulation in general has got its roots in the inarticulate. How does the transition 
occur, for example in indicative forms of speech as used in the statement of fact, e.g. 
scientific fact? While an answer to these questions is being thought out or surmised, 
we need to remain open to the possibility that articulation itself in the sense of 
dealing with symbols chosen for expression seems, in its own right, to confer 
intellectual powers to the users of the language. This could help in explaining the 
intellectual superiority of humans over non-human animals. Taking the cue from 
Polanyi, the operational principles of language can on purely commonsensical 
grounds be classified into those that constrain the process of linguistic 
representation, i.e. seeking to say something about the world, and those that
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constrain the very operation of symbols to help in the process of thought. The 
illustration I suggest here is the one of mathematics in which we would talk of 
applied mathematics in the first instance (i.e. representation) and pure mathematics 
in the second instance (i.e. operation). We can arrive at the constraints needed in 
each of the two principles by stretching the advantages of each to its absurd limits.
2.1.2 Constraints on 'representation' in language
Language strives in some measure to communicate and thereby to
represent15, i.e. to declare something about the world (real or imagined as in 
mathematics) in the measure that this is possible. The more about the world an 
ordinary language can represent, the richer is the language said to be. Let us then 
say that we want to increase the wealth of a given language, L indefinitely. We 
could do so, as Polanyi suggests by representing each single sentence by a unique 
word that would act as a verb. There would be unique and unrepeated words to 
cover each sentence made about the world. Yet in this very process, the language 
would be destroyed. Not only would nobody be able to leam all the words, there 
being too many of them, but also the words would become meaningless. The 
meaning of a word is formed or agreed upon and manifested by its repeated usage of 
the word.
The structuralist school in the philosophy of language would object to this 
position and assert instead that the position of a given word in the overall structure 
of a given language is what gives a word its meaning, rather than the usage of the
151 choose not to go into the controversy on whether language is representational, because such 
controversy would lead us adrift from the simple point being made here. The details of the debate 
spearheaded by Donald Davidson and others do not leave us with a conclusive position. Polanyi 
avoids a similar controversy on the matter o f language and what he says is valid for this controversy: 
“The present argument... and its restriction to the representative function is not meant to endorse, e.g. 
a ‘Representative’ as against an ‘Expressive’ or ‘Evocative’ theory. I am engaged here not in 
constructing still another theory of the origin of language, but in an epistemological reflection on the 
relation of language to its inarticulate roots.” (1958, fh.l, p. 77)
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word. As indicated earlier, I steer clear of this debate in the philosophy of language 
and support Polanyi in making this claim on purely commonsensical grounds.
Surely, if for each sentence there was a new word, and if it is assumed that 
sentences declare something about the world, then for each new situation in the 
world there would be a new word. Our words would be repeated once or only too 
rarely to establish a definite meaning.16 Polanyi concludes: “It follows that a 
language must be poor enough to allow the same words to be used a sufficient 
number of times. We may call this the Law of Poverty.” (Polanyi, 1958, p. 78) 
Grammatical order and more or less fixed meanings then come to the rescue of a 
limited vocabulary to enable a language to report the vastness of experience. In 
other words, besides the need for the Law of Poverty, there is a need for a Law of 
Grammar according to which specific combinations of words would be permissible 
to convey a particular meaning.
Yet these two laws, of poverty and of grammar are not sufficient to provide 
the operational principles of language. Both of these refer only to words, and words 
are only words when they are both identifiably repeated and consistently used. 
(Polanyi, 1958, p. 79) Being identifiable distinguishes words from shapeless (or 
meaningless) utterances like groans. Consistent use distinguishes them from other 
repeatable utterances. It is in the combination between being repeated and being 
used consistently that meaning (or denotative power) comes to words and to 
language. Even then, the element of ‘consistency’ remains vague. For there to be 
consistency, there must be an identification of obviously different situations in 
relation to a given feature. Here again, there is a need for personal judgment
16 Locke uses a similar argument to come to the usefulness of general terms and the uselessness of a 
name for every particular thing. (1690/1978, Book III Chapter 3, sections 2-4)
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according to Polanyi. (Polanyi, 1958, p. 80) But the personal judgment called
17upon here is not as extreme as proposing a private language.
On the contrary, what is meant by personal judgment here is the ability of a 
user of the language to draw from experience both of the language and of the context 
to come to a meaning of a word. There is some creativity involved, and a kind of 
heuristics on the part of the listeners or readers of the word in question. The 
personal judgments come about in e.g. choosing the relevant variations, choosing 
what real variations are as opposed to changes that completely destroy a feature as a 
persistent experience. We form frameworks or theories of the universe within which 
we hope to refer to reality in the future. Having figured out a meaning in a particular 
context, the user becomes more capable of recognising the same or a similar 
meaning in other contexts in the future.
What results is an interesting dynamics. The user of the language discovers 
how the language classifies objects and situations in the world adequately. She then 
remains satisfied that the language is right in the sense that it is used well. She 
accepts a so-called ‘theory of the universe’ or world view (given that each language 
makes its own description of the world) implied in the language as true. And by and 
large the art of speaking precisely, by applying the vocabulary of the language is 
comparable to the delicate discrimination as practiced by an expert taxonomist. 
Seen in this light, we have a vivid example in which a formal structure (in this case a 
language) is applied to experience. The element of indeterminacy and judgment 
comes out: the meaning of a word is expertly found out or applied by the expert user 
of the language. Judgment is playing a role. The process is inarticulate. Seen in
17 Wittgenstein would object to the use o f personal judgment to fix meaning in his argument on 
private language. (1953, paragraphs 243, 256ff)
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this light, denotation is understood as an art. What we say about objects and 
situations in the world assumes our own endorsement of our own skills in practicing 
the art of denotation. (Polanyi, 1958, pp. 80-81)
2.1.3 Constraints on operation in language
Next we look at the operational principles that constrain the very operation of
language, where language is understood as a set of symbols. As introduced above, 
the very manipulation of the language as a symbol may confer intellectual powers to 
the users of the language which powers help the user to declare something about the 
world. The symbols can be compared to a map in its relation to the world. Yet if (as 
in the case of representation above) we seek to perfect the virtues of the symbols in 
an exaggerated way, we come to the constraints on the operation of the same 
symbols.
We imagine with Polanyi that a given geographical map were so perfect in 
representing a part of the world, that its scale approached unity. Yet, if it were to 
attain unity, the ‘map’ would be useless for it would be as difficult to locate places 
on it as it would be to find one’s way on the ground. Replacing this illustration back 
in the context of language understood as a symbol (or a map) for a language to be 
useful, linguistic symbols must be of reasonable size in comparison to the 
phenomena they symbolise. In other words, they must consist of manageable 
objects. The symbols that make language can assist thought only to the extent to 
which the symbols can be reproduced, stored up, transported, re-arranged, and thus 
more easily pondered, than the things which they denote. This is the Law of 
Manageability. (Polanyi, 1958, p. 81)
When a language is thus easily manipulable or manageable, it is helpful in 
enlarging the human intellectual capacities. Managing here consists in representing
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an experience in a way that with the help of the creativity of a user of the language 
reveals novel aspects of it. The representation may be by writing, printing, drawing 
or speech. The managing may follow prescribed formal rules or it could be totally 
spontaneous or informal. There are basically three stages involved: primary 
denotation; reorganization, and the reading of the result. Sometimes the 
reorganization takes place mentally.
Managing may involve various levels of ingenuity, including genius. The 
intellectual superiority of humans over animals (cf. Type C learning above) seems to 
be based in this capacity to represent experience in manageable symbols that can be 
reorganized to give new information. The whole seems to rest on the tacit powers of 
speech. Thus far, to speak knowledgeably or skilfully in a given language means 
having the capacity of contriving signs, observing their fitness and interpreting their 
alternative relations. (Polanyi, 1958, p. 82) All these are tacit capacities. Non­
human animals happen not to combine all these capacities to come up with language 
even if they possibly possessed them. But as for humans, there is a whole range of 
articulation from the less articulate through speech or a text to the very formal and to 
the making of conceptual decisions.
2.1.4 The range of articulation
2.1.4.1 The ineffable domain -  where the inarticulate dominates
One area of language in which articulation gradually differentiates itself from
the inarticulate is the area of the relationship between thought, idea or hunch, and 
speech. Any articulation always leaves something unsaid about a matter we are 
addressing. Before we manage to express a thought in speech, the thought may 
reside in a domain we can refer to as the ineffable domain. In this domain, the tacit 
or inarticulate component predominates, making articulation impossible at the
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moment. We can indeed talk of ineffable knowledge without thereby sounding 
logically vacuous. To take an extreme example, how would I speak of or 
communicate knowledge of how to ride a bicycle in a way that is exhaustive?
Yet I cannot say that I do not know how to ride a bicycle. There is 
knowledge we possess, which we cannot articulate fully. Such knowledge is most 
eminent in the knowledge of skills. It is instrumental in the sense that we use it as 
an instrument to focus on some other area of knowledge. In knowing how to ride a 
bicycle, so many other subsidiary or instrumental areas of knowledge go into this 
knowledge. And should I focus on these other areas, I lose my focus of the main 
skill and may make mistakes in its performance. It is not possible to pass on the 
knowledge of a skill by merely passing on a text of the list of the subsidiary 
knowledge elements that contribute to the skill. This is because the list is 
inexhaustible, because the subsidiary knowledge itself relies on other subsidiary 
elements etc. Such knowledge is passed on through practical example and not by 
precepts.
An objection to this position may be that in finite time, a complete list of the 
subsidiary elements could be arranged and the knowledge passed on by precepts. 
But Polanyi gives an example of topographic anatomy in support of his position. In 
this branch of knowledge, all the particulars are explicitly specifiable in terms of 
detailed diagrams. And yet the skill lies in the personal insight that helps in 
integrating the parts -  i.e. how the particulars interrelate. The detailed diagrams 
only offer clues for understanding a part of the body. Much is demanded of the 
intelligence of the student of topographic anatomy. She makes an effort to integrate 
the parts and understand how they work together. She makes up her mind by 
suggesting an interpretative framework
79
Thus far, nothing distinguishes the student’s efforts from those of an infant or 
a non-human animal: all are engaged in forming an interpretative framework. This 
is a step towards articulation, a process that moves from the inarticulate to speech 
relying on a capacity. And so it becomes clear from this example that articulation is 
appraised by the subject in order to come to precision. In humans, the articulation 
comes to the use of words in speech etc. But the words are not private on the one 
hand, while our capacity is not infallible on the other hand. We are either competent 
or incompetent to use them. (Polanyi, 1958, p. 91) We must rely on the use of our 
ineffable capacities at the risk of error, if we are to speak at all.
2.1.4.2 The domain of the co-extension of the articulate and the inarticulate
Another domain in which the articulate (or text) and the tacit are interrelated
is one in which they are coextensive. It is possible to imagine that on receiving post 
in different languages, one may remember the message in a letter and yet not 
remember the language in which the letter was. Or again, it is imaginable that the 
context of a text is learnt faster than the words of the text. In these instances, there is 
tacit knowledge even where the source of the knowledge is verbal. There is 
instrumental knowledge of the language in the first instance, and instrumental 
knowledge of the words of the text in the second instance. For a word to have a 
meaning in a given text, it must have acquired the meaning before, through its use, a 
meaning that may be modified by the current use. At the same time, our 
understanding of the things signified by the word will have been acquired before, in 
experience. This is an example of the domain in which the tacit is co-extensive with 
the text of which it carries the meaning. Yet that is similar to what takes place in the 
way animals get to ‘understand’ their surroundings. It is through repeated 
experience of trial and error.
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In this way, when I understand the message of a given word, I am focally 
aware of the message and subsidiarily aware of the text and of the many foregoing 
experiences that have been designated by the word - usages of the word and things 
that have given the word its meaning. When I focus on my knowledge of a given 
concept (i.e. when I know a concept focally), I am only instrumentally or 
subsidiarily aware of all the instances, experiences, words, meanings, etc. that go 
into building this concept.
There is a problem with this Polanyian position of co-extension between 
thought etc. and text. In the latter expression that relates all instances, experiences 
etc to the meaning of a text, there is an implicit suggestion that the more the 
experience the less the likelihood of erring in the use of a text. This strategy may 
serve Polanyi’s goal well, of explicating the centrality of apprenticeship in passing 
on the knowledge of skills. But left as it is, this position promotes dogmatism. 
There are certainly instances in which less experienced users of the words and 
younger scientists have arrived at novel or original meanings and discoveries. The 
remedy to this weakness would be to qualify the position by attributing to the 
knower the choice of those experiences, meanings, instances that are actually 
relevant to support a given interpretation. Yet even with this correction, the skill of 
choosing the relevant experiences, instances, etc. is attributed to the knower and it is 
inarticulate or unspecifiable.
2.1.4.3 The domain where sophistication begins
A third domain in which the formal and the tacit interrelate in language is
what Polanyi calls the domain of sophistication. In this domain, the tacit and the 
formal fall apart either because the speaker has not yet grasped the speech (i.e. is 
fumbling and requires a correction later by tacit understanding), or because the
81
symbols have superseded our understanding and gone as far as anticipate novel 
modes of thought (i.e. the speaker is making some pioneering steps which are to be 
followed up later by tacit understanding). Sometimes there is a discrepancy between 
our tacit thoughts and our symbolic apparatus. We then face the choice, which of 
the two to rely on more and which to correct in view of the other. To give an 
example, children might have come to a way of solving their practical problems 
before they leam a language. But when they are learning the language, they feel 
encumbered rather than aided by the symbolic apparatus related to solving the same 
problems.
As we leam a new interpretative framework, there is always risk of error -  
error due to false interpretations of elaborate systems. New systems bring with them 
new kinds of errors. There are kinds of errors that animals are free from because 
they do not have this elaborate system of language. Together with the benefits that 
come with adopting a language or a system of formalization are the uncertainties and 
possibilities of error. The attempt by linguistic philosophy, to eliminate 
uncertainties in language by imposing precision on language, was bound to fail. The 
benefits of language come only when the language is allowed to function according 
to its own agreed operational principles with which the user must cooperate even at 
the risk of error.
In fact there have been times when the novel expressions in an established 
language have been declared vague, and when they have been fully appreciated, the 
novel expressions have helped to widen the scope of language. An example of this 
is the invention of irrational, negative, imaginary, and transfinite numbers in 
mathematics. They ended up depicting a mathematical reality and are now well 
established in the formal language of mathematics. And so, speculative,
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unconvenanted uses may open doors to fruitful uses of a language or a system of 
formalization. In line with Godel (1931), Polanyi points out that within a deductive 
system like arithmetic, we can in some cases prove that a system is inconsistent. But 
we cannot prove that a system is consistent if it is sufficiently expressive. We end 
up committing ourselves to a risk of talking total nonsense if we are to say anything 
at all in the system. (Polanyi, 1958, p. 94) Ordinary language behaves in a 
comparable way. When we look at terms describing an experience, their descriptive 
function is conditioned on some recurrent nature of the experience they describe. In 
other words, we cannot describe an experience using totally unfamiliar terms and 
hope to communicate. We take recourse to the repertoire of existing terms that 
describe familiar experiences. And yet our terms remain open to a new view of the 
experience we describe.
Now a generalization over the recurrent features we seek to describe provides 
the rudiments of a theory or a world view. Grammatical rules help to amplify these 
theories or world views and we may end up with a system that anticipates much 
more knowledge than was surmised by the originators of the system. The myriads 
of arrangements of verbs, adjectives, adverbs, nouns, etc. cannot be wholly 
controlled in advance. But the verbal speculations that usher in novelty can either 
bring about new true knowledge or mere sophistry.
Faced with this dilemma in each case, we need to decide by using our 
judgment to adjust a given text to the conception it suggests and to the experience 
this may affect. At times we may need to adapt the use of language to include a new 
meaning, or we may decide to continue holding our meanings based on former 
experiences and instead adjust or correct the text, or else we may even dismiss the 
text as meaningless. All in all, language requires of us to constantly make
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judgments in the use of the formalism it suggests -  either to maintain the formalism 
or to reconsider it basing on experience. Just as our knowledge always bears a tacit 
element that does not allow us to make explicit all what we know, so too with 
meaning, we are never fully aware of the full implications of what we say. (Polanyi, 
1958, p. 95)
2.1.4.4 Formalization
As we enter into the realm of articulation and increased formalization, we
find that even as this realm expands and increases our human mental capacities, it is 
itself a continuum that remains throughout linked to the inarticulate at one end. As 
examples, when data is transferred into a picture form, e.g. a graph, or onto a grid to 
form a map, etc., characteristics of the data which were at first not visible may be 
easily read off and even interpreted. Comparatively much more information about a 
situation that is being studied is gained through this transference of data or suitable 
symbolization. But in general, the mere manipulation of the symbols does not on its 
own produce any new information. Rather, it is effective because it assists the 
inarticulate mental powers used in reading off the results of the manipulations. And 
this applies even in the manipulation that uses mathematical computation. There is 
controlling intelligence -  a tacit intelligence -  throughout the use of mathematical 
symbolization.
In the natural sciences, the data that has been gathered and rendered in 
numerical denotation may be computed to yield new information. Such data can be 
greatly expanded into the logical apparatus of the exact sciences by throwing in a 
formula representing a law of nature. On their part, the descriptive natural sciences 
(zoology, botany, etc.) rely a lot on the systematic accumulation of recorded 
knowledge which knowledge is then looked at from different points of view.
84
Representing these ‘findings’ symbolically in print and multiplying and storing this 
print where it is easily accessible (i.e. managing in libraries, etc.) aids human 
mnemonic powers greatly. Thus accessible, these records are an aid to the 
speculative imagination of the inventors. This is how articulation (and 
formalization) can help enhance the intellectual powers of human knowers. By it, 
the essentials are presented on a reduced scale that is easier to manipulate creatively 
than the mass of data. (Polanyi, 1958, p. 85)
In the same way, the invention of appropriate symbols that can be 
manipulated according to specific rules and without reference to measured entities 
(experience) has enhanced human intellect. There are examples in logic and pure 
mathematics. In the pure mathematics, the invention of the decimal and of zero has 
made the whole group of symbols more powerful for measuring and counting. 
Likewise, formal logic has gained from the development of symbolic notation. The 
symbols help us reduce complex sentences to manageable symbols and also to make 
deductive inferences where they would be much more complex. The sequence, from 
one to the next, of descriptive sciences, exact sciences and deductive sciences shows 
increasing use of formalization and symbolic manoeuvring and decreasing contact 
with experience. There are more impersonal statements, more reversibility, and 
more precision.
Such tacit intelligence is used in understanding the situation, i.e. the problem 
involved, in choosing the appropriate symbolic representation and in the correct 
performance of the operations, and finally in the correct interpretation of the result. 
(Polanyi, 1958, p. 83) In this way it becomes clear that the capacity to denote 
furnishes humans with a huge range of mental powers on the one hand, but on the 
other hand, even with their powers of thought being enhanced by the use of symbols,
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humans still think within the frameworks of unformalized intelligence. Such 
unformalized intelligence may not be different from the intelligence of the non­
human animals. Something comparable to this process takes place in ordinary 
language. The language that describes experience as fully as possible is often very 
imprecise and poetic. (Polanyi, 1958, pp. 86-87) Such language seems to allow 
room for the tacit coefficient or inarticulate judgment to fill in the gaps of imprecise 
and indeterminate speech. We participate personally in denoting, in saying 
something about experience.
A question about Polanyi’s rendering of the relationship between language 
and experience arises. Does he not concede too much to the mere manipulation of 
language in such a way that we should be able to retrace our steps from the results of 
such manipulations to concrete experience? It seems as if Polanyi suggests that we 
can conjure up reality simply by conjuring up language. It is true that in pure 
mathematics interesting and novel results can be arrived at by manipulating the 
formulae etc. But how much of experience is retraceable from the results of such 
mathematical manipulations? I imagine that Polanyi can give a satisfactory response 
to this criticism. In the first place, it should be remembered that language is agreed 
upon to describe experience. It is not a fortuitous effort indulged in for its own sake. 
It is agreed upon for very pragmatic reasons -  to describe and be able to 
communicate about experience. And so language properly used remains in touch 
with experience. But the interpretation of the various nuances of the same language 
reveals different sides of experience to different users of it at different times. The 
wealth of the language that is not seen by a given user at one time may be brought 
about by another user because of her different experience.
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That is one way to explicate the novelty that arises with the manipulation of 
language. Another way to explicate such novelty, which does not rule out the first 
way, is by means of the tacit component. Because of the poverty of language, there 
are gaps in its description of experience. We have already discussed above to show 
that the poverty of a language is not necessarily a negative for the language. The 
gaps left by the poverty of language are filled in by the skilled user of the language, 
basing on her judgment and ingenuity. These two reside in the tacit component of 
intelligence. And so, the cases of more profound novelty that occur in a language 
can be accounted for using this tacit component. It is important to point out that the 
tacit component is not totally independent of skill in the use of the language, and 
neither is it independent of the experience of the skilled user of the language. The 
tacit component underlies both the experience and the use of the language, giving 
sense to both. It is in this light of the tacit component being active in both language 
and experience that conceptual decisions are to be understood
2.1.4.5 Conceptual Decisions
A further area in which the articulate differentiates itself from the inarticulate
is in the domain of conceptual decision-making. The way the tacit faculty functions 
to increase our knowledge achieved by articulation is such that this faculty provides 
us with the power to understand both the text and the things to which the text refers 
within a conception which is the meaning of the text. Our senses are already imbued 
with the urge to pick up perceptions and make some kind of sense of them. In the 
same way, we are imbued with the urge to understand experience and the language 
referring to the experience. There is an impulse to shape our conceptions, moving 
away from obscurity to clarity, from incoherence to comprehension.
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This impulse is due to a discomfort with things being unclear as is seen in 
our senses (e.g. when the eye is impelled to make clear what we see, even if that 
entails filling in or reshaping what it sees). In this way the paradox is enlightened: 
why articulation plays such a key role in our intellect even though the focus of our 
articulation is actually conceptual with language only playing a subsidiary role. For 
when language is used well, we end up with a conception which tells us both about 
how our language refers and about its contents (the things to which it refers). We 
only leam to speak by learning to know what is meant by speech. (Polanyi, 1958, p. 
101) We are aware of language in every thought, even when we think of things and 
not of language. Likewise, we never understand language unless we understand the 
things to which we attend in thought.
As an example, the student of radiology starts out by seeing patches and 
webs in the X-ray picture of an infected chest. The language is technical and the 
things that the experts say it refers to seem to be merely imagined. Yet she 
gradually begins to see what is referred to and to understand what she sees, with 
more experience in seeing. Likewise for speech, there is a joint understanding of the 
words and the things. Once this knowledge has been acquired, it acquires a latent, 
inarticulate or tacit character. It is no longer tied to the words in which it was learnt 
nor to the natural language in which it was received. We can manifest this 
knowledge in an indefinite number of ways. For this flexibility of expression to be 
possible, this knowledge must continue to exist in an inarticulate or tacit way. The 
consideration of the range of articulation throws light on how the tacit capacity 
functions. And aided with this knowledge of how the tacit functions, we can arrive 
at a series of consequences, adjustments to the standard or received view on a 
number of epistemological areas as related to language.
88
2.1.5 Consequences
2.1.5.1 Consequence 1: Reinterpreting objectivity, rationality and reality
In contrast to animals, humans are able to combine the practical,
observational and interpretative in the area of language setting the operational 
principles of language (as discussed above on treatment of speech, linguistic 
symbols, print etc.) in motion, and perhaps even making some new discoveries. 
Thus far, to be educated is to enter upon a vast wealth of knowledge which is being 
managed through access to verbal and other linguistic pointers. These help us to 
keep track of a vast amount of experience. We have a sense we are masters, and this 
sense is an inarticulate form of knowledge. Polanyi specifies: “Education is latent 
knowledge, of which we are aware subsidiarily in our sense of intellectual power 
based on this knowledge.” (Polanyi, 1958, p. 103) In other words, our concepts are 
powerful in terms of being fecund. They are powerful in always remaining ever 
open to new aspects of things that we know. It is akin to the perceptive and the 
appetitive apparatuses, of always looking out, anticipating and being able to 
recognize something new. To be intelligent is to a great extent visible in the 
capacity to continually enrich and enliven one’s conceptual frameworks. We open 
up to experiencing new conceptual frameworks, and we trust ourselves to be able to 
interpret them successfully.
Thus far, our thoughts can be deeper than we know, and they might disclose 
novelties to later generations in the way that Copernicus anticipated Kepler and 
Newton. This is a token of objectivity. Our conceptions can make sense beyond 
specifiable expectations in unprecedented situations. We entrust the guidance of our 
thoughts to our conceptions because we believe that our conceptions can only have 
been manifestly rational if they were in touch with aspects of domains of reality.
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We give our conceptions (which are in fact our own creations) a sway over us in as 
much as we believe they are intimations of reality -  we make contact with reality 
through them. They will enable us to see deeper meanings of reality in the future. 
Yet we are ready to modify and update these conceptions judging from our contact 
with reality. We have self-set standards, but we trust that we can subjectively 
recognize objective reality.
This view of objectivity, rationality and reality is bold and novel, and must 
face up to some scrutiny. To recap, what Polanyi seems to argue is that faced with 
reality in terms of the world we experience (i.e. as capable of revealing itself more 
deeply in the future), we try to make sense of it in the way that our senses make 
sense of perceptions. We create a language or kinds of formalisms to describe our 
experience of the world. We entrust ourselves to these languages and we continue to 
vet and adjust them in as far as they continue to describe our experience in ways that 
make sense to us. We are rational in remaining open to what our experience will 
reveal to us and what we may arrive at by paying closer attention to what our 
languages will reveal about the world. In the same way, objectivity is both an 
attitude of a knower (i.e. tacit) and an attribute of propositions held by the knower. 
It is an attitude in the sense that the knower remains open to what the experience of 
the world will reveal. It is an attribute of the propositions in that with time they are 
either corroborated, or modified or rejected depending on what the experience of the 
world reveals. The problem with this rendering of objectivity, rationality and reality 
is that it seems sanction relativism -  reality is as I create it for myself. And if I find 
that my language, my methods, etc are working, then I am in touch with reality.
In a criticism to the whole notion of personal knowledge, Alan Musgrave 
raises the point of subjectivism/relativism that underlies this notion. A more
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systematic answer is given to this objection when I treat answers to criticisms. But 
already here a brief response is that what saves this Polanyian position from outright 
relativism are two elements. First of all, the search for knowledge right from the 
senses is aimed at making sense of the surroundings of the animal (human or non­
human) it is a matter of survival for the animal, what sense it makes of its 
experience. There is a possibility of illusion even with the best of intentions, it is 
true. On the other hand, what the individual human animal has come up with as 
knowledge is stored and communicated in a common language agreed upon by 
many. Her propositions about her experience of the world are open to being tested 
by the experience of others immediately and in the future.
2.1.5.2 Consequence 2: Modification of language
Verbal clues play an important role in the way the educated mind acquires
and develops knowledge. Whenever language is used to refer to experience in a 
changing world, language itself is changed and so is our conceptual framework. 
Language is being re-interpreted as it is being used. According to Polanyi, when we 
reformulate idiom we reformulate at the same time the frame of reference within 
which we are to understand our experience. (Polanyi, 1958, pp. 104-105) As it 
were, we reformulate ourselves. We deliberately choose new premises, not 
following strict rules of argument. We make a decision based on our personal 
judgment to modify our idiom and ourselves in order to arrive at a more satisfactory 
intellectual existence. We are satisfying ourselves, but not in an egocentric effort. 
Rather, self-satisfaction is here a token of that which should be universally 
satisfying. We have modified our intellectual identity because we hope to draw 
closer to our experience of reality. We may end up being wrong, because the effort 
is conjectural in nature, but that does not make our efforts mere guesswork. “The
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capacity of making discoveries is not a kind of gambler’s luck. It depends on natural 
ability, fostered by training and guided by intellectual effort.” (Polanyi, 1958, p. 
106)
An obvious question to this position would be: What then motivates our 
desire to modify language? Is it our encounter with our environment? Is it our 
minds detached from experience? Is it a conflict that we experience between these 
two? Polanyi would respond in the line that like artistic achievement, this effort 
though unspecifiable, is not arbitrary or accidental. In modifying a language, we are 
involved in a tacit activity, a heuristic feat, driven on by a desire to come into closer 
contact with what is true and right.
The modification or re-interpretation of language takes place at three levels: 
The first level is the receptive level. This is when e.g. a child, is learning to speak a 
language. At this level, the child’s language may appear foolish or conjectural, yet 
the conjectural character of language here remains with us in the use of language 
throughout. We doubt and fumble when we come across unusual words. We may 
associate meanings of two or more words because the words sound similar, etc. 
Scholars may conjecture at the precise meanings of technical terms (e.g. arete, etc.)
The second level is the innovative level where poets and scientists propose 
new uses and even teach others to apply them. This is the case e.g. in the sciences 
where confusion in the use of a term and the understanding of experience may 
persist for years before an intervention is made by a scientist in a way that clarifies 
terms and introduces a new framework of reference that may aid the understanding 
of experience. An example that Polanyi gives is the confusion that reigns upon John 
Dalton’s general introduction of atomic theory, before Stanislao Cannizzaro
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proposes a precise distinction between three closely related conceptions of atomic 
weight, molecular weight, and equivalent weight. Here it is clear that what guides 
the betterment of language or of conceptual discovery is the better understanding of 
experience. Again, there is a decision based on judgment -  a heuristic act -  when 
choosing to clarify or dismiss a position.
The third level of modification is what Polanyi calls the intermediate level, 
where language is modified imperceptibly without any conscious effort at 
innovation. This kind of re-interpretation of language takes place continuously on a 
daily basis. The world keeps changing and our anticipatory powers have to adapt to 
suit the unprecedented situations.
An example of imperceptible modification of language in science that 
Polanyi (Polanyi, 1958, p. I l l )  gives concerns the use of the word ‘isotope’. When 
heavy hydrogen was discovered by Harold C. Urey in 1932, he chose to call it an 
isotope of hydrogen. Protests from Frederic Soddy in 1934, to the effect that the 
word was being wrongly applied, since isotopes were not meant to be chemically 
distinguishable as heavy hydrogen was distinguishable from hydrogen, were 
ignored. The word ‘isotope’ gained a new meaning that way, i.e. a linguistic reform. 
But at the same time, there was a new form of chemical separability launched, 
between two elements with the same nuclear charge.
When we encounter new experiences which we can identify as variations of 
our earlier familiar experiences, we adapt both our conceptions and our use of 
language in order to give meaning to the novelty. The groping for meaning while 
adjusting both conceptions and language is done subsidiarily, in the same way that 
we try to find clear and coherent perceptions without knowing focally how we carry
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this out. Our speech changes meaning without our being focally aware of it. While 
we grope for meaning, words are invested with a wealth of unspecifiable 
connotations.
2.1.5.3 Consequence 3: The contextual or cultural truth of language
Polanyi makes a link between ‘truth’ and ‘rationality’. When a given culture
uses a language confidently, they are affirming the interpretative framework of 
foregoing generations in the same culture. The current use of the words can be 
relied on as meaningful and true because down the generations, the meanings that 
these words have gained through the gropings about in the dark by the culture have 
been reliable. According to him, a child learns a language by accepting the 
interpretative frameworks of the culture in which it grows up. And thereafter, every 
effort made by the educated mind (i.e. skilful user of the language) is made in this 
framework. If this interpretative framework were wholly false, then the rationality 
of the said educated mind would be wholly lost. The said educated mind “... is 
rational only to the extent to which the conceptions to which [it] is committed are 
true.” (Polanyi, 1958 p. 112)
Now the link made between rationality and truth is interesting. It is 
interesting because it leaves room for error -  it is fallibilist. The scientist (for 
example) can still change her mind and admit to the falsity of her conceptions. Yet 
the same understanding of commitment to the rationality of a whole culture of truth 
and rationality helps to explain why the scientist may be committed to a particular 
interpretative framework. The reason why a given interpretative framework seems 
to survive could be (in the mind of the scientist) that the framework has latched onto 
a truth about the world -  a reliable way of describing the experience of the culture 
within which the scientist is working.
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This link between rationality and truth is nevertheless problematic. The 
problem is that this view can allow for a relativist conception of truth. Concepts are 
true, if they are rational and vice versa. But the rationality of an interpretative 
framework in this view is based on its having persisted over a long period. This 
view cannot explain why some interpretative frameworks survive over long periods 
before they are rejected as false or incomplete. An example of such a persistent 
view was the Ptolemaic view of the universe. And so it is not enough that a given 
interpretative framework corroborates the experience of a given culture.
This objection picks out a real weakness in the Polanyian view of rationality 
and truth. But I will postpone the defence of it to the next two parts that treat 
intellectual passion and intellectual culture. For now it is enough to point out that 
Polanyi’s view remains open to an external criterion. The positions that result from 
a given interpretative framework are open to the scrutiny of later discoveries. These 
later discoveries and modifications can reject a view if it is false or modify it if there 
is an element of truth in it, i.e. if it reveals more about our experience of the world 
than was originally supposed.
2.1.5.4 Consequence 4: A personal approach to how words 'refer'
Polanyi proposes an interesting understanding of the use of words to refer to
objects in the world. (Polanyi, 1958, pp. 113ff) In a given language, the choice of 
words is done carefully, and not merely as a matter of convenience. They are meant 
to express a matter of truth and error, of right and wrong. The use of words goes 
further than mere language games and further than nominalism (which he seems to 
understand as a treatment of words detached from the reality). Polanyi seems to opt 
for a more robust metaphysics in which words are bound to reality depending on the
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fitness of the user of the language in which the words occur to judge and to vet the 
use of the language.
Thus far, words do not merely mean anything. They have particular 
meanings that will be decided upon or vetted by the expert in the language. The 
expert user of the language stands between the words and the reality they are used to 
refer to. Experience of the reality often influences the use of words, but there may 
be instances in which words revealed something more about the experience they are 
meant to refer to than originally known. The link there is between words and reality 
(or our experience of reality) is bome out when there is a disagreement about the 
nature of objects in the world. A mere analysis of the words would not resolve the 
problem. Rather, a resolution is to be sought when words are understood as really 
referring to the world, to the things about which people disagree. As the expert uses 
the language, our human capacity to recognize real entities and to designate them to 
form a rational vocabulary is acknowledged and confirmed.
The process of logical intensionality by which we recognize, identify and 
classify objects in the world and experiences takes place at three levels, according to 
Polanyi. First of all there are the readily specifiable properties of objects that make 
classification of objects with similar properties possible. Second are known but not 
readily specifiable properties. Words are designated to describe such properties 
even though the properties are only subsidiarily known. The chosen words then bear 
subsidiarily known connotations that may be rendered explicit on deeper reflection 
on the words and by a study of the use of the words in various times and contexts. 
These come to be known through investigation, e.g. Socratic enquiry as applied to 
such terms as ‘justice’, ‘truth’, etc. Definitions are then arrived at.
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Philosophy comes in handy at this point in arriving at true and new 
discoveries by an analytical investigation and definition. But even then, the reality 
being investigated and defined guides the process of definition. The way we arrive 
at the proper use of the word then is by focusing, not on the word but on the reality 
to which it refers. We thus uncover more meanings of the word. A third level of 
intensionality is one in which we designate a word and are not yet aware of all the 
indeterminate meanings it might convey, but we anticipate that it will reveal much 
more than what we mean right now in a way that confirms the truth of the term. The 
reason why we believe that the term can reveal itself in more and unexpected ways is 
that we believe in turn that it is true or in contact with reality. (Polanyi, 1958, p. 
116) This is the way in which formal speculation upon the words chosen and 
expertly used could raise new problems and lead to new discoveries.
Two related objections can be raised against this position -  one is about the 
metaphysical assumptions involved and the other on the level of epistemology. The 
objection about the metaphysical assumptions involved is itself twofold. In the first 
place, Polanyi’s position seems to have a background in naive realism. He assumes 
that the world out there exists as we sense it, and that is why our words and our 
language can refer to it to some reliable degree of accuracy. The objection then is 
that Polanyi does not support his realism with convincing arguments. Rather, he 
assumes that realism is an accepted metaphysical outlook. But the debate about 
realism has been raging for long, and the objections raised by the anti-realists (of all 
kinds) could be applied to Polanyi’s position. But so would the pro-realist 
arguments be raised in answer to the objections by the anti-realists.
This objection of Polanyi not declaring himself explicitly on the realism 
debate would be an easy objection to respond to. In the first place, Polanyi could
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have been aware of the realism/anti-realism debate and still chosen to ignore it 
because it was no longer a fecund debate. On the other hand, Polanyi can be 
defended by pointing out that his views on realism are not central to his position 
here. He can maintain his position without committing himself to realism as it is 
currently construed. One way to do this is by referring to our experience of the 
world rather than to objects in the world. And so the words and the language 
referred to in this section could be understood as referring to our experience of the 
world in Kantian terms -  a phenomenal description -  rather than a noumenal 
description which would be aimed at the reality (or non-reality) of objects out there 
in the world.
A more serious objection about the metaphysical assumptions that Polanyi 
makes on this point is that he seems to assign some kind of metaphysical link 
between words and objects in the world to such an extent that words and objects are 
causally linked. Seen in this light, words cause objects, and objects cause the words 
that the expert user of a language chooses to describe them. There seems to be a list 
of the uniquely correct words to use to describe a given set of objects. This 
objection is justified because Polanyi points out that in the description of an 
experience of the world, words are chosen for being correct and for describing 
reality in a truthful way. The objection is all the more difficult to deal with, 
especially if Polanyi claims that a formal analysis (e.g. of a language) could lead to 
discoveries about objects in the world. In order to answer to this objection, Polanyi 
needs to emphasize that his analysis does not take place at a meta-level of language. 
He is arguing within a given interpretative framework of a given natural language. 
This framework has been handed on in history, tested for its adequacy, and its rules 
and assumptions are considered as clear and agreed upon by all expert users.
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Within such a context, the use of the words can be seen as appropriate or not, 
correct or incorrect by the expert users of the language. There is a certain amount of 
flexibility within which the judgment of the expert user is free to apply a given word 
to a given specific context. This is because the expert user bases herself on 
subsidiary knowledge of the object or experience that needs to be described. This 
room that allows for flexibility and the judgment used by the expert user combine to 
allow for various connotations of the word depending on the exact circumstances 
within which the word is applied. And so the implied connotations may come out at 
a later period as the word continues to be used to describe an object or an 
experience. In this way, words do not cause objects or experiences. Rather with 
expert use of words, the connotations that were not expressed before could come out 
at a later stage.
The emphasis placed on expert use is the basis of a second possible objection 
-  the objection on an epistemological level. Polanyi places such emphasis on the 
expertise in the use of words in a language that in the end he seems to be promoting 
a kind of elitism (Lakatos, 1978). The experts must always be there to judge and vet 
the novel uses of a word in a language. He seems to assign special and privileged 
knowledge to the expert users of the language. This is a justified objection, but 
again the position of Polanyi can be defended against it. It must be pointed out, first 
of all, that the experts do not ‘know’ all the connotations of the word in a given 
language beforehand. Rather, they work out the suitability of novel connotations by 
and large, relying on other experiences of adjusting the meaning of the word in 
various circumstances and focusing on the object or the experience that the word is 
meant to describe.
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Further, the experts do not form an exclusive club. Any user of the language 
can accede to its expert use simply by adopting the interpretative framework handed 
down within the language and by exercising the use of the language with the 
guidance of the already existing experts -  i.e. by apprenticeship. In the end Polanyi 
has proposed a personal as opposed to an objectivist theory of how we use language 
to refer to objects and experiences in the world. His theory is consistent with his 
overall tacit or personal (as opposed to objectivist) theory of knowledge. Overall, 
therefore, we are self-reliant in probing into reality, setting our own standards for 
correctness and truth, and believing that we shall have the capacity to recognize our 
efforts as leading us to know reality as it really reveals itself in deeper ways in the 
future.
2.2 The role of the tacit in deductive processes and heuristics
2.2.1 The role of the tacit in deductive processes
2.2.1.1 Mathematical Proofs
A deductive process, e.g. a proof or the solution of a mathematics problem,
can be compared to using a map. We become subsidiarily familiar with the map and 
by it we go about the landmarks around us. Using the map, we form a conception 
which we can reorganize to find out the particular itineraries we are really interested 
in. Likewise in a deductive process, we are involved in a conceptual decision based 
on what we know already but one that furnishes us with a new interest. The 
conceptual decision is itself informal even though it is based on articulation i.e. the 
manipulation of the formal language of mathematics etc. There might be mental 
effort required, and indeed a problem is solved in the end. This, according to 
Polanyi (Polanyi, 1958, pp. 117-118), is a deductive transformation in which one set 
of symbols is transformed into another set. The second set of symbols is implied in
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the first set. The transformation is akin to a denotation in which, e.g. a descriptive 
word evokes the reality that it describes. Likened to a denotation, the deductive 
process can be seen as conveying both our understanding of the formal 
manipulations (of the relevant language), and our acceptance of the process as right.
Thus far, there is much of the tacit and of the person involved in being 
convinced even by a mathematical proof. No one would be convinced by a 
mathematical proof that they do not understand. The minimum required to 
understand a mathematical proof is to understand the logical sequence involved as a 
purposeful procedure. Poincare describes this required understanding as that 
(something) which constitutes the unity of demonstration. (1935, p. 26, pp. 20-34) 
He argues for this ‘something’ in the context of arguing for the role of intuition in 
mathematics and creative or inventive science besides pure logic. When that 
‘something’ is grasped, even when the details of the steps of a proof are forgotten, 
the mathematician can still be said to understand a proof. And so, the actual 
meaning of a formalism is to be found in a subsidiary awareness of the formalism 
itself and a conceptual focus on the whole or the goal that is sustained by this 
formalism. That same meaning is necessarily absent where focus is shifted to an 
impersonal treatment of the symbols of the formalism. (Polanyi, 1958, p. 119)
Likewise when mathematical formalism is over emphasized with a goal of 
reducing ambiguity as much as possible, general clarity, and with it intelligibility 
suffers. Yet proofs are in fact ingenious contrivances, purposive actions aiming to 
establish an implication and to compel acceptance of it. In this way, proofs do not 
just denote their subject matter. They bring it about. Proofs contrive what they 
eventually convey. The tacit operations at work in mathematical proofs (and in
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deductive processes in general) are similar to those at work in perception and in the 
learning and application of a language.
2.2.1.2 Problem-solving
All animals are possessed of an awareness, an ‘awakeness’, i.e. a readiness to
perceive and to act in order to make intelligent and practical sense of their 
surroundings and to adapt. What happens in problem-solving is that a hidden aspect 
of a situation is appraised. To this aspect, the animal assumes to have a solution. 
The solution is provided through the clues to which the animal has access through 
perception. Already at this stage o f appraising a problem, something is being 
added to knowledge. An objection to the use of the word ‘knowledge’ is in place at 
this point. This must be a very qualified use of the term, for Polanyi admits that in 
choosing a problem, the investigator makes a decision that is fraught with risk.
But the use of the word ‘knowledge’ here must be detached from the 
objectivist approach that seeks to define knowledge entirely on the grounds of 
propositional knowledge. A fuller definition of knowledge must be able to account 
for inarticulate knowledge, e.g. skilful knowledge. Being able to single out a 
problem involves a skill. In this sense of knowledge that permits of inarticulate 
knowledge, the appraisal of a problem, especially if the appraised problem 
culminates in a solution is knowledge.
And on this point of finding a solution to an appraised problem, an objection 
may be raised. There is a possible situation in which an investigator singles out a 
problem that is insoluble or too difficult to solve. How useful is an appraisal of an 
insoluble problem? In the day to day functioning of science, the balance must be 
struck between playing safe to the extent of stunting research and problems that can 
be solved within finite time and at not too great a cost (in terms of talent, labour and
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money). In the end, the process of choosing a problem is an assessment of the very 
skill of the investigator and her collaborators. It is not guaranteed that their intuition 
about a soluble problem is right, and yet whenever it succeeds, it is a confirmation of 
the investigator’s skill and the dependability of the process of appraising problems. 
As Polanyi points out: “To form such estimates of the approximate feasibility of yet 
unknown prospective procedures, leading to unknown prospective results, is the day- 
to-day responsibility of anyone undertaking independent scientific or technical 
research.” (Polanyi, 1958, p. 124) The whole is a tacit process comparable to 
perception and to the learning and application of a language.
Thus far, to see a problem is to add to knowledge and to find a problem that 
can be solved is a discovery. Now a distinction should be made between discovery 
which comes as a result of accident and discovery which comes as a result of 
intelligence. Both manners of discovery are part of heuristics. What is 
philosophically interesting and what concurs with Polanyi’s treatment of tacit 
knowledge, is not the first kind of heuristics. In that kind of heuristics, intelligence 
plays a negligible role. Polanyi deals rather with heuristics or discovery in which 
the discoverer is engaged in an intellectual effort. Borrowing from Poincare again, 
Polanyi considers that the second type of discovery follows a series of identifiable 
stages after a solvable problem has been discovered.
Briefly, these stages are: 1 preparation -  in which the discoverer takes time 
to think about the problem and take in the whole context with the clues that might 
lead to its solution; 2)Incubation -  during which there is a heuristic tension within 
the mind, or at the back of the mind of the discoverer as she struggles to find a 
solution even as she continues with other tasks; 3^Illumination -  in which the
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discoverer suddenly comes to a tentative solution in her mind; and 4Verification -  
in which the discoverer tests the tentative solution in practical life.
I find the four stages uncontroversial for the purposes of explicating the 
nature and functions of tacit knowledge, and I avoid going into the discussion of 
finding out whether they are necessary and sufficient. What is of interest as far as 
tacit knowledge is concerned, however, is what Polanyi underlines as the personal or 
emotional involvement of the discoverer, in the moment of pensive preoccupation 
before the tentative solution is arrived at, and the joy at the discovery of a solution.
Without such a personal or emotional engagement, the problem is really not a 
problem to the discoverer. It is either too easy and can be solved effortlessly, or it is 
too difficult and thus does not puzzle her. A problem is not a problem in itself, 
except in relation to identifiable persons. And once the problem has been solved at 
least once, the discoverer can get back to the solution of similar problems in a 
routine manner without heuristic tension and thus without discovery. That explains 
the irreversibility of heuristic progress -  we cannot restore the heuristic tension for 
each of the similar problems.
And given the possible fact18 that deductively logical conclusions can be 
traced back to a finite possibility of their premises, this understanding of heuristics 
precludes them from being strictly logical. Instead, where discoveries are to be 
made, there is a ‘logical gap’ in the sense of deductive logic. And crossing that gap 
is the function of originality, i.e. ways of solving a problem without using intelligent 
conclusions from already existing knowledge. In this light, originality is a natural 
talent that alone enables the discoverer to start an important innovation and genius
181 call it a possible fact basing on my argument for it in dealing with learning and reversibility.
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singles out problems and proposes solutions in ways beyond general anticipation. 
Genius can then be understood as extensive originality, a token of the originality in 
biological life.
2.2.1.3 Mathematical heuristics -  an illustration of tacit knowledge in heuristics
The function of heuristics in mathematics can be used as an illustration of
how heuristics work in discoveries in natural science and technology. The question 
here is: how do anticipatory powers lead to discovery? Mainline philosophy of 
science has concentrated on defining and justifying the process of empirical 
induction with little attention being paid to heuristics. Some have consigned 
heuristics to psychology (later Lakatos, etc.). When we are open to the tacit aspect 
of knowledge, heuristics become important.
Now, practice plays a major role, even in a formalized branch of knowledge 
like mathematics. In other words, acquiring an art is important for this formal 
discipline. What goes on in the practice is the transformation of a language thus far 
passively acquired into an effective tool for solving new problems. Now, to solve a 
mathematical problem, as discussed in the last section above, is to use clues to arrive 
at something totally new to us. Moving towards a solution involves both deliberate 
and passive moments. Some things, like happening on a solution, may just happen 
to the investigator in the moment of incubation, which is akin to one of the four 
major stages in the solution of a problem pointed out above. In that sense, 
happening on a solution is a comparatively passive moment in contrast to 
verification. The verification of the solution (another stage in the solution of a 
problem pointed out above) is a deliberate act.
Now, in the case of students of mathematics, it matters that the problems set 
for them are believed to have answers, even though the students might never have
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come across the answers before. There is an expectation of how the answer will 
eventually present itself or look like. The answer to a mathematical problem is 
similar to the satisfaction of a desire -  the problem. Inventiveness is geared up as 
the students get engrossed in satisfying the desire. Their thoughts are then 
reorganized continuously in the search of suggestive aspects. They focus on 
something they do not know, yet one about which they have formed a notion. They 
also focus on the data that they already have, not in themselves, but as clues towards 
the unknown. They try to see how the data all fit together, convinced that they 
actually do belong together to form a whole. Memory may help in the comparison 
of a particular problem with earlier solved problems. The students rely on their 
capacity to recognize a yet unrevealed relationship between the clues and the 
solution. And as they get nearer to the solution, they need to know that they are 
getting nearer, otherwise their efforts will be characterised by random conjectures 
and remain fruitless.
All these are tacit capacities. The students have the capacity to sense a 
hidden inference from given premises and the capacity to keep tweaking the 
premises until they strike in the direction of the inference. The probability of hitting 
the right answer grows above zero. The mind may continue to work in this manner, 
narrowing the logical gap to the solution, and reducing the effort needed to finally 
arrive at the solution. The students finally come to the solution and it comes 
stamped already with its own accreditation of being true, given that the students 
were searching something about which they had formed a notion. Even the most 
outstanding originality is perceived by the investigator as more of a revelation of 
what has always been there than an initiation of something completely new. Such 
investigators are usually rewarded when their discovery reveals more aspects than
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formerly foreseen. This is a clue that the investigators may be in touch with reality 
understood as that which reveals itself in unforeseen ways.
2.2.2 The heuristic recognition of value, elegance and beauty
2.2.2.1 Scientific value
Values are considered as outside the ambit of scientific knowledge in an
objectivist approach. The objectivist approach can itself be traced back to a position 
of Laplace who holds in the introduction to his work on probability that:
“We should therefore look at the present state of the universe as the effect of its 
anterior state and as the cause of its subsequent state. An intelligence which for 
a given instant would know all the forces that are active in nature and the 
respective situation of the beings composing nature, and if moreover this 
intelligence were vast enough to subject this information to analysis, such an 
intelligence would embrace in the same formula the movements of the biggest 
bodies of the universe and those of the lightest atom: nothing would be 
uncertain for it, and the future, like the past would be present to its eyes. The 
human mind offers a weak sketch of this intelligence, in the perfection that it 
has attained in astronomy. Its discoveries in mechanics and geometry, 
combined with the discovery of universal gravitation, have brought this 
intelligence at the beginning of understanding in the same analytical 
expressions the past and future states of the world system. By applying the 
same method to a few other objects of knowledge, the intelligence could relate 
observed phenomena to general laws and could foresee those that given 
circumstances must bring about.”19 (Laplace, 1886, pp. vi-vii)
19 A translation o f « Nous devons done envisager l’etat present de l’univers comme I’effet de son etat 
anterieur et comme la cause de celui qui va suivre. Une intelligence qui, pour un instant donne, 
connaitrait toutes les forces dont la nature est animee et la situation respective des etres qui la 
composent, si d’ailleurs elle etait assez vaste pour soumettre ces donnees a l ’Analyse, embrasserait 
dans la meme formule les mouvements des plus grands corps de l’univers et ceux du plus leger 
atome : rien ne serait incertain pour elle, et l’avenir, comme le passe, serait present a ses yeux.
L’esprit humain ofifre, dans la perfection qu’il a su donner a 1’ Astronomie, une faible esquisse de cette 
intelligence. Ses d£couvertes en Mecanique et en Geometrie, jointes a celles de la pesanteur 
universelle, l’ont mis a portee de comprendre dans les memes expressions analytiques les etats passes 
et futurs du Systeme du monde. En appliquant la meme methode a quelques autres objets de ses 
connaissances, il est parvenu a ramener a des lois generates les phenomenes observes et a prevoir 
ceux que des circonstances donnees doivent faire eclore. » (Laplace, 1886, pp. vi-vii)
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This Laplacean hope is interpreted by Polanyi as an attempt to pursue science 
with the ideal of absolute detachment. The world is represented in terms of exactly 
determined particulars and a universal mechanics governs the motions in the 
universe. All that is needed in such a view of science are die impersonal facts, the 
data. But this is a partial representation of science, for science is a human activity 
and values have got a role to play. Polanyi holds that an affirmation is deemed 
valuable for science, i.e. acceptable as part of science, on the foundation of three 
points. 1) The affirmation must possess certainty/accuracy; 2) It must have 
systematic relevance/profundity; and 3) It must have intrinsic interest. (Polanyi, 
1958, p. 136) The three criteria apply jointly, and they compensate one another, i.e. 
excellence in the other two makes up for the weakness in one of the areas.
It is clear in this outline already that scientific value is one of those things 
that even though they are not precisely definable, and are therefore inarticulate, it 
can be reliably assessed. Each contribution in a journal of science is judged on its 
scientific interest. Research grants are given where referees judge that the research 
is worthwhile. What is judged trivial or false is denied publication or the funds. 
Evidence that appears incompatible with an already established system of 
knowledge is usually initially ignored by the body of scientists in the hope that it 
will soon be proved to be irrelevant or false. At times useful evidence is thus 
ignored, but it is difficult to see how else science would survive being caught up in 
chasing blind alleys. The rules for avoiding this complication are tacit or inarticulate 
because scientific value is itself tacit or inarticulate. The function of scientific value 
is only vaguely describable. The way that science seeks value is similar to human 
perception in the sense that it is done skilfully and deliberately. Polanyi maintains 
that:
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“Just as the eye sees details that are not there if they fit in with the sense of the 
picture, or overlooks them if they make no sense, so also very little inherent 
certainty will suffice to secure the highest scientific value to an alleged fact, if 
only it fits in with a great scientific generalization, while the most stubborn 
facts will be set aside if there is no place for them in the established framework 
of science.” (Polanyi, 1958, p. 138)
Some of this approach has already been presented in the treatment of the 
Michelson-Morley experiments earlier. It should be pointed out that the impersonal 
element in scientific knowledge is not being denied. But an excessive emphasis of 
this impersonal knowledge would leave us with a partial and therefore inaccurate 
representation of knowledge. Values do have a role to play. But the claim for the 
role of values in science needs more elaboration. What guides value towards 
scientific truth? Polanyi suggests an emotional element. Great scientific theories 
operate like works of art -  there is an emotional force in both of them. This 
emotional force can be evoked in an articulate culture. When a scientist comes 
across a great scientific theory, this experience is accompanied by an expression of 
delight. For Polanyi, the theory “... has an inarticulate component acclaiming its 
beauty, and this is essential to the belief that the theory is true.” (Polanyi, 1958, p.
133)
We have seen earlier that the treatment of language (e.g. the formal aspects 
that form pure mathematics) expands the range of our thought, so does it expand the 
range of our system of emotional responses by which we can appreciate scientific 
value and ingenuity. The beauty of a theory calls attention to itself and by the 
beauty, the theory makes a claim on empirical reality in the same way that a work of 
art by its artistic beauty makes a claim to artistic reality. Science appreciates its own 
beauty through a kind of passion: intellectual passion.
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Yet the analogy that Polanyi draws between artistic beauty and the reality to 
which scientific theories relate is not without problems. It is for example possible to 
think of the reality to which scientific theories relate as one that reveals itself 
gradually and cumulatively, governing and directing the scientific theories. Artistic 
reality, on the other hand, is difficult to perceive as being cumulative towards a 
greater clarification. The various masterpieces of art are difficult to unify and 
coordinate or perceive as contributing to one wider reality -  an artistic reality that 
would correspond with the scientific reality. A further problem with this 
comparison between art and science is that while scientific reality can plausibly 
make ‘truth claims’, it is difficult to think of artistic ‘truth claims’, or even to 
conceive of what nature such claims may have.
A response to both objections would be to assert that what Polanyi is 
engaged in is the mechanism by which scientists come to hold on to and assert 
scientific theories. The contents of the theories have to be tested against reality. But 
what has been argued all along is that the mechanism is an important part of the 
contents. An attempt to depict scientific knowledge as absolutely detached and 
impersonal leaves us with an incomplete account of how science works.
A complete account of science should be able to explain the passionate 
origins of science. Scientific passions are not just a psychological by-product of 
science and shying away from them is not helpful to explicating how science works. 
Rather, the passions perform a logical function because they respond to an important 
element in a scientific claim and the claim may be said by the scientist to be right or 
wrong depending on the presence or absence of that element. (Polanyi, 1958, p.
134) But Polanyi must have a unique and specialised sense of emotions or passions, 
if his position is not to be obviously controversial. As a descriptive definition,
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intellectual passions are appreciative expressions about theories, discoveries, etc. 
which theories etc. are considered as having intellectual value that is precious to 
science. It is not about every whim and caprice, therefore. He is aware of the 
controversial status of his claim and so he goes on to explain:
“The function which I attribute here to scientific passion is that of 
distinguishing between demonstrable facts which are of scientific interest, and 
those which are not. Only a tiny fraction of all knowable facts are of interest to 
scientists, and scientific passion serves also as a guide in the assessment of 
what is of higher and what of lesser interest; what is great in science, and what 
is relatively slight. I want to show that this appreciation depends ultimately on 
a sense of intellectual beauty; that it is an emotional response which can never 
be dispassionately defined, any more than we can dispassionately define the 
beauty of a work of art or the excellence of a noble action.” (Polanyi, 1958, p.
135)
Thus far, according to Polanyi, we possess a vision of reality which 
accompanies scientific knowledge. This vision is not really knowledge, for it is a 
guess. But at the same time, the same vision is in fact more than knowledge because 
it relates to things not yet known and presently inconceivable, but which things may 
later reveal themselves as true in experience. To Polanyi, it is by this vision of 
reality that we are able to weather the storm of crises when a given scientific 
position is shaken by contradicting evidence. By the same vision we are able to 
ignore apparently founded positions in the hope that further evidence will help 
disprove the positions.
This seems to me to be the furthest we can go in explaining the way emotions 
are involved in the appreciation of scientific theories without thereby succumbing to 
an irrational explanation. It is important to first of all get rid of objectivism or the 
view of science as a purely detached and impersonal engagement. The alternative
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left, if this role of emotions is not acknowledged, does not leave an account of 
science more rationally robust in the objectivist sense. It is my view that the 
attempts at a ‘logic of science’ or any similar account of science as seen in standard 
methodologies can be improved by improving the way they handle this emotional 
element in science. Thus far, falsificationism could better explain why scientists do 
not immediately abandon a bold conjecture once it has been falsified in a crucial 
experiment. Also, it can be seen why there is a quasi-religious conversion on the 
part of scientists who abandon one paradigm for a new one. (Kuhn, 1962) The 
same can be said about what motivates the members of a given methodological 
research programme to shift to new programme once it is detected that the older 
programme can no longer generate new answers to new problems. (Lakatos, 1983)
Polanyi asserts further that we need and do have a general vision which acts 
as a general guide for the interpretation of experience. This vision is in turn guided 
by intellectual passions otherwise it would spread out in all directions, in pursuit of 
various trivialities. The intellectual passions propose a number of things: what is 
scientifically valuable, beautiful, and worthwhile to pursue; the kind of conceptions 
and empirical relations that are plausible; the empirical relations to reject as specious 
even in spite of evidence that supports them, etc. (Polanyi, 1958, p. 135) In the 
meantime, our vision relies on the evidence of our senses.
Obviously, the way in which beauty or elegance is being used about 
scientific theories as perceived by a scientist needs to be explained further. Polanyi 
is aware of a major objection to his claim pointed out above in the treatment of 
value, that the intellectual beauty of a theory is a token of its being in touch with 
reality. He himself points out that there have been discoveries made from purely 
manipulating the formal symbols of earlier theories. Examples are when Adams and
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Leverrier calculated the position of another planet -  Neptune by the use of 
Newtonian mechanics. Likewise, van’t Hoff arrived at the laws of chemical 
equilibrium by manipulating the Second Law of Thermodynamics. It is therefore 
plausible, as Polanyi admits in reference to the position of Mach, that the true value 
of a theory is in its being an economical account of observed facts.
Polanyi points out that a similar debate had raged in the time immediately 
after Copernicus, between the Copemicans (Kepler, Giordano Bruno, Galileo, etc.) 
and those who held on to the Aristotelian world view (Osiander, theologians, etc.). 
For the latter, the Copemican system was not true; it was merely an economical 
hypothesis. (Polanyi, 1958, p. 146) According to Polanyi, both sides agreed on the 
meaning of ‘true’, i.e. contact with reality, one that is “destined to reveal itself 
further by an indefinite range of yet unforeseen consequences.” (Polanyi, 1958, p. 
147) ‘Fruitfulness’ could be used to designate this idea of ‘truth’, yet it falls short.
In the example of the dawn of the Copemican system, the Ptolemaic system 
had been a fruitful source for a thousand years. But it was a source of error. The 
Copemican system was a source of truth by contrast. Still as Polanyi notices, a false 
theory can be a fruitful source of truth, at least by accident. But the difference with 
the Copemican system is that it did not accidentally lead to Kepler’s and Newton’s 
discoveries. Rather, it led to them because it was hue. Polanyi has a unique view of 
truth of scientific theories -  “the indeterminate veridical quality ...” of a theory. 
(Polanyi, 1958, p. 147) The Copemicans saw this quality in the Copemican system 
long before Newton published his Principia. They saw the veridical quality not 
subsequent to the fruitfulness of the system. Rather, they intimated this fruitfulness.
And now, a further objection that Polanyi foresees is that still the formal 
reformulations of a theory may help lead to new discoveries. This seems to have 
been the case with the reformulation of Newtonian mechanics by d’Alembert, 
Maupertuis, Lagrange, and Hamilton. But Polanyi points out that the discovery 
character of these contributions is in as far as they made huge strides in 
mathematics. They are in fact formally elegant and do not bear on intellectual 
beauty, which beauty makes contact with reality.
Again Polanyi foresees two important objections to his approach so far. One 
could wonder what use experiments are in such a framework. Secondly, what 
distinguishes science from astrology in this same framework? Polanyi’s answer to 
the first question is that experience is necessary as a clue to understanding nature, 
but it does not determine that understanding. The understanding is a kind of groping 
around in the dark or unknown, with the meaning of the facts. The experience 
dispels the notion of mere formal elegance or formal advance, and reaches further to 
a new insight in the nature of reality. The indeterminacy persists, we are thinking on 
our feet. We do not yet know what we mean, or whether we mean anything. And 
when at last we decide to take up the theory as valuable to science, the 
indeterminacy is merely limited, not eliminated. Yet this indeterminacy must 
remain if our newly adopted theory is to have a bearing on reality -  only in its being 
indeterminate can it reveal itself ever more deeply in the future. The whole process 
can be compared to the learning and the use of a language discussed earlier.
On this point of beauty and elegance, Polanyi’s position is not 
distinguishable from astrology, for example. Even the astrologers can claim to find 
beauty and elegance in their explanation of the world. This looks like a serious 
objection on the lines of the discussion about the demarcation between science and
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other branches of knowledge. Polanyi needs to find a way of marking the difference 
between science and astrology without succumbing to objectivism. Tentatively, 
Polanyi answers to this objection by pointing out that the intellectual beauty of a 
putative scientific theory points towards the veridical powers of a theory. With more 
research along the lines of the theory, the theory reveals itself ever more deeply, 
bringing to light unforeseen knowledge about the world. True to fact that 
astrologers will claim to see a beauty in their astrological claims and endeavours, but 
these will rarely reveal themselves ever more deeply in the future and will require 
constant ad hoc re-interpretations to fit the theories with the events.
A further objection in this line would be that this criterion proposed by 
Polanyi is not useful in helping to choose immediately between two competing 
theories or world views. By pointing to the future indefinitely, the criterion only 
postpones the problem. How long must researchers wait before they can approve of 
a theory as true or jettison it outright as false? The criterion becomes less useful 
when the two theories are closely comparable, e.g. if both share a scientific approach 
to the world (e.g. a Ptolemaic versus a Copemican world view).
To answer to this objection, it needs to be pointed out that Polanyi’s criterion 
like his whole theory of tacit knowledge, is not a neat criterion. The criterion ought 
to be seen as forming part of a wider process or system. The criterion comes 
towards the end of an interpretative framework that has been tested over the years 
and is being adapted to the times. The intellectual passion of the individual scientist 
or of a group of scientists researching the same question should also be taken into 
account. And finally, the community of scientists also plays a role in vetting 
theories. These latter two elements will now be further elaborated.
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2.2.3 Heuristic guidance of intellectual passion
Intellectual passions have been introduced earlier (in the section discussing
beauty and elegance) and they are described as appreciative expressions about 
theories, discoveries, etc. They can be further analyzed into heuristic and persuasive 
intellectual passions. Both of these perform the function of bridging a logical gap 
between what is known and accepted and what is about to be discovered or 
introduced as a theory. We look first at heuristic passion.
For Polanyi, intellectual or scientific passions play a further role besides 
affirming harmonies that open the scientist up to an indeterminate range of future 
discoveries. These passions guide the scientist to specific discoveries as well as 
sustain years of scientific labour towards the discoveries that they foreshadow. He is 
of the opinion that “The appreciation of scientific value merges here into the 
capacity for discovering it; even as the artist’s sensibility merges into his creative 
powers. Such is the heuristic function of scientific passion.” (Polanyi, 1958, p. 143)
That is to say that a heuristic passion, an unspecifiable impulse, sustains and 
guides creative scientists in their lifelong effort to guess right. And remaining 
within his wider framework of how discoveries are made, Polanyi holds that we 
need originality to cross the logical gap between what we already know and what we 
are yet to discover. A new framework of interpretation is launched which changes 
our way of seeing the world. Originality demands intention, it demands passion in 
order to be accomplished.
As an example, Einstein was guided by an aspiration stimulated by Mach, to 
free himself from the mistaken assumptions about space and time and “to replace 
these by a frankly artificial framework in which the assumption of absolute rest was 
replaced by that of an absolutely constant velocity of light.” (Polanyi, 1958, p. 144)
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He ended up with a vision in which the electro-dynamics of bodies in motion were 
set beautifully free from the traditional constraints of space and time. According to 
the interpretation of this event by Polanyi, “[accepting this intellectual beauty as a 
token of reality, Einstein went on to generalize his vision further and to derive from 
it a series of new and surprising consequences .... The new beauty inaugurated the 
modem view of a mathematically defined reality.” (Polanyi, 1958, p. 144)
Thus far, intellectual passions and beliefs attendant to them are held 
personally by the creative scientist, yet she holds the conviction that they are 
universally valid. The possibility still remains, however, that the passions and the 
beliefs may be mistaken. To this objection, Polanyi may answer that there is no way 
around this limitation rather than the judgment of the scientific community within 
which the scientist works, and the deepening of the putative theory with the passage 
of time, showing the theory to reveal more to those who use it than originally 
foreseen by those who propounded it.
The second role of intellectual passion is persuasive. The thrust of heuristic 
passion does not end when at last a discovery is made. Together with the said 
discovery there comes a claim to universal validity, for the discoverer would 
normally make a claim that what she has discovered is universally valid. And so, 
there follows the struggle to make it accepted by other scientists. This is a 
persuasive passion which, like heuristic passion, meets with and tries to cross a 
logical gap in the following way.
The innovative scientist has separated herself from the rest of the wider 
scientific community in terms of having a different interpretative framework brought 
about by her new discovery. Initially the struggle is to make the others believe that
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the new framework means anything before they can even give the innovative 
scientist an audience. Winning intellectual sympathy for a theory that they have not 
yet understood is crucial. Conversion, persuasion, etc. are the way forward because 
the formal argument that the outsiders subscribe to belongs to the older framework. 
There is no logical transition from the one to the other rather than conversion and 
persuasion, etc.
As an example, for over 148 years from the publishing of Copernicus’ De 
Revolutionibus to the publishing of Newton’s Principia, the Copemicans and the 
Ptolemeians disagreed among themselves and on top of each of the systems having 
explanations of phenomena, neither of the two was totally spared from internal 
problems.
An empirical approach may play a key role in the persuasion, but again tacit 
or personal knowledge, rather than a set of rules plays the key role. In other words, 
while empiricism as an approach is valid, it is only a maxim the application of which 
is only part of the art of knowing. Not every theory that is backed up with empirical 
evidence is accepted as knowledge in the scientific community. It is usually the case 
that the mainstream scientists bluntly refuse to discuss the views of their opponents 
in details, contenting themselves with a caricatured designation of them.
Neither is a theory dismissed merely on the grounds that it is not backed up 
with empirical evidence. In the case where the proposed theories are seen as mere 
guesses, the practice of science is such that it would be wiser to remain by the 
guesses of the scientist who guesses within a conceivable scientific system, and is 
thus making a competent guess. Guesses based entirely on speculation without any 
empirical backing, are incompetent guesses. Thus in summary, intellectual passions
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serve to affirm the scientific value of given propositions while denying it in others. 
They thus play a selective role. The same passions play a heuristic role in linking 
the appreciation of value to a vision of reality. Heuristic passion both sustains and 
produces originality and consequently propels the innovative scientist to persuade 
others, thus evolving into persuasive passion.
2.3 The tacit in the organization of science
The role of the scientific community and the whole culture of doing science
has been hinted upon above as regulating passion. Polanyi holds that the articulate 
systems (e.g. elaborate cultures) which both foster and adjudicate over intellectual 
passions need a society to support them and to form of them a part of wider culture. 
To him, the tacit coefficients by which such articulate systems are understood and 
accredited are also part of the cultural life of the community. Wherever there is 
articulate communication, there is underlying it tacit knowledge understood as a set 
of assumptions agreed upon by all involved in and profiting from the 
communication. A sharing of this tacit knowledge, in tacit interactions, is the 
foundation on which cultural interchange and life are built. Our attachment to the 
truth may then mean our attachment to a community of people whom we trust to 
respect the truth. (Polanyi, 1958, p. 203)
A ready example is the use of a natural language, e.g. Kiswahili. All parties 
in a communication in Kiswahili agree tacitly that it is a language with a small and 
manageable set of symbols, with grammatical rules and a vocabulary. They all 
assume that their correspondents intend to communicate sense and those 
communicating assume that the content of their communication is accessible by their
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counterparts, etc. The idiom used, the examples given, in brief the experience 
referred to tacitly is all tacitly agreed upon.
And so when we communicate what we consider to be facts, thus wishing to 
communicate knowledge, we call our interlocutors’ attention to the message of our 
communication and to us. We are using more than the mere descriptive powers of 
language. There is still a possibility of misunderstanding in communication. Even 
though people may misunderstand one another on particular words, they still do 
manage to convey information on the whole by speech. Their tacit judgments on 
denotation coincide in some way. And in the end, different people can use the same 
set of symbols skilfully to reorganize their knowledge. Polanyi gives an example 
from animal intelligence. Animals imitate their more intelligent counterparts in a 
process by which there is a genuine transmission of an intellectual performance -  a 
communication of knowledge in an inarticulate way. (Polanyi, 1958, p. 205)
This is also the way in which arts are learnt -  by imitation of the practices of 
those trusted because they are better initiated, through tacit judgments of 
unspecifiable skills. Whenever we communicate, say by telling somebody 
something, we make an effort to find the best fitting words to express what we 
mean. Having said it, we endorse our words as being the best expression of what we 
mean. We then hope that our words will be received as we meant them, by our 
interlocutor. We do make tacit endorsements of our words in such cases. We may 
be mistaken, but we have to accept the risk in order to say anything at all.
Yet for novices of any articulate system of cultural lore to assimilate the lore, 
they need to have previously been affiliated in an act of apprenticeship to a 
community considered to be the masters of this lore. The novices appreciate the
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values of the lore and endeavour to live by them. Confidence in the intellectual 
leadership of the masters of the lore is cultivated. The learner believes that what she 
is learning makes sense, before she knows that it does make sense. She takes this on 
authority. This may sound medieval, but the learning of a natural language, 
especially of a mother tongue, is an example of this process. But also the learning of 
science involves passing on a whole interpretative framework from the experienced 
and skilful scientist to the novice or apprenticeship. Science is not just passed on 
when the propositions that form the theories are passed on by rote. The budding 
scientist adjusts to a whole worldview.
An objection to this position may point out that the independence of the mind 
of a scientist may be eroded in this approach to science. But Polanyi makes a fitting 
response that merits being quoted at length. He holds:
“Every time we use a word in speaking and writing we both comply with usage 
and at the same time somewhat modify the existing usage... even when I make 
my purchase at current prices I slightly modify the whole price system. Indeed, 
whenever I submit to a current consensus, I inevitably modify its teaching; for I 
submit to what I myself think it teaches and by joining the consensus on these 
terms I affect its content.” (Polanyi, 1958, p. 208)
This response by Polanyi advocates more for a piecemeal evolution of 
science rather than by revolutions. It brings together both the discoveries in 
science and the influence of the scientific community on the work of the 
individual scientist. In this context, it makes sense why the individual scientist 
may hold on firmly to what she may believe to be true even though she knows 
that it may conceivably be false. It so happens that in the actual practice of 
science the body of scientific knowledge is so vast that any scientist can judge 
at first hand only a hundredth of the total current output of science. Still the
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community of scientists jointly administers the advancement and 
dissemination of science (through a control of academic appointments, 
research grants, scientific journals, degrees, etc.) In so doing, the community 
establishes the current meaning of the terms ‘science’ and ‘scientist’. 
(Polanyi, 1958, pp. 216-217) The rest of society takes the meaning and truth 
of these terms on trust in the established scientific community.
Where consensus exists in the scientific community, it is usually held that by 
this consensus is meant the ‘fact’ that observations in science can be repeated and 
confirmed. Yet in reality this ‘fact’ is a different way of showing adherence to the 
consensus. No significant part of the observations of science is in reality ever 
repeated. If an attempt to confirm scientific observations fails, the blame is usually 
laid on the incompetence of the scientist who is seeking to confirm the observations. 
And if the observations are reliably repeated, this would still not be enough to justify 
the scientist’s acceptance of the generalizations that science sees as accruing from 
these observations. Neither would the choice of these particular observations as 
subjects of scientific observation be justified.
And finally, the truth of a generalization is not enough to make it part of 
science. Other coefficients must be present before a statement can be said to have 
scientific value, namely the statement must have reliability, systematic interest, and 
intrinsic interest. And so consensus in this sense is not principally about a common 
experience. It is rather about an appraisal of a common domain where those 
consenting are experts only of a narrow section of the whole.
But how would this process qualify to be called a consensus? According to 
Polanyi:
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“Each scientist watches over an area comprising his own field and some 
adjoining strips of territory, over which neighbouring specialists can also form 
reliable first-hand judgments. Suppose now that work done on the speciality of 
B can be reliably judged by A and C; that of C by B and D; and that of D by C 
and E; and so on. If then each of these groups of neighbours agrees in respect 
to their standards, then the standards on which A, B and C agree will be the 
same on which B, C and D agree, and on which C, D and E agree and so on, 
throughout the whole realm of science. This mutual adjustment of standards 
occurs of course along a whole network of lines which offers a multitude of 
cross-checks for the adjustments made along each separate line; and the system 
is amply supplemented also by somewhat less certain judgments made by 
scientists directly on professionally more distant achievements of exceptional 
merit. Yet its operation continues to be based essentially on the ‘transitiveness’ 
of neighbouring appraisals ....” (1958, p. 217)
A valid objection to this presentation is that it makes science look as if there 
is neither dissent nor room for dissent. In fact there is dissent e.g. in modem day 
physics. Polanyi’s suggestion then should be understood as an idealization on this 
point of how to resolve the differences there are in views. In this way the consensus 
has two roles. First, by it there is a continuous network of critics who maintain the 
same minimum level of scientific value in all accredited publications of science.
Secondly, the same network, with members relying on the expertise of 
neighbouring members of the network, is able to judge outstanding distinction using 
the same standards throughout the network. Appropriate decisions about the 
distribution of human and material resources as well as nodding to or halting novel 
departures in science can thus be made. Mistakes have been made and there have 
been delays in recognizing novelties. Further, dissent has at times dragged on for 
long within the scientific community. Nevertheless, “... we should acknowledge 
that we can speak of ‘science’ as a definite and on the whole authoritative body of 
systematic knowledge only to the extent to which we believe that [such] decisions
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are predominantly correct”. (Polanyi, 1958, pp. 217-218) In this last quotation, 
Polanyi is speaking at a meta-level. At this level, the hazardous nature of human 
knowledge20 (Polanyi, 1958, p. 245) in general and of scientific knowledge in 
particular, together with the imperfections of science, can be acknowledged. On the 
other hand, the efforts by scientists to arrive at an ideal of true knowledge about the 
world can be evaluated.
2.4 Conclusion: The tacit premises of science
At the end of this long and complicated argument, the question is relevant: 
What then are the premises or the presuppositions of science? Are the rules for 
correct procedure specifiable? Is substantial belief in the scientific propositions 
justifiable? And the answer is not direct. Polanyi holds on this point that the rules 
of correct scientific procedure and the beliefs and valuations we hold in science 
determine each other mutually. We posit what we expect to be the case and then we 
proceed accordingly, shaping our anticipations according to the success that our 
procedures have accorded us.
The beliefs are used to project the standards of evaluation and the evaluations 
are about the beliefs. (Polanyi, 1958, p. 161) There is a continuous adjustment of 
both poles as the scientific enterprise develops. The way we establish what end up 
being scientific facts is important in determining whether they are facts. Thus far, 
establishing the premises of science and likewise establishing facts is comparable to 
skills. Skills, according to Polanyi, are practiced without any focal awareness of 
their operational principles or premises. If anything, those premises are discovered 
in the practice of the skill. They can then be known focally and be passed on to the
20 On these grounds, Polanyi hopes to give a response to skepticism.
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one who wishes to learn the skill by re-embedding them into the practice of the skill 
as maxims. That way, the skill is improved.21
The body of science is so vast that there is no single scientist who knows an 
aspect of it in its entirety, enough to judge the validity and value of propositions 
made within it at first hand. The rest of the judgments made are accepted on trust of 
authority of other members of the scientific community. These members of the 
community have been accredited as scientists by yet other scientists. This happens 
in a complex chain. Each scientist can only accredit a small number within her area 
of research. She is accredited in turn by that small number she is accrediting and by 
others. There is then a series of second hand recognitions that spreads throughout 
the community and backwards in time. The whole community has the same masters. 
There is in that way a general consensus on what science is, what is scientific and 
what does not qualify to be called science.
But the commitment to authority and tradition in this community is not 
absolute or unconditional. The existing opinion is accepted as a competent 
authority, but not as a supreme one in identifying the subject matter called ‘science’. 
This latter must remain open-ended to an extent since science defines itself by and 
large in the very process of doing science. There is room for conflicting views 
within science itself. There is also the possibility to change beliefs and values 
considered hitherto fundamental. In that light, the premises of science are ever
21 On this point it should be pointed out that Polanyi is not oblivious of the fact that tacit knowledge 
can be made explicit in some form and to some extent for the purpose of passing it on. It is important 
to separate the imparting of this knowledge from the performance of the skill, or else hitherto 
subsidiary awareness of the skill will take the place of focal knowledge needed in performing the 
skill. We can also safely conclude in these circumstances that Polanyi does not think that the 
teaching of science can be limited to passing on of a list o f propositions. The skilful part needs to be 
passed on in the context of apprenticeship.
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changing as science keeps changing. These premises play a guiding role as the 
innovative scientist goes about her work of discovery and verification. Science 
keeps emerging from vagueness to ever deeper clarity. And so, Polanyi seems to 
have tapped into an original insight in the way philosophers of science up to and 
shortly after his time (verificationists, falsificationists, holders of the methodology of 
scientific research programmes, etc.) described science in their methodologies. 
Such methodologies, when they are justifiable, are only useful for scientific theories 
that are considered hitherto established. (Polanyi, 1958, p. 170) The formal criteria 
suggested by the mainline philosophers of science at the time of Polanyi can at best 
function as maxims or idealized and abstracted guidelines of backward looking 
scientific value and procedure. But methods keep changing and so should maxims 
of procedure.
The purpose of coming up with logical antecedents of science as furnished by 
some of the philosophies of science (e.g. Popper) should not be understood as aimed 
at arriving at forward looking axiomatic presuppositions of empirical inference. 
This way of understanding logical antecedents of science obscures the very purpose 
of coming up with premisses of science. In fact, the reason why such premisses 
have been upraised in the history of science is in order to help resolve conflicts and 
upheavals in science. In themselves, detached from their historical contexts, they 
are neither comprehensible nor convincing. Such postulates are a ‘highly attenuated 
summary’ of a body of knowledge which is itself a result of passionately sustained 
efforts of generations of people society has recognized as scientists.
The reason we hold on to the postulates reflects back and should lie in the 
body of knowledge they are meant to summarise. Science can then be seen as a vast 
system of beliefs handed down in history and organized by a specialized section of
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society. (Polanyi, 1958, p. 171) The element of our commitment to given scientific 
positions is then accounted for more accurately. Science is a system of beliefs to 
which we are committed and which cannot be represented in detached, impersonal 
and non-committal terms in the defence of objectivism. This is a closer description 
of science than one which tends to depict science as the acceptance of a formula. 
And given the passionate involvement in the establishment of scientific ‘facts’, 
rather than emphasize the infallibility of scientific positions, an accurate account 
represents their competence.
Intellectual passions in humans differ from similar passions in animals in the 
way that the human intellectual passions are attached to an articulate system -  
language. Thus, when the passions have been gratified in discovery etc, they can be 
passed on to a cultural system and thus become a heritage. In intellectual passion, 
we wish to gratify ourselves, not frivolously, but respectfully. We yield to a desire 
for self-education to the measure that our passions set for us. These passions differ 
from other passions in seeking to fulfil universal obligations rather than private 
satisfaction. Thus far, intellectual passions are both private and public at the same 
time.
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Part Three: Responding to the reception of the theory of tacit 
knowledge
128
Chapter Three: A critique of Tchafu Mwamba's sympathetic 
appreciation of Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge
3.0 Introduction
This chapter is a critical examination of the interpretation of Polanyi’s theory
of tacit knowledge by a recent sympathetic adherent to his philosophy of science -  
Tchafu Mwamba. I assume that I have made a defensible and faithful discussion of 
the theory up to now. Now I test my interpretation of the theory against the 
interpretation of Mwamba. How does Mwamba and other similar adherents agree or 
differ with my rendering? A few more aspects of the theory become clear in this 
examination.
Tchafu Mwamba has published his doctoral thesis on the thought of Michael 
Polanyi. (Mwamba, 2001) In a chapter, he discusses Polanyi’s theory of tacit 
knowledge.22 A critical examination of this chapter will reveal that Mwamba does 
only partial justice to the general notion of tacit knowledge. From the outset, I agree 
with Mwamba on two important ideas about tacit knowledge. First of all, I agree 
with him when he holds in general agreement with Polanyi that reports about 
scientific theory have been incomplete in having only given an account of what is 
clearly observed or expressed in logical terms. Thus far, he accurately remarks that 
“Polanyi’s aim is to describe a strategy for inquiry, more in keeping with the 
strategies of working scientists rather than the descriptions advocated by the logical 
positivists, or even by the ‘standard’ view.” (Mwamba, 2001, p. 9)
Secondly, I agree with him on the point that Polanyi’s most important and 
most original contribution to epistemology and to the philosophy of science lies in
221 limit my analysis to this chapter on tacit knowledge, but Mwamba goes much further to engage in 
the contribution that Polanyi has made to rationality and methodology.
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having insisted that personal/tacit knowledge not be assigned simply to the realm of 
the context of discovery. (Mwamba, 2001, p. 4)
Nevertheless, there are areas that I consider important to the whole theory of 
tacit knowledge, which need fine-tuning if the full potential of tacit knowledge as an 
important epistemological notion is to be gained.
3.1 Ob j ections to Mwamba's rendering of the
disco very/justification or psychological/logical distinctions
Mwamba does not give due emphasis to the fact that Polanyi steers clear of 
the debate on the separation between the psychological and the logical (or the 
contexts of discovery and justification) by showing that tacit knowledge is pervasive 
in all areas of knowledge including the logical. For Polanyi, the learning process 
(which we share with non-human animals) is governed by tacit capacities. It 
consists in the learner abiding by self-set standards and evaluating progress either 
through experience or from the feedback of the community of more experienced or 
more skilful counterparts in the learning process. Heuristics are not only at work 
where big discoveries are made. Rather, they are an attitude of the learner towards 
the environment in which the learner actively makes sense of the environment. The 
tacit capacities that enable the learner to proceed in this way are in turn guided by 
intellectual passion.
In the context of justification too, tacit capacities are at work. In the 
particular area of making a contribution to science, the scientist operates within a 
culture that defines science in a particular way, besides other specific views and 
practices. The justification of a novel scientific position pays subsidiary attention to 
all these -  it assumes them. An attempt to justify each of these views and practices
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would stall the process of justification. In addition, personally, the scientist is 
guided by a commitment to her (novel) position on which she seeks to convince or 
persuade other scientists. Even when she makes an effort to remain as objective as 
she can, she is not thereby detached and impersonal about her proposed novel 
position. And so the separation between the context of discovery and the context of 
justification, or the one between the psychological and the logical in that order, is for 
Polanyi not enlightening. Mwamba does not emphasize this point enough and this 
could be a source of criticism from proponents of the separation.
Mwamba does point out nevertheless, that Polanyi’s goal is not to describe a 
theory of the psychology or the sociology of scientific knowledge, nor of mapping 
the unconscious process of cognition nor the social determinants of science. 
(Mwamba, 2001, p. 5) But left as it is, this position can only invite criticism for not 
offering an alternative to the claim that Reichenbach, Popper and the critical 
rationalists have made that the psychological should be separated from the logical in 
epistemology. Polanyi’s point of departure is rather that tacit knowledge is 
pervasive -  it bridges the two sides of the separation. The divisions of ‘sociology of 
science’, ‘psychology of discovery’, etc. are of secondary epistemological 
importance therefore. And yet there are more parts of his analysis in which 
Mwamba seems to have subscribed to the separation between discovery and 
justification. He claims:
“My concern, and of deeper significance to the methodology of science, is with 
Polanyi’s theory that understanding is a process we know in as far as we 
exercise it, but find difficult to talk about and to describe explicitly. This is 
because we attend to the content of understanding and not to the process itself.
We attend either to actual scientific discoveries or to methodological principles 
but not simultaneously to both.” (Mwamba, 2001, p. 5)
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Here, Mwamba is extrapolating or borrowing from the notion of focal and 
subsidiary awareness in Polanyi, according to which we pay attention to some areas 
of knowledge only as clues while we focus on other areas. Thus we have subsidiary 
awareness of the first clue-like elements, and focal awareness of the objects of our 
investigation or observation. The subsidiary/focal distinction is a Polanyian context. 
But to apply it in the context of discoveries and the context of methodology would 
be to succumb to the very separation that Polanyi is seeking to undermine in his 
theory of tacit knowledge. There is a continuum from the simplest and inarticulate 
learning process (e.g. one carried out by a non-human animal) and the most 
abstracted and formalised scientific discovery in the sense that tacit knowledge 
operates in these two extremes and anywhere in the learning processes placed on a 
scale between these two extreme ends. Tacit knowledge pervades all of learning and 
all of discovery.
3.2 Evaluative observations on Mwamba's 'central theses' of 
Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge
According to Mwamba, the central theses of Polanyi’s theory of tacit 
knowledge are four:
(1) “True discovery, exemplified particularly by the progress of 
science, cannot be adequately explained in terms of a set of wholly explicit rules or 
algorithms, used either to find or to test theories
(2) Though public and social, knowledge is in varying degrees, and 
most importantly, inherently personal
(3) Not only is it impossible to make all knowledge explicit, since “we 
can know more than we can tell” but the knowledge that cannot (always) be 
specified is more fundamental than explicit knowledge ...
(4) Tacit and explicit knowledge are neither empirically nor 
theoretically completely separate nor independent processes. They interact in a kind 
of synergistic relation.” (Mwamba, 2001, p. 18)
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First of all the effort is commendable: that an understanding of Polanyi’s 
theory of tacit knowledge is rendered into a few clear theses. One of the criticisms 
levelled at Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge mainly from the quarters of analytic 
philosophy (Musgrave, 1968, Lakatos, 1978) is that it is not outlined in clear 
analysable theses. And so Mwamba is to be commended on initiating the effort to 
fill in this gap. However, it should be pointed out that it is neither by omission nor 
in a bid to remain vague, that Polanyi does not give such a concise summary of 
‘central theses’ of his theory of tacit knowledge. I suggest two reasons why Polanyi 
avoids such a summary. First of all, tacit knowledge does not lend itself readily to a 
summary of ‘central theses’ just in the same way that it defies a concise definition. 
This in turn is because tacit knowledge pervades all knowing in the sense that it is 
what is presupposed for any knowledge claim to be made. In other words, whenever 
we make a knowledge claim, there is a lot else towards which we only pay 
subsidiary attention in order to pay focal attention to what we claim to know. To 
give an example, the knowledge claim: ‘I know that this paper is white’ is in turn 
based on my currently tacit knowledge of paper and of white etc. And if I tried to 
make explicit all the knowledge on which I rely to make this knowledge claim, I 
would end up with an infinite regress of background knowledge.
The second reason why Polanyi does not give a precise set of ‘central theses’ 
of the theory of tacit knowledge is that such an effort would go against the very 
objective he sets himself -  to work against an objectivist approach to knowledge. 
As already pointed out, the objectivist approach to knowledge treats only explicit 
knowledge. Explicit knowledge can conceivably be summed up in a set of theses.
But knowledge is more than just explicit knowledge. Mwamba himself 
subscribes to the distinction there is between explicit and tacit knowledge in the
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description he gives of both. For Mwamba, the characteristics of explicit knowledge 
are: “precise analysis, verbal articulation, descriptive identification, observational 
objectivity and a clear distinction between the knower and the known”. (2001, p. 
29) On the other hand, the characteristics of tacit knowledge according to Mwamba 
are: “intuitive discovery, bodily expression, holistic recognition, embodied 
subjectivity, and a contextual distinction between the knower and the known ...”. 
(2001, p. 29) Mwamba makes a clear distinction between the two kinds of 
knowledge as he goes about to give a summary of the central theses.
Now, just because tacit knowledge defies summary or definition does not 
mean we should abandon and discourage every effort to summarise it into central 
theses. Caution must be exercised in choosing which of the many features of tacit 
knowledge to be the central one(s). It is therefore important to look at the theses that 
Mwamba has proposed as the central theses. My goal is not to replace Mwamba’s 
theses with other theses I consider as being more central, for I do not think that such 
central theses are crucial for the theory of tacit knowledge to be tenable.
The first thesis holds that “True discovery, exemplified particularly by the 
progress of science, cannot be adequately explained in terms of a set of wholly 
explicit rules or algorithms, used either to find or to test theories”. (2001, p. 18) I 
claim that the phrase ‘true discovery’ is misleading and it is based on a 
misunderstanding of Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge. For Polanyi, there is no 
‘true discovery’ as opposed to ‘untrue discovery’. He addresses discovery in 
general. His treatment of learning and heuristics as these are performed in science is 
different in degree and not in kind from what is practiced at other levels of learning. 
What distinguishes human learning and heuristics from non-human animal efforts at 
learning and solving problems is the use of language, Polanyi argues.
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A further problem with this first thesis is the phrase ‘adequately explained’. I 
claim that in terms of explaining, when we look back at advancements made in the 
area of science, there is a possibility of explaining them adequately because tacit 
knowledge can be rendered explicit. There will always be a tacit component to 
explicit knowledge, and therefore not all knowledge about a given scientific 
advancement or discovery can be rendered explicit at the same time. But at the 
moment that we choose to focus explicitly on what has up to now been tacit, we 
thereby in turn pay implicit attention to other areas.
The second thesis holds: “Though public and social, knowledge is in varying 
degrees, and most importantly, inherently personal”. (2001, p. 18) Mwamba is 
touching on an important thesis in the whole theory of tacit knowledge. Polanyi 
does address the personal nature of scientific knowledge. However, Mwamba puts 
the emphases in the wrong places. Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge underlines 
personal knowledge, but not in contrast to public and social knowledge. In fact it 
can be argued that organisations, cultures, scientific communities, etc. can have tacit 
knowledge. Rather, Polanyi underlines the personal nature of knowledge in 
opposition to the objectivist and impersonal tendency in accounts of how science 
works. In his elaboration of how we learn language and by extension how we arrive 
at scientific knowledge, Polanyi explains that the society within which we operate 
plays a key role. The knower tests her knowledge of the language against the 
approval of the community. Still, the learner of the language can come up with a 
neologism or a new use of a word (as in poetic licence). But in order to do this, the 
user of the language needs to have learnt how to come up with new words or new 
uses, and this skill is sanctioned by the community within which she learns and uses 
the language. The same can be extended to science in terms of making new
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discoveries. The community of scientists continues to play a key role even in what 
may end up being a revolutionary discovery or theory because the scientist who 
comes up with the novelty learns the skill of arriving at novelties within the 
scientific community. And so Mwamba should not oppose the ‘personal’ to the 
‘public and social’ in the theory of tacit knowledge.
The third thesis states: “Not only is it impossible to make all knowledge 
explicit, since “we can know more than we can tell” but the knowledge that cannot 
(always) be specified is more fundamental than explicit knowledge ...”. (2001, p. 18) 
As I have noted in my response to the first thesis, what is tacit knowledge at some 
point can be made explicit at some later point. What happens is that should we 
succeed in making erstwhile tacit knowledge in some area of investigation or 
engagement explicit, we rely in turn on implicit knowledge of some other area of the 
matter under investigation etc. An example is in the learning of a language. A 
language, e.g. a mother tongue can be passed on from parents to children just by 
allowing the child to grow up in the environment where the language is used. But a 
language can also be broken up into explicit grammar, idiom etc. and passed on to a 
learner. What went as tacit knowledge in the first instance has now been mostly 
made explicit in the second instance where there is a written grammar. And yet 
when a learner relies on the written grammar and idiom to learn the language, she 
must still rely on these tacitly in order to use the language. She cannot be thinking 
of the correctness of the grammar all the time if she is to become fluent in the 
language.
This example can be applied to other forms of language learning. And so 
Mwamba’s third thesis needs to be qualified by including that it is impossible to 
make all knowledge about a given aspect (e.g. of a scientific investigation) explicit
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at the same time and in the same aspect. Elsewhere, Mwamba admits of this 
element of tacit knowledge when he points out: “That one knows these tacit factors 
can be made clear by asking a person to focus on them, whereupon we may become 
quite articulate about the movement of our head and hands, and about the rational 
steps necessary to identify an object or an action. But then, some other factors will 
be supplying the tacit context within which this new focusing is taking place.” 
(2001, p. 29) And finally is the fourth thesis, i.e. “Tacit and explicit knowledge are 
neither empirically nor theoretically completely separate nor independent processes. 
They interact in a kind of synergistic relation.” (2001, p. 18) I think that this thesis 
is unproblematic and it agrees with my objections I raise about the other three 
theses.
Besides the objections about Mwamba’s proposed theses, there are some 
important omissions and ambiguities that should be pointed out. First of all, in what 
he proposes as the central theses, it is not made clear that tacit knowledge is skilful 
knowledge. In other words, similar to the perceiver in the act of perception, the 
knower participates in the act of knowing, filling in missing gaps and ignoring so- 
called ‘interfering’ or ‘irrelevant’ details in order to come up with a view that makes 
sense. Tacit knowledge is creative in this way. This is how the theory of tacit 
knowledge is better poised to explain heuristics than other objectivist theories of 
knowledge.
A second omission by Mwamba is the central role played by intellectual 
passion and commitment in tacit knowledge. The knower is motivated in her search 
for knowledge by the inarticulate or tacit belief that the knowledge is attainable. She 
is committed to what she is yet to discover and by the same tacit capacities she is
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able to recognise it when at last she attains it. The details of this aspect of tacit 
knowledge have been discussed earlier.
One ambiguity that needs clarification is the undue emphasis that Mwamba 
puts on the way Polanyi advocates for the inarticulate or the unproven. Mwamba 
holds that in his theory of tacit knowledge, Polanyi hopes “...to replace the self- 
evident foundational truths of critical thought with the knower’s pre-reflective 
context. This context is historically and culturally conditioned. Polanyi’s post- 
critical thought holds beliefs that are both non-explicit and ‘unproven’.” (2001, p. 
15) But represented in this way, Polanyi may seem to be choosing the inarticulate 
and unproven over and above the articulate and proven. And yet his goal is to show 
both the inarticulate foundations of what is articulate and the unavoidability of the 
inarticulate. His approach is more inclusive than Mwamba is giving him merit for. 
Polanyi allows room for the inarticulate and the unproven -  the tacit -  in such 
formalized rational processes like scientific reasoning. The pre-reflective, non­
explicit and ‘unproven’ characteristics of tacit knowledge pointed out by Mwamba 
are only part of a wider category of knowledge.
In conclusion to these observations, Mwamba’s effort to give a summary of 
central thesis looks like a step in the right direction. Some theses in it need to be 
revised to show a better understanding of his theory of tacit knowledge. A few more 
theses should be included before it is complete. But the task remains a daunting task 
for the theory resists being condensed into a few theses.
3.3 Mwamba on Polanyi’s solution to the Meno paradox
In Plato’s dialogue entitled Meno, Socrates is engaged with Meno in a
discussion about virtue. Socrates challenges Meno into accepting that he, Meno
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does not know what ‘virtue’ is. But Socrates offers to help Meno in searching for 
what ‘virtue’ might be. Meno objects to this offer by Socrates, pointing out: “But 
how will you look for something when you don’t in the least know what it is? How 
on earth are you going to set up something you don’t know as the object of your 
search?” To this Socrates replies by showing that this is a problem that faces all 
learning.
On the one hand, how would we find out what we do not know? On the 
other hand, why should we set out to search for what we already know? Socrates 
resolves this paradox by showing Meno, with the help of one of the servants 
answering questions without help, that learning is in fact recollection. The 
background of his solution is that we know with the help of our soul and the soul, 
according to what priests and poets teach, is immortal. Life and death are different 
phases that the immortal soul takes on at various times. And so what appears as 
learning is in fact a recollection of what the soul knew from an earlier existence in 
life. All nature is interrelated, and every memory can lead eventually to every other 
memory.
The paradox cannot be swept aside as trivial. Plato’s Socrates gives a 
solution to the paradox that is consistent with other areas of the platonic world view. 
What is surprising is, as Polanyi points out (Polanyi, 1967, p. 22) that even though 
the paradox (which he reduces to a dilemma, i.e. a: either we know what we are 
looking for, and then there is no problem, or b: we do not know what we are looking 
for, and thus we cannot recognize it when we find it) may be acknowledged, Plato’s 
suggested solution has not been overlooked yet unaccepted for so long. Problems 
have been solved over time and yet there is hardly an effort to resolve the paradox. 
Polanyi makes the bold step of suggesting that the theory of tacit knowledge may
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provide a solution to the paradox. The sum total of clues that the researcher uses 
both to single out a possible problem and to recognize the solution when she arrives 
at one, is part of tacit knowledge.
Polanyi’s bold suggestion is met with opposition from Michael Bradie and 
Herbert Simon. (Bradie, 1974, Simon, 1976) Using examples from mathematics, 
both Bradie and Simon claim that one of the homs of the dilemma proposed by 
Polanyi is false and consequently the paradox collapses. They argue that the false 
hom of the dilemma is the claim that knowing what we are looking for means there 
is no problem. The example that Bradie gives (and Simon takes up together with 
other examples of his own) is that a mathematician may seek to refute Goldbach’s 
conjecture that every prime number can be represented as the sum of two prime 
numbers. Such a mathematician, they maintain, knows what she is looking for -  
namely a counterexample -  an even number that cannot be represented as the sum of 
two prime numbers. Yet the problem of finding such a number remains. And so 
there can still be a problem even when we know what we are looking for.
Mwamba intervenes by pointing out that for Polanyi, ‘knowing what we are 
looking for’ begins already in the capacity to find a good problem with which to 
launch the inquiry. It is not merely limited to the solution or the answer to the 
problem. Taken in the context of the objection by Bradie and Simon to Polanyi’s 
proposed solution, Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge accounts for how the 
mathematician in question comes up with the idea of finding a counterexample to 
Goldbach’s conjecture -  why she thinks this is a fruitful problem. The 
mathematician could have scattered her search in innumerable other problems. It is 
not random that she chooses this particular one. The choice of a good problem is 
guided by the same tacit faculties as the recognition of the solution to the problem
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when at last it is arrived at. In fact the same tacit powers govern the actual process 
of solving the problem. Heuristics are being applied from the moment of the choice 
of a problem, through working out a solution to arriving at and recognizing the 
solution. As Polanyi holds, as the researcher seeks a solution to an identified 
problem, “Things are not labelled evidence in nature, but are evidence only to the 
extent to which they are accepted as such by us as observers.” (Polanyi, 1958, p. 30)
Bradie and Simon may have a strong point in pointing out that there may 
exist a formula, a way to solve a whole class of problems. But this would apply only 
for routine problems. At times of great scientific advancement, what is needed is a 
creative new problem. The counter-example that Bradie and Simon are proposing 
does not suffice when the problem is not a standard problem. Science allows for 
such moments when great originality is needed both in finding a totally new problem 
and an equally new solution to it. In Mwamba’s interpretation of Polanyi’s theory of 
tacit knowledge, Polanyi is dealing with such unique moments of science. 
(Mwamba, 2001, pp. 49-50) I disagree with him in this interpretation, as I have 
argued in my critique of the central theses proposed by Mwamba. Heuristics, I 
argue, pervade the whole learning process. And in relation to Plato’s dialogue, the 
paradox pointed out concerns the whole learning process.
The problem with Bradie and Simon is even deeper. When they point out 
that the mathematician seeking a counterexample to Goldbach’s conjecture “... 
knows that what he is looking for is a number which is not the sum of two primes 
...” (Bradie, 1974)23, they make an ambiguous claim. Bradie and Simon commit the 
fallacy of amphibology on the term ‘know’. One way to expose the fallacy is to ask 
the researcher what the number is. It turns out that the researcher knows the method
23 Emphasis in the original.
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by which to find the number, but does not know the actual number. And in fact, 
even when the researcher knows the method, she remains open to clues and 
heuristics that she cannot make fully explicit in that very method. There is a kind of 
knowledge she has which she cannot make explicit -  a tacit kind of knowledge.
Denying that there is a paradox by denying one of the lemmas does not help 
resolve the valid question posed by the Meno paradox. For Mwamba, Polanyi’s 
notion of tacit knowledge is borne out both logically and in experience. Logically, it 
is founded in the fact that logical arguments always have unstated or silent/tacit 
premises to them -  the so-called enthymeme. In experience we are always 
‘empathic’ in our observations, and it is through such ‘empathy’ that we join the 
dots in our stimulus. (Mwamba, 2001, pp. 52-53)
3.4 Mwamba’s answer to the 'vagueness' objection
Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge is easily criticised as being vague. In 
answer to this criticism, Mwamba has the following answer in line with D. Scott. 
By its very nature, tacit knowledge defies definition, because it is part of the very 
foundation on which the awareness of definition is made possible. Mwamba points 
out that all attempts to express Polanyi’s thought in analytical style are bound to be 
faced with difficulties. In addition, and quite accurately:
“... critics might argue that merely explaining that the tacit is not limited to the 
psychological aspect of knowledge does not clear up the confusion in Polanyi’s 
use of the term, especially since Polanyi seems to be applying the tacit 
interchangeably to three quite different components: to awareness, to mental 
acts, and to the subsidiary. He seems to treat these as if they were primitive 
terms needing no further clarifications notwithstanding that they make up the 
feature of knowing that analytic philosophers, if they mark it at all, consider 
anomalous, lucky, or anarchistic.” (2001, p. 56)
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In other words, Mwamba points out that there is an ambiguity almost 
inherent to Polanyi’s notion of tacit knowledge. He agrees with R. Gelwick (1977) 
whom he quotes as holding: “the objective ideal of knowledge omits two major 
areas of knowing: our subsidiary reliance upon clues and our integrative powers as 
persons.” (2001, p. 56) For Mwamba, Polanyi’s position suggests that even at the 
end of a rigorous analysis of our perception, there remains an irreducibly tacit 
dimension. “Indeed we never encounter anything or anyone absolutely directly and 
immediately in brute form. We never simply attend to something, but rather, of 
necessity, always attend from something to something.” (2001, p. 57)
For the simplest instances of knowledge, there is always an infinity of 
particulars relied upon and tacitly implicated. We cannot specify all the subsidiary 
factors or clues relied upon. This is not just because the content of such clues cannot 
be made explicit. Rather, it is because of the nature of knowledge. Once we turn 
our gaze to such clues, they lose their character or function as clues in the overall 
search for knowledge. They gain new meanings and play a new role in the whole 
search for knowledge. They are no longer clues. We no longer indwell them the 
way we indwell our clues in order to focus on what the clues point out to us.
Mwamba’s defence of Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge against the 
objection of vagueness fits in with the whole theory, but it leaves the theory exposed 
to an imprecise use of the tacit. Mwamba has pointed out at least three areas where 
Polanyi uses the term. The question remains -  what binds all these uses together 
consistently? My response is in two instances. First of all, it needs to be 
emphasised that our understanding of tacit knowledge must resist the urge towards 
objectivism. As I argued in the treatment of knowledge in general, the analytic 
tradition of epistemology seeks to understand and define knowledge in objectivist
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terms. But not all knowledge meets the objectivist standards. Not all knowledge 
can be made explicit. In that light then, the effort to designate adequate definitions 
for some of this tacit knowledge is understandably difficult though not fully 
impossible.
Secondly, I pointed out earlier in my discussion of the central theses of the 
theory of tacit knowledge as proposed by Mwamba, that heuristics and learning are 
central to the theory. In answer to this question of three varying uses of the term 
‘tacit’, a view of heuristics and learning is helpful. What is common in each of the 
three varying areas that Mwamba points out (i.e. awareness, mental acts and the 
subsidiary) is the urge to make sense of reality by the knower. Learning and 
heuristics -  both of them operating tacitly -  are the way the knower makes an effort 
to make sense of reality. In brief, I propose that the objection of vagueness be 
redirected to epistemology. If epistemology drops the objectivist assumptions (that I 
argue it makes in my discussion of knowledge above), and there is room for 
inarticulate or tacit knowledge, epistemology would stand to gain because the 
inarticulate is ubiquitous even in formalized and objective knowledge.
3.5 Mwamba's answer to the 'subjectivism' objection
Mwamba examines the objection of subjectivism levelled at Polanyi’s theory 
of tacit knowledge. It is claimed by some (Musgrave, 1968, Lakatos, 1983, Popper, 
1969) that Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge endorses subjectivism. In response, 
Mwamba points out quite accurately that Polanyi’s notion of the personal is not 
synonymous with the subjective. He notes that the personal in us, should be 
distinguished from the subjective. The personal actively enters into our 
commitments, while in our subjective states we merely endure our feelings. The
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personal is neither subjective nor objective in the objectivist sense of being 
impersonal and detached. For Mwamba in his interpretation of Polanyi, “The 
personal is a quasi-normative concept while the subjective is merely descriptive, 
non-normative, non-committal.” (2001, p. 61) In order to know the external world, 
we rely on the way we are in the world. It is always a personal experience. Even in 
scientific practice which relies on a prescribed and rigorous procedure, we need our 
personal discretion and judgment.
Mwamba goes into some detail in showing that Polanyi’s position that points 
out the limits of formalism indeed has similarities with the Godelian position to the 
same effect. Thus:
“Godel’s theorems are actually special, self-referential consequences of the 
requirement of consistency: in a consistent system, something must remain 
improvable. One improvable statement is the statement of that very fact, 
namely the statement that says of itself that it is unprovable (first theorem): you 
cannot prove a statement that says that it can’t be proved (and remain 
consistent). Another unprovable statement in a consistent system is the 
statement of consistency itself (second theorem). In addition, if the formal 
system has a certain stronger form of consistency, the sentence which asserts its 
own unprovability, called the Godel sentence, is also not refutable in the 
system.” (2001, p. 65)
Thus far, to Mwamba’s interpretation, the limitations in formalization that 
Godel’s theorems demonstrate are seen by Polanyi as an indicator that formal 
languages are similar to natural languages. Further, it becomes clear from the 
comparison with Godel’s theorems, formal systems function in virtue of informal or 
unformalizable ingredients in them. (Mwamba, 2001, p. 67) Tacit knowledge, as 
well as personal judgment, always comes in to help sustain a formal system. And 
so, Mwamba holds that Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge is essential in the
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understanding and growth of science. Mwamba regrets that it is rare to find it taught 
in colleges today, that the purpose of science is to discover the hidden reality 
underlying the facts of nature. He points out that the modem ideal of science is to 
establish a precise mathematical relationship between the data without 
acknowledging that if such relationships are of interest to science, it is because they 
tell us that we have hit upon a feature of reality. Citing Polanyi, Mwamba remarks 
that Polanyi’s aim is to restore the idea of reality at the centre of a theory of 
scientific inquiry. (Mwamba, 2001, p. 74, Polanyi, 1967)
My estimation of this position by Mwamba is that it leads Polanyi’s tacit 
knowledge far out into the minefield of the realism debate. There is an anachronistic 
element in Mwamba’s interpretation of Polanyi when Mwamba applies the term 
‘realism’ to Polanyi in a later period when the realism debate is advanced. I argue 
that there is room for adhering to Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge (even as far as 
it claims to be realistic in some sense) while at the same time remaining agnostic 
about realism or anti-realism. There is a way of adhering to the theory of tacit 
knowledge as operating within a descriptive or phenomenological context without 
making substantial metaphysical claims about the true nature of reality. Mwamba 
himself holds that Polanyi presents seeing as a process that involves the construction 
of objects seen, besides engaging the seer in a process of learning to see -  learning 
to see wholes. (Mwamba, 2001, p. 79) And so when our tacit capacities lead us to 
an aspect of nature, this aspect could be a confirmation about nature as it ‘really’ is 
or it could be a confirmation of our methods of learning and our heuristic strategies 
for learning about nature. I deliberately avoid the realism debate because I think it 
has no direct relevance to the theory of tacit knowledge.
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There is an elan in Polanyi’s theory to shift (unexaminedly, according to 
Harre, as cited in Mwamba, 2001, p. 82)24 from relations and processes regarding 
perception to conceptual and prepositional relations. But this can be stopped at 
discoveries without going further into explicating the nature (or ontology) of what is 
discovered. The question is whether Polanyi is careful enough to stop at that level. 
But Mwamba himself acknowledges that this latter is an additional step: “It is one 
thing to recognize rain as rain. It is quite another thing to understand why it rains 
and what rain really is. This understanding is not given in the perceptual forms 
themselves. It results from an intelligent insight into the connections between 
phenomena. It is literally added to the data of perceptual forms and events.” (2001, 
p. 83) And I argue that we do not have to go as far as that in order to find that 
Polanyi’s theory is defensible.
3.6 Conclusion
Mwamba interprets Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge sympathetically.25 
But his interpretation still needs to be fine-tuned. He touches on areas of the theory 
that are central, but at the same time he omits some that would have helped the 
theory to be better understood and perhaps better received. The effort of Mwamba 
could have been to understand Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge from the point of 
view of an analytic philosophy of science. The problem with this approach is that 
analytic philosophy of science has its own conceptual baggage to deal with, 
questions in epistemology, philosophy of language, etc. that have not been resolved
24 Mwamba citing from Harre. (Harre, 1982)
25 A few other sympathetic interpreters of Polanyi’s theory o f tacit knowledge include: Stefania 
Ruzsits Jha, (2002) and H. Prosch, (1986). They too have their strong points and areas where I would 
argue that they have misinterpreted Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge. But to include this treatment 
at this point would lead me far afield.
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and have almost stalled. It would not serve the purpose of understanding the theory 
of tacit knowledge adequately if this baggage is brought along to an interpretation of 
the theory. And if at the end of the effort it is found out that the theory of tacit 
knowledge sits uncomfortably with a few areas of analytic philosophy of science, as 
I argue throughout that it does, then the theory needs to be taken on its own merits. I 
foresee a possibility of breaking new ground and finding solutions to age-old 
questions in analytic philosophy of science if a sympathetic and correct 
interpretation of Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge is made.
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Chapter Four: A response to Alan Musgrave on Polanyi’s theory 
of tacit knowledge
4.0 Introduction
In accounts on the methodology of science, Polanyi’s theory of tacit
knowledge receives scant, oblique, and often dismissive consideration. Many 
methodologists of his time simply ignore him. Some, mainly of the Popperian 
streak, address him often in the ways I mention above. It is therefore a privilege to 
find a direct, sustained and systematic response by a Popperian -  Alan Musgrave -  
to Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge. Revealingly, the contrast there is in titles 
between Alan Musgrave’s (unpublished) doctoral thesis, “Impersonal Knowledge: A 
Criticism of Subjectivism in Epistemology” (1968), and Michael Polanyi’s main 
work, Personal Knowledge, Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (1958), is not 
coincidental.
Alan Musgrave sets out, in the main, to critique what he presents as a 
subjective element in Michael Polanyi’s epistemology of science. On his part, 
Musgrave belongs decidedly to the school of the Popperians -  disciples of Popper 
who subscribed to the latter’s idea of falsificationism and by extension, of critical 
rationalism (henceforth CR, others include David Miller, etc.). CR is broadly 
speaking falsificationism applied to the whole of rationality beyond merely scientific 
rationality. Falsificationism is the position that theories in science are bold 
conjectures that are either corroborated or falsified depending on how they fare 
when faced with evidence in crucial experiments. When this view expands into 
critical rationalism, it puts a certain understanding of logic -  deductive logic
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understood as a method for ‘probing rather than proving’ (Miller, 1994, p. ix) at the 
centre of reasoning.
In his description of CR, David Miller (1994, pp. 66-67) holds that criticism 
is naturally central to CR. The way to critically examine any hypothesis that is 
presented as a candidate for truth is not on the grounds of whether or not it is 
actually true, but whether, if false it can be overthrown and rejected. Thus logic 
comes to play a crucial role in CR. In science, conjectures or hypotheses are 
proposed and from these, further conjectures are derived. The conjectures can be 
tested, e.g. by experience.
When the consequences of the derived conjectures are found to be false, they 
are to be rejected together with the original conjectures. This can be done because 
valid derivations (i.e. deductions) transmit truth and retransmit falsity backwards 
from the conclusion to at least one of the premises. And so logic (also called reason) 
is given a central role in CR in criticizing the proposed hypotheses. (Miller, 1994, 
pp. 66-67) Deductive logic understood in this light as the core of reason (Miller, 
1994, p. ix), is seen as providing an impersonal and objective method for being 
rational. In that vein, it becomes understandable why proponents of CR are 
intolerant to whatever they perceive as subjectivism, for to them subjectivism leads 
to relativism. In contrast, objectivity is the ideal and standard that governs the 
probation of scientific hypotheses.
At some points of his work, Polanyi addresses the work of Karl Popper 
directly or in general on the logic or methodology of science (Polanyi, 1958, p. 167). 
Polanyi is opposed to the Popperian misrepresentation of science which depicted 
science as ‘objective’ in the sense of being detached and detachable from the
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scientist and thus impersonal. In particular, he finds fault with falsificationism and 
its attendant CR. He thus advocates for “personal knowledge” based on his theory 
of tacit knowledge as a more accurate representation of how science works. I make 
the conscious assumption that Musgrave’s doctoral thesis written at the suggestion 
and the guidance of Karl Popper himself suffices as a representative Popperian 
response26 to the Polanyian core position of tacit and personal knowledge and thus 
of the theory of tacit knowledge. The response is a refutation of Polanyi’s tacit and 
personal knowledge. And so the question is: How adequate is this Musgravean 
response and by extension the Popperian or CR-ist response to Polanyi’s theory of 
tacit knowledge and personal knowledge? A further preliminary assumption I make 
is that any methodology of science will be judged upon how closely it comes to 
balancing both a normative account of science and an informative account of how 
science actually works.
4.1 Musgrave’s global understanding of Polanyi
Musgrave describes Polanyi’s view of the epistemology of science as a
“subjectivist theory of scientific objectivity”. (Musgrave, 1968, p. 129, and Chapter 
Vffl) Instead, he argues for impersonal knowledge. Impersonal knowledge, 
according to him, is objective, public or interpersonal knowledge. It is the more
77fruitful of only two possible methodological approaches to knowledge , the other
26 The assumption is based on the Acknowledgements by Alan Musgrave in his Doctoral Thesis, 
where he expresses his double indebtedness to Sir Karl Popper, both as the one who suggested the 
topic to him and being the source of the views defended in the Thesis (!). That is in addition to much 
advice, encouragement, helpful criticisms and suggestions throughout the work. This should suffice 
as a basis for the claim that Musgrave’s thesis is in a true Popperian voice.
27 It is worth noting that Musgrave argues in terms of epistemology as a whole. Even with this 
holistic view of epistemology, Musgrave et al. include the epistemology o f science as a first among 
equals, as epistemology at its best -  epistemology to emulate. The question is: Is the epistemology of 
science distinguishable from general epistemology? There are indications that in mainline traditional 
approaches to epistemology, the two are distinguishable. The epistemology o f science seems to be 
able to proceed with a working definition instead of the definitive truth. General epistemology, on 
the other hand, can afford to occupy itself with ideals of truth and also to pick and choose between
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approach being the personal, psychological or subjective approach. Impersonal 
knowledge, as Musgrave presents it, is directly opposed to personal knowledge in 
that the latter is subjective. In his words:
“An epistemologist can approach human knowledge from one of two very 
different points of view. He can approach it from the personal or psychological 
or subjective side, and consider knowledge as systems of ideas or beliefs in the 
minds of human beings. I shall call this the subjective approach to knowledge, 
or subjective approach in epistemology, and shall sum it up, very crudely, in 
the slogan ‘Knowledge is something in people’s minds’. One can also 
approach knowledge from the interpersonal, or public, or objective, side, (sic.) 
and consider it as systems of statements, or propositions, or theories. I shall 
call this the objective approach to knowledge, or the objective approach in 
epistemology, and sum it up, again very crudely, in the slogan ‘Knowledge is 
something in books’.” (1968, p. 8)28
To be fair to Musgrave, he does admit that he is not seeking to discuss which 
of the two approaches he cites captures the fundamental nature or essence of 
knowledge. He admits that knowledge is both subjective (personal) and objective 
(interpersonal). Rather, he hopes to show that objective, impersonal knowledge is a 
more fruitful and accurate way to describe the way science works. (1968, p. 8) That 
is a weaker position than to attempt to identify the fundamental nature of human 
knowledge in science. And this weaker position could be a way to find common 
ground between Musgrave and Polanyi. But again, as a general remark, Musgrave 
misunderstands ‘personal’ in Polanyi’s notion of tacit and personal knowledge.
First of all, Musgrave conflates subjective knowledge with personal 
knowledge. As long as Musgrave considers that Polanyi is a subjectivist, Musgrave 
misses the point of Polanyi’s notion of tacit and personal knowledge. Polanyi would
plausible and implausible methods of arriving at the desired truth. What is more, while the 
epistemology of science works close to phenomena, general epistemology can afford to be abstract 
from any phenomena and rely entirely on some given rules o f logic.
28 Emphasis in the original.
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agree on the one hand that subjectivism is counterproductive to science (as 
Musgrave rightly argues). Polanyi asserts on the other hand that tacit and personal 
knowledge is at the core of scientific practice properly understood and represented. 
He holds on this matter that the difference between personal and subjective 
knowledge is not merely one of degree but one of kind. In subjective knowledge, 
there is no intellectual commitment to the truth i.e. what is known as being capable 
of unfolding in yet unpredictable ways in the future. Subjectivism further lacks 
universal intent -  the hopeful drive to discover (passively) and to realize (actively) 
that what is held by as knowledge by the person will find corroboration in the 
community of knowledge (e.g. a scientific community) and universally. (Polanyi, 
1958, pp. 65, 201)
Musgrave could respond to this criticism by pointing out that even granted 
the possible misunderstanding within which he may have conflated subjectivism 
with ‘personalism’ in knowledge, his criticism goes even deeper. He is opposed to 
the whole ‘psychologistic’ approach to knowledge (a criticism that I treat below). 
Those who subscribe to the ‘psychologistic’ approach to knowledge focus more on 
the knower and on the psychological aspects of knowledge than on knowledge itself. 
He could thus reply that the above criticism does not take his suggestion of 
objectivism seriously enough. He could maintain that it is possible to think of 
contents of knowledge (objective facts) without thinking of the knower (subject, 
person, etc.).
Epistemology, and especially the epistemology of science should (and in the 
CR-ist view does) concern itself with these objective contents rather than on the 
processes by which the scientist arrives at those contents. In that sense, theories of
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science would be evaluated, justified or given up, on the merits of the grounds of 
their contents rather than on the grounds of the person of those who propound them.
At the level of the justification of scientific theories (which is one of the 
proper subject of the philosophy of science), a consideration of the persons of those 
propounding theories would lead to subjectivism and consequently to relativism in 
the following manner. Relativism results when each individual scientist holds on to 
her theory as true even if it was contrary to another theory. And so, Musgrave 
would argue, for the sake of ensuring the conditions of the possibility of science, 
objectivism is a better option than subjectivism. Science is about the truth or the 
falsity of theories propounded within it. And in the case of subjectivism and 
resultant relativism, a theory cannot be tested for truth or falsity.
4.2 Contextualizing Musgrave's accusation of 'psychologism'
This is how Musgrave comes to accuse Polanyi’s epistemology of
‘psychologism’. Musgrave claims that the epistemologist who is concerned about 
the contents of her mind must end up in methodological solipsism when she 
considers that all that she knows are the contents of her mind, even when these 
contents are beliefs about the world outside her mind. (1968, p. 20) When the 
epistemologist has turned her attention to the contents of her mind, she faces the 
problem of how to catalogue the ‘raw materials’ of her knowledge and to come to a 
way in which she can show how the rest of her knowledge is derived from this 
catalogue. She is concerned, according to Musgrave, with the explaining how the 
contents of her mind come to be there. This problem, according to Musgrave “... is, 
properly speaking, a factual problem of psychology. We might call it the problem o f 
the psychological genesis o f beliefs, or the problem o f the psychology o f discovery,”
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(1968, p. 22)29 or a “factual problem concerning knowledge as a psychological 
entity.” (1968, p. 48) And so the initially methodological solipsist becomes an 
actual epistemological solipsist when she cannot really know, by inspecting the 
contents of her mind, whether anything exists outside the contents of her mind. 
(1968, p. 26)
The methodological turned epistemological solipsist must deal with an 
additional problem besides the genesis of the contents of her mind, namely how to 
justify her beliefs. To Musgrave, traditional epistemology has often fused and thus 
confused these two clusters of problems. They should be kept apart. Addressing 
Polanyi’s epistemology, Musgrave declares that the focal point of his own criticism 
of Polanyi’s theory of knowledge (among other ‘subjectivist theories of knowledge) 
is “... the contention that we must distinguish sharply between two sets of problems: 
first, psychological problems concerning subjective knowledge (ideas or beliefs); and 
second, non-psychological problems concerning objective knowledge (the contents 
of ideas or beliefs).” (1968, p. 47) The problem of the justification of beliefs is non- 
factual and non-psychological. It deals with truth and falsity and with the relation 
between a given set of beliefs held by one knower and other beliefs held by other 
knowers. It is a “problem about knowledge approached objectively.” (1968, p. 49) 
Musgrave thus argues that the answer to the psychologistic tendency is to insist on 
objectivity.30
Musgrave does not come up with a clear definition of ‘psychologism. E. 
Sober is an example of those who make the accusation of psychologism about other 
epistemologists. Sober defines ‘psychologism’ as “... a family of views, all tending
29 Emphasis in the original.
30 Gregory Currie has critically investigated the objectivist trend in Frege and Popper and he 
addresses some of the positions of some Popperians including Musgrave. (1978)
155
to downplay or deny distinctions between epistemology and logic on the one hand 
and psychology on the other.” (Sober, 1978, p. 167) Sober then clarifies that 
psychologism breaks down into two forms. First there is epistemological 
psychologism, which “... denies that there is any question of justifying a logical rule 
or epistemological maxim above and beyond the question of whether it is in fact 
followed by practice”. Besides that, there is metaphysical psychologism which holds 
that “... the laws of logic and the characterization of rationality that epistemology 
seeks to formulate are about human mental activity.” (Sober, 1978, p. 167)
This definition of psychologism in both of its manifestations fulfils the 
purpose of this discussion for two reasons. First of all, it shows what the accusers 
think is a problem with those they accuse of psychologism, namely that these latter 
do not make the needed difference between psychology and logic/epistemology, and 
secondly because it shows that in his critique of Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing, 
Musgrave is referring to epistemological psychologism.
4.2.1 Roots of the psychologism accusation in Reichenbach and 
Popper
Musgrave fits in a wider context of philosophers arguing against 
‘psychologism’. The accusation of psychologism spans over a long period in the 
history of philosophy. A few lines would therefore not do enough justice in 
attempting to address it. But what is within the ambit of this discussion is to outline 
a brief history or genealogy marking the major positions, with the intention of 
finding a fitting response using Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge. Thus far, the 
direct source of Musgrave’s psychologistic accusation in Polanyi’s theory of tacit 
knowledge is Karl Popper. (Popper, 1959, p. 99, 1963) For Musgrave, Popper has 
picked on a salient point when he points out that both empiricist and intellectualist
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classical epistemologists have confused two problems: the justification of beliefs on 
the one hand and the genesis of beliefs on the other hand. According to Musgrave’s 
interpretation of Popper, the classical epistemologists (both empiricist and 
intellectualist) have tried to answer questions about the two areas in one stroke by 
providing what Popper calls ‘sources of knowledge’. Thus beliefs can be 
psychologically derived from these ‘sources’ and the reference to such ‘sources’ 
should provide the logical derivation or justification of the beliefs. For Popper, both 
the empiricists and intellectualists agreed that the two questions could be answered 
in one stroke, even though they disagreed on the nature of the ‘sources’. (Musgrave, 
1968, p. 49)
Popper’s analysis (Popper, 1959, 1963) and consequent attack on 
psychologism in turn refers to and shares something with a similar analysis by 
Reichenbach. Reichenbach separates the field of the physicist from that of the 
philosopher. He traces the division of labour between the physicist and the 
philosopher to the limitation of human capacities. In that sense, the goal of the 
physicist is to discover relations that can be empirically verified. The methods of 
the philosopher are analytical and critical and not predictive. On the other hand, the 
physicist may be guided by a certain faith mid guesswork, but the philosopher is not 
interested in the thought process that leads to the discoveries. The philosopher deals 
with the logical analysis of completed theory and with the relationships that help 
establish the validity of the completed theory. The physicist deals with the context 
of discovery, and the philosopher deals with the context of justification. 
(Reichenbach, 1949, p. 292) This is an application of a more general view by 
Reichenbach as I expose below.
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It must be acknowledged that Popper does not reproduce Reichenbach’s 
position in every aspect. Reichenbach holds that science is in need of a principle of 
induction, and no serious scientist can contest the need for a principle of induction. 
Popper disagrees with the need of such a principle and opts for deductivism. He 
argues that such a principle of induction would never be free from the problem of 
induction as discussed by Hume. Another point on which Popper disagrees with 
Reichenbach is the view that epistemology is engaged in a ‘rational reconstruction’, 
unless according to Popper this reconstruction is a “logical skeleton of the procedure 
of testing” a proposed hypothesis. (1959, pp. 31-32)
Nevertheless, what both Reichenbach and Popper share is the view that the 
epistemology of science should be rid of psychologism. Popper proposes a logical 
approach. While he agrees with Polanyi that there can be no logic of discovery, 
logic referring to deductive logic, the two differ in their responses to this belief. 
Polanyi is willing to concede that an alternative to ‘logic’ is not necessarily 
irrational, while Popper holds that anything outside deductive logic is irrational. 
And so Popper claims that that discovery contains an element of irrationality -  a 
creative intuition, “an intellectual love of the objects of experience”. (1959, p. 32) 
For Popper, this part of doing science has no place in epistemology because 
epistemology deals with proposed hypotheses and their logical properties and 
relations with other similar hypotheses. Polanyi, on his part is willing to rethink the 
traditional notions of epistemology in order to account for what has for long been 
downplayed in an objectivist understanding of epistemology.
As indicated above, further backwards in the genealogy of the accusation of 
psychologism, and more generally on the difference between the context of 
discovery and the context of justification as applied to the difference between
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psychology and epistemology, Reichenbach holds an interesting view. He argues 
that because the structure of knowledge is the system of connections as it is followed 
by the thinking process, there is a temptation to understand epistemology as a 
description of the process. Rather, epistemology is about the system of logical 
connections and not about the actual thinking process. The psychology of the 
thinking process fluctuates and may skip logical operations needed for a complete 
exposition. So epistemology should be separated from psychology. Epistemology is 
therefore normative -  constructing a thinking process as it ought to occur linking the 
starting point to the end result if it is to be a consistent system. Epistemology is 
therefore a substitute of the real process -  a ‘ rational reconstruction’ -  a phrase 
carried over from Carnap’s rationale Nachkonstruktion. As a background to the 
position that Popper and Musgrave take up, Reichenbach continues to claim:
“Many false objections and misunderstandings of modem epistemology have 
their source in not separating these two tasks; it will, therefore, never be a 
permissible objection to an epistemological constmction that actual thinking 
does not conform to it. ... In spite of its being performed on a Active 
constmction, we must retain the notion of the descriptive task of epistemology.
The constmction to be given is not arbitrary; it is bound to actual thinking by 
the postulate of correspondence. It is even, in a certain sense, a better way of 
thinking than actual thinking. In being set before the rational reconstmction, 
we have the feeling that only now do we understand what we think; and we 
admit that the rational reconstmction expresses what we mean, properly 
speaking. ... If a more convenient determination of this concept of rational 
reconstmction is wanted, we might say that it corresponds to the form in which 
thinking processes are communicated to other persons instead of the form in 
which they are subjectively performed.” (Reichenbach, 1938, p. 4)
While this view by Reichenbach is widely held among the CR-ists, they do 
not analyse or explicate the phrase ‘postulate of correspondence’. This is an 
important term because it is the link between epistemological theory as proposed by
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Reichenbach and the CR-ists, to actual thinking. It prevents the logic-driven 
epistemology from becoming totally out of touch with and irrelevant to actual 
thinking. That is why the concept of ‘postulate of correspondence’ needs to be 
explained. Does it, for example operate like an analogy between the thinking 
process and (deductive) logic? Is it a set of highly abstract logical relations that both 
the reconstruction and the actual process must correspond with? Is it, in the 
language of the CR-ists a part of the psychology of knowing?
But in the long run again, it is difficult to see the virtues of this concept. It 
multiplies the number of logical relations. Beyond the logical relations between the 
logic-driven rational reconstruction that is the subject matter of epistemology and 
the actual thinking process, there are the relations between each of these with the 
concept itself. In other words, there are three ‘entities’ to deal with, namely: the 
actual thinking process, the rational reconstmction, and the postulate of 
correspondence. It is an unnecessary introduction to which Occam’s razor is to be 
applied. The problem lies in trying to separate the psychological from the 
epistemological while still admitting that the two are related. The solution should be 
integrative -  in finding a way to see them as mutually beneficial to us in our 
understanding of how we know. I argue that Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge 
provides such an integrative solution.
4.2.2 Psychologism in western philosophy - Martin Kusch's account
Following up further backwards on the genealogy of the anti-psychologism
argument, in his turn Reichenbach owes the view of separating psychology from 
philosophy in general (and the philosophy of science in particular) to an earlier 
tradition. There is before Reichenbach and Popper an effort to rid philosophy of a 
‘psychologistic’ trend. Kusch has traced the history of psychologism. The position
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of philosophy relative to psychology as two very distinct (even irreconcilable) areas 
of inquiry is a certainty only to a few traditional minds. And the developments in 
cognitive science have further made the certainty less clear. To these traditional 
minds, Bloor points out in a foreword: “[Philosophy], ... deals with knowledge, with 
what makes something into knowledge rather than mere belief. Psychology, by 
contrast, deals with the processes and conditions of coming to know. These are 
quite different and disjoint concerns. Psychology deals with causes, philosophy with 
reasons. Philosophy concerns truth; psychology cannot rise above belief and taking- 
for-trae.” (Kusch, 1995, p. xi)
As Kusch points out, western philosophy in general has from the end of the 
19th Century to the beginning of the 20th Century and until recently been “... hostile 
to the idea that central epistemological, logical or metaphysical questions could be 
answered by the natural or social sciences.” (1995, p. 1) According to him (1995, 
pp. 2-3) psychologism first broke into German philosophy around the time of the 
death of Hegel (1831) when idealistic philosophy and the whole philosophical 
enterprise fell into disrepute, and was being replaced by natural sciences.
Philosophers then adopted a naturalistic or positivistic approach, namely that 
philosophy too should be subjected to the ideal of knowledge and the justification of 
the empirical sciences. It was at this time that Feuerbach, Marx and Engels went as 
far as developing materialistic philosophies. Thus philosophical problems in 
epistemology, logic, ethics, etc. would have to be solved by empirical research. 
Logic was particularly approached as a branch of psychology -  as an empirical 
generalisation of the way human beings reason -  by British empiricists like Locke, 
Hume and Mill and by some German logicians like Erdmann, Lipps and Sigwart.
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Frege and Husserl come to rescue philosophy from this erroneous path when 
they attack this naturalism in philosophy around 1900. Both of them argued that the 
doctrine of psychologism is self-refuting. According to Frege, logic and arithmetic 
are not about mental contents. Even if human psychology changed, and even in the 
absence of thinking animals, the sum of two and three would continue to be five. 
And so, arithmetical and logical statements do not depend on the psychology of 
thinkers for their truth value. Logic and arithmetic are not about mental entities for 
they do not depend on mental entities. (Sober, 1978, p. 167) Kusch reports that 
Frege was initially ignored by mathematicians and logicians on the continent. His 
critique of psychologism was adopted by Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein and many of 
the analytical philosophers from Carnap and Popper, to Sellars. (1995, p. 3)
Yet in fact, Frege and Husserl did not solve the problem of psychologism, for 
it continued to be a question in the philosophies of Reichenbach, Popper, and 
Musgraves and the CR-ist school of thought. Neither do the CR-ists, and 
particularly Musgrave and Popper, give a convincing remedy following this 
diagnosis. One reason for the continued existence of this ‘problem’ is, as Kusch and 
Nottumo point out, that the accusation of ‘psychologism’ is a blanket and 
systematically vague term with no clear agreed definition that has been used even 
against self-declared anti-psychologists (like Frege and Popper) those who are 
purportedly fighting it. (Nottumo, 1985, p. 9, Kusch, 1995, pp. 4-5)31 The 
accusation of ‘psychologism’ fails the objectivist or precision test set by analytic 
philosophy. It is not a precise term. It stands for everything that is not objectivist in
31 Kusch has given a series of varying definitions of ‘psychologism’. (1995, pp. 4-6) On top of that, 
he has provided a table of philosophers accused of psychologism and those who accuse them. 
According to that list, and cited by Kusch, Frege is accused of psychologism by Kitcher, (1979).
More interestingly, Popper is reported to be accused o f psychologims both by Pandit (1971, p. 89) 
and by Willard (1984, p. 200).
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the CR-ist sense of objectivism (which in the epistemology of science and in 
methodology is seen as concerning logical relations between hypotheses by CR-ists 
after Popper). Given such a wide scope for the application of the term, it denotes 
subjectivism (Musgrave, 1968), personal and tacit knowledge (as misunderstood by 
Musgrave), the psychology of science, etc.
4.2.4 Musgrave on psychologism in Polanyi's theory of tacit 
knowledge
Thus in line with the anti-psychologistic tradition traced above, Musgrave is 
bent on dissociating the origin of interesting ideas (e.g. scientific discoveries: how 
they arise in the mind of a scientist) from what he calls the ‘objective merits and 
demerits’ of the ideas. He maintains that the origins can shed little light on the 
merits and demerits. A fitting counter-argument to this objectivist position by both 
Popper and Musgrave is given by Currie. Currie objects to Popper’s and 
Musgrave’s claim that epistemology, even the epistemology of science, is about the 
logical interrelations e.g. between hypotheses.
Although it would be unreasonable to include it in the results of a test that 
someone felt a deep conviction about the results, in empirical science it is assumed 
that the observation has been reliably carried out by somebody reliable. (Currie, 
1978, pp. 155ff.) If the rationality of our methods (e.g. of justification) depended 
entirely on some objective logical relations, then we would not be able to rule out 
the tossing of a coin to decide between competing theories. The tossing of a coin is 
objective given that we know it is a fair coin and the method is agreed upon 
beforehand by all concerned. On the contrary, in the long run it matters that a 
scientist has carried out the observations and registered the impression the 
observations make on her and how strong or weak they are. Currie calls this an
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argument for a ‘whiff of subjectivism’ -  i.e. subjectivism as Popper and Musgrave 
understand it -  observational basic statements made based on perceptual evidence. 
(Currie, 1978, pp. 155-165) And yet this is not to argue that our senses give us 
indubitable knowledge. Our senses do mislead us at times, but again they are the 
only means we have of ever coming up with so-called ‘objective’ theories about the 
world.
When Musgrave and the CR-ists limit their epistemology of science to 
dealing with the logical relations between hypotheses, there is a hidden assumption 
that science comes up with a set of indubitable truths upon which, then, the 
epistemologist can apply the logical relations. There must, in the limit be a 
hierarchy of hypotheses with those that merit being manipulated logically on the one 
extreme and those that are not worth such manipulation on the other end. Otherwise 
the epistemologist would have an infinite task to apply her logical toolbox to all the 
available hypotheses.
Yet as soon as this epistemologist admits to a hierarchy, then the criterion of 
placing the various hypotheses in their place in the hierarchy points towards some 
empirical report about how the hypotheses were arrived at or chosen. Yet such a 
report would fall under psychologism/subjectivism, for it would be introducing the 
‘sources’ of the hypotheses. Currie has argued for a whiff of subjectivism on those 
lines. In my opinion, Currie calls this a plea for a whiff of subjectivism in order to 
fit within the mindset of the CR-ists that divides knowledge into objective and 
subjective. Polanyi’s theory of knowledge allows for a third alternative -  the 
personal element in knowledge which as I discussed in an earlier chapter accounts 
for the commitment of the knower to knowing the truth about reality as well as keep 
her open to the possibility that she may be wrong.
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On the other hand, let us imagine that science arrived at a set of indubitable 
theories that were proved to be true. Still, the objectivist epistemology that 
Musgrave and the CR-ists are proposing would not be fruitful. Neither the set of 
theories nor the logical relations between them can be rendered fully objective. As I 
have discussed earlier in outlining the nature of tacit knowledge, articulate or 
‘objective’ (i.e.in the objectivist view) knowledge relies on inarticulate, tacit 
elements. There cannot be rendering of knowledge that makes all knowledge 
objective in terms of being articulate. And so both the set of would-be ‘true and 
indubitable’ theories, and the logical relations would rely in turn on inarticulate or 
tacit elements.
4.3 An examination of proposed non-psychologistic questions
In the CR-ist and anti-psychologistic effort of detaching what he calls
psychological aspects from the epistemological ones, Musgrave holds:
“I ... argue that when we evaluate our knowledge, this has nothing to do with 
knowledge considered as a subjective or psychological phenomenon. In order 
to evaluate the content of a belief, or a theory, we ask such questions as “Is the 
theory true or false?”, “Does it explain a lot?”, “Does it solve its problem?”, “Is 
it an advance on previous theories?”, “Is it compatible or incompatible with 
previous theories?”, “Does it perhaps follow from some other theory?” or “Is it 
consistent with the available evidence?”. Now none of these questions has 
anything to do with the way in which the inventor of the theory, or anybody 
else, came to believe the theory, or with the strength of anybody’s belief in the 
theory, or even with whether anybody believes the theory at all. The questions 
all concern objective properties of theories, which hold independently of 
anybody’s belief in those theories, and even whether anybody is conscious of 
the theories at all.” (1968, p. 65)
This cited paragraph shows a number of problems with the CR-ist approach 
to the epistemology of science, especially in its critique of psychologism. In the first
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place, if the so-called objective properties are detachable from the beliefs of the 
scientist to the extent that the scientist need not believe in her positions, the question 
is: what use is such objectivity at all? For as Polanyi endeavours to show, the 
scientist does believe in her positions and her belief matters to her in the process of 
coming up with a theory. There is commitment to her theory or hypothesis, which 
commitment is useful in motivating her research, in arriving at a solution to her 
question, and in arguing for it and publishing it.
Besides commitment, the scientist engages in evaluation and judgment at 
various steps of her research. Besides using her evaluative judgment to select the 
methods of observation, experimentation and calculation to undertake, and the 
interpretation of the results, she uses it in interpreting the given laws. (Dewey, 1939, 
p. 174) The evaluative judgment is important in helping the scientist to decide 
whether or not she has arrived at a close (however temporary) of her inquiry. It is by 
these evaluative capacities that she can recognize the ‘beauty’ or ‘elegance’ of a 
hypothesis or theory in as far as these refer to a harmonious ordering of various 
facts. (Dewey, 1939, p. 176) These are used by the scientist as pointers to the 
‘truth’ of the hypothesis.
Now, one of the non-psychologistic questions that a theory of scientific 
knowledge is supposed to ask, according to the citation above, is whether a given 
hypothesis is true or false. The background to this question is that science has got a 
set of truths which are the subject matter of the epistemology of science. But this 
position would be contradictory to the whole falsificationist programme for in this 
programme science is only ever approaching the truth asymptotically. It arrives at 
verisimilitude. Science is a work in progress. For example, such a question can 
hardly be asked of Newtonian mechanics or even relativity without attaching an
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empirical report to the answer, e.g. by qualifying them as beliefs or as representing 
the state of science thus far. But the empirical report would be psychologistic 
because it would involve the sources of the empirical knowledge.
So far, if such commitment and evaluative judgment fall under the category 
of psychologism as Musgrave and the CR-ist tradition would hold, then we have a 
kind of psychologism that is useful for epistemology to understand better and 
explain more fully the workings of science. Instead, the position that Musgrave has 
just explained in the paragraph cited leaves us with an epistemology of science that 
is detached from what scientists actually do. What matters is the way theories hang 
together logically. In that case, what is of primary importance are the logical 
relationships between theories. The substance of the theories is of secondary 
importance. Of no relevance whatsoever is the process through which the person of 
the scientist is involved in coming up with the theory.
The question is: What function has such an epistemology of science? It is 
neither descriptive of the activity of the scientist, nor is it prescriptive/normative of 
what the scientist ought to do. There may be moments in science when a set of 
hypotheses in one scientific view cannot be logically reconciled with another set of 
hypotheses in another view, when scientific views clash. And yet scientists may 
hold on to their position despite the fact that it does not logically fit with another 
position. Some scientists may even shift from one view to the opposing one without 
thereby undermining their credibility as scientists. An example could be the 
corpuscular versus the wave theory of light. Scientists could shift from one view to 
the other in order to explain the behaviour of light in different circumstances. When 
a study of the logical relations between hypotheses is more important for the 
epistemology of science than the actual process, we end up with an epistemology
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that is not informative about the activity of science. This is a weakness of Popperian 
falsificationism understood as a description of the methodology of science.
4.3.1 Examining ‘p is true' in a context of science
Musgrave disagrees with Polanyi on the sincere assertion of the statement ‘p
is true’. For Polanyi, when this statement is asserted sincerely, it shows the belief of 
the one who makes the assertion. (Polanyi, 1958, pp. 27-30) For Musgrave, that is 
an introduction of subjectivism/psychologism into the epistemological notion of 
truth. Musgrave claims:
“Clearly, what has misled Polanyi is that if a person says, sincerely, that a 
theory is true, then he does of course, by using this form of words, express the 
fact that he believes in that theory. But he is not only expressing this 
psychological fact -  he is saying something about the theory, that it has a 
certain objective property. The making of assertions about the objective 
properties of theories is, no doubt, correlated with psychological attitudes 
towards the theories. But to define lp is true’ as ‘I sincerely believe p ’ is to 
abolish an objective property and to substitute for it a psychological attitude.”
(1968, p. 139)
While it is true that there is an ‘objective’ property a la Musgrave (or in the 
CR-ist objectivist sense) in the statement ‘p  is true’, Polanyi’s statement needs to be 
seen in its context. In a scientific context, the statement that ‘p  is true’ cannot be 
detached from the belief of the one who asserts (e.g. in a hypothesis) that p  is true. 
In the context of science (e.g. at conferences, etc.) it would introduce a lot of 
distractive complications if sincerity and the belief in one’s statements were 
withdrawn from assertions like ‘p is true’. The statement may end up being rejected 
as ‘false’ by the scientific community. But again it will have been held sincerely by 
the one asserting it. Sincerity goes hand in hand with commitment which as 
discussed above is needed in scientific inquiry.
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Musgrave avers on this point that the single main objection to all subjective 
theories of truth, including Polanyi’s, is that they involve relativism. According to 
Musgrave, if “/? is true” means simply “I believe p ”, then the same statement can be 
true for one person and false for another person. We end up losing the objective 
standards for deciding the truth. (1968, p. 142) Musgrave’s objection is warranted 
in an objectivist approach. But within the epistemology of science, the situation he 
is describing is not necessarily one of relativism.
Various and even at times contradicting positions can be simultaneously held 
by the general scientific community with each of them solving various sets of 
problems. The Ptolemaic position co-existed for some time with the Copemican 
position and in each of them various problems were solved. One or a few of the 
competing positions may end up asserting itself. What makes this possible is again 
the sincerity with which the scientists carry out their inquiry because they are 
committed to discovering the truth about the world and they remain open to 
unforeseen manifestation of the more accurate position in the future. This latter 
attitude is what Polanyi calls universal intent, as explained in the discussion of the 
nature of tacit knowledge.
4.3.2 Conflation of justifications - of attitude and of theories
A more serious criticism of Polanyi’s theory of knowledge (and those
classified as subjectivists) by Musgrave is the one of conflating two kinds of 
justification. Polanyi is said to conflate the justification of attitudes towards theories 
with justification of theories. This obscures the fact that the justification of attitudes 
depends upon the circumstances of the person considered while the justification of 
theories does not. (Musgrave, 1968, p. 301) The criticism is serious because if such 
a conflation happens, then relativism is truly introduced in the process of
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justification because personal idiosyncrasies are introduced. However, the picture 
surrounding justification is itself complex. In as far as justification is understood as 
a logical process by which scientific knowledge claims are assessed and vetted, this 
criticism by Musgrave is a valid criticism. The conflation of justifications as 
described above is a serious flaw. But as long as justification is understood as the 
acceptance of a position by a significant number of scientist and the dependence on 
that accepted position for further research, and given positive findings (Collins & 
Pinch, 1998) then the conflation is not a problem. Sometimes in the actual practice 
of science, theories have been accepted before the due empirical data has been 
‘justified’. On the other hand, there have been cases in which data has been 
overlooked which should have been evidence enough to abandon a given theory.
Left at this, it may appear that science is capricious in the ways in which it 
chooses to follow strict logical procedures of justification at times and then 
following some kind of intuition at other times. This would be an irrational 
representation of the way science functions. I argue that Polanyi’s theory of tacit 
knowledge provides the needed rationality that brings together the two apparently 
separate methods of justification. By tacit knowledge, scientists will know to choose 
when a proposed theory is acceptable without further rigorous logico-deductive 
tests, and when a proposed theory must be subjected to further testing before it 
becomes part of the body of scientific knowledge. And had Polanyi’s theory only 
been brought in at the moment of justification, it would be an ad hoc strategy. But 
Polanyi’s theory shows that tacit knowledge pervades all knowledge. Tacit 
knowledge plays a role in the choice of research question, helping in choosing an 
interesting and yet answerable question. It helps in choosing the methods of 
research, in reading off, evaluating and deciding on data, in drawing conclusions and
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in the commitment to argue for these conclusions as part of knowledge. In the end it 
is involved in helping accept or reject conclusions of a given research.
Overall, therefore, there is a change of perspective from one in which the two 
methods of justification are strictly separated to an approach in which the two (and 
perhaps more) methods can be seen as mutually complementary or intertwined. 
Polanyi is not arguing for the replacement of logico-deductive rigour with a court- 
style consensus among scientists. His approach shows that the reduction of 
justification to this logico-deductive method is unwarranted. The push for 
‘objectivism’ in this sense is not helpful for understanding how science works.
On this note, Musgrave may still insist on the impersonal nature of the 
justification of theories thus:
“... the context of criticism remains ‘impersonal’ in the sense that what is 
critically discussed is the theory itself and its objective properties, rather than 
subjective facts about adherents or opponents of the theory. This can be 
recognised by the participants in a critical debate, who will therefore try to 
propose objective arguments. Rationalists too have inarticulate visions of 
reality, but they try to transform them into explicit, discussable, theories. 
Rationalists surely have subjective feelings of conviction or doubt, but they try 
to transform them into objective arguments.” (1968, p. 316)
Two responses can be given to this Musgravean position. First of all, it 
needs to be emphasized that in the practice of science, the contrary of ‘objective’ is 
more nuanced than being merely ‘subjective’. Polanyi’s theory of knowledge 
emphasizes the personal role of the scientist. Such a scientist brings her inarticulate 
knowledge to bear on her scientific work. She is committed to discovering the truth 
about nature as it unfolds in unexpected ways. This is not an ‘objectivist’ approach, 
but neither is it ‘subjectivist’.
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The second response is that Musgrave himself lays emphasis on such terms 
as ‘argument’, ‘conviction’, etc. This emphasis concurs exactly with what Polanyi is 
advocating for when he proposes a central role for intellectual passions. What 
guides the participants in a scientific debate to rephrase their positions into ‘explicit, 
discussable theories’ should not be glossed over as being merely subjective or 
psychological in a bid to arrive at the purely objective and articulate. Certainly, 
when we are seeking to understand the process of justification, we cannot overlook 
these efforts. In the above citation, what is logically deductive does not need to be 
argued in terms of being defended. It is only demonstrated, and the interlocutor can 
only take it or leave it. But Musgrave himself admits to ‘arguments’ and 
‘convictions’ in other words intellectual passion in science debates.
And in addition to this, let us say for the sake of argument that the parties in 
an argument about a given scientific theory managed to outline their argument so 
deductively, even then there would be the recalcitrant inarticulate that persists in any 
form of human or animal act of learning or attempt at articulation. This position has 
been discussed in the treatment of the nature of tacit knowledge.
Musgrave appears to be ready to rebut this position elsewhere by 
maintaining:
“We can take science seriously if we adopt an objective approach to 
knowledge; if we begin, not by adopting epistemological solipsism, but from 
knowledge as a public, intersubjective affair. Here we insist upon the 
distinction between the objective merits and demerits of the theory considered, 
and psychological properties of anybody’s belief in that theory, or awareness of 
that theory. We will find irrelevant, in discussing the theory, psychological 
facts about whether a person finds that for him the theory is dubitable or 
indubitable, certain or uncertain, self-evident or counter-intuitive. If we are
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interested in the theory, and its objective properties, then these psychological 
facts become uninteresting.” (1968, pp. 83-84)
Here again, it is significant that Musgrave admits of the inter subjective 
nature of scientific knowledge. It would be interesting to find out how he manages 
to separate this intersubjectivity from what are the subjects that are guilty of 
subjectivism. A way out of this Musgravean impasse is to move away from 
‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ to talk of ‘persons’, i.e. to approach scientific knowledge not 
with ‘objectivism’ as opposing ‘subjectivism’, but with personal and tacit 
knowledge. The person is imbued with intellectual passions and committed to 
universal intent, who is being proposed by Polanyi.
Further, the crucial questions here would be: Why are the so-called 
psychological facts ‘uninteresting’, especially given the fact (as discussed in the 
nature of tacit knowledge) that without them we end up with an incomplete 
methodology of science and in the light of the view that Polanyi hopes to be able to 
put these facts to good use in proposing a fuller and more accurate methodology of 
science?
Secondly, is Musgrave still interested in the scientist and her work? Or is he 
rather focusing on a version of science (a rational reconstruction) a step away from 
the scientist, which would be a creation of the philosophers of science? For it is 
difficult to imagine how a scientist would go on to publish what they actually 
doubted and still claim to be doing science. The philosophy of science can 
legitimately detach some aspects of science from the practice of science and 
propagate positions and theories about how these detached aspects of the practice 
operate. But what happens then is not a methodology of science provided by the
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philosophy of science. We end up with such methodologies as proposed by the 
verificationists, the Popperians, etc.
There are further grounds to consider that Musgrave may make a concession 
to Polanyi’s position. Musgrave holds: “We cannot justify our theories but we may, 
by considering the present state of the critical debate about them, be able to justify 
our preference for one theory over some others.” (1968, pp. 302-303) This may 
provide grounds to suppose that Musgrave concedes that at times the justification of 
the theories is not to be found in the ostensive arguments given, but in the ‘state of 
the critical debate’. This state is not further described by Musgrave, but it may have 
similarities to what Polanyi describes as the intellectual passions that motivate 
debate, besides other such inarticulate factors.
On the whole, however, Musgrave attacks psychological attitudes because he 
contrasts them with ‘objective aspects of our knowledge’. The former are thus 
unimportant in comparison to the latter and the growth of the latter. He does make 
some concessions, but remains attached to an objectivist understanding of how 
science works. Accordingly:
“One must admit, however, that for the individual scientist and his work 
decisions about which theory to accept may play an important role. Some 
argue that a scientist cannot articulate and elaborate a theory unless he has a 
‘deep commitment’ to its truth. If a scientist is like this, then for the good of 
the growth of objective knowledge, he should be left to his deep 
commitment.... But more important than attitudes are the objective views and 
arguments which may follow upon the adoption of the varying attitudes; and if 
nothing follows upon the adoption of some attitude, it remains a mere attitude 
and can, and should be, ignored.” (1968, p. 304)
Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge has two responses to this objection. First 
of all, personal epistemology is built on commitment neither to the personal attitude
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of the knower nor to self-standing propositions removed from the phenomena they 
are purported to represent. The commitment is to the phenomena under 
investigation as these manifest themselves in unforeseen ways in the future. The 
propositions may fall short and some of the knowledge may be inarticulable. But 
there is commitment to arriving at an understanding of the phenomena.
The second response is that the knowing subject, the person in Polanyi’s 
theory of tacit knowledge, is actively involved in the act of knowing, because, as 
Polanyi holds and as discussed in the nature of tacit knowledge earlier, knowing is a 
skill. Right from the moment of a heuristics when a knower, for example a scientist, 
has a notion of the answer to a problem, she is committed or impassioned about 
moving closer to the solution. Her guide, according to Polanyi, is intellectual 
beauty. She is able to recognize the ‘answer’ to her inquiry guided by this notion of 
elegance (a very personal judgment).
This overall personal participation includes the most abstract areas of 
scientific knowledge. Even such abstract areas as mathematical physics assimilate 
experience to beautiful systems of indeterminate bearing even if their application to 
experience may be strictly predictive within certain not strictly definable conditions. 
(Polanyi, 1958, p. 320) And at the end of the research process, before the claims of 
the scientist become knowledge (i.e. through publication in articles and textbooks 
etc.) they are subjected to personal judgment by a body of other experts in the area 
of science. Thus both the process and the product of scientific inquiry are personal 
without thereby being subjective.
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4.3.3 Musgrave's Parrot as an Illustration of his Core Position
Further, an illuminating quotation could help clarify Musgrave’s position as
he tries to keep the psychological separate from the epistemological/logical, and 
thereby preserve the objectivity of scientific statements. He holds:
“At the risk of labouring the obvious, suppose a parrot were somehow to make 
noises which a physicist can understand as a statement of Newton’s theory of 
gravitation. This is only possible because the meaning or content of Newton’s 
theory is not constituted by any private goings-on which may, or may not, be 
correlated with the utterance. We can understand a theory, find it meaningful 
and interesting, examine it, test it, see if it is compatible with other theories, all 
without even considering any private goings-on. Newton himself, of course, 
was not a parrot, and when he uttered and wrote down his theory he was trying 
to articulate some thought-processes. But the historian of science begins with 
Newton’s theory, which he can try to understand independently of Newton’s 
thought-processes (to which he has no direct access). Moreover, it makes 
perfectly good sense to say of some utterance, that the person did not know 
what he was saying...” (1968, p. 74)
There is a problem with Musgrave’s parable of the parrot uttering statements. 
The problem lies in the attempt to detach language from the speaker of a language. 
In attributing meaningful scientific statements to a parrot, Musgrave may seem to 
have succeeded in detaching language from the persons who use it. But has he? 
The only reason we can make sense of what the parrot is prattling is because there is 
the teacher of the parrot and us. On its own, the parrot only prattles. Turning this 
position around, we do not know whether other bird and animal noises are actually 
statements of some laws of physics, but they could be. In other words, what gives 
sense to the prattle of the parrot are the persons around it. The parrot makes noises 
whose closeness or similarity to our language allows us to attribute speech to the 
parrot in question.
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At a deeper level, this Musgravean argument can be held for any form of 
meaningful phrases (poetry, rhetoric, etc.) that the parrot can be taught to repeat. 
But when it comes to making scientific statements, the intent to be believed cannot 
be overlooked on grounds of making objective and impersonal statements. They 
may be made in the most abstract terms, but controversy and argumentation about 
precision and truth of the statements are an essential part and parcel of the process of 
coming to scientific truth. The intention is crucial to their nature as scientific 
statements given the fact (discussed in the nature of tacit knowledge) that the 
scientist is guided by intellectual passion. One may argue that this position is about 
the intentional state and not about the personal component of a scientific statement. 
But that makes the example of the parrot even less appropriate for making scientific 
statements. If the teacher of the parrot fed the parrot a nut whenever it repeated the 
statements of Newton’s laws, the ‘intention’ of the parrot in repeating them at any 
one time could be -  not to make a scientific statement -  but to induce the listener to 
give it a nut.
Musgrave does not succeed in salvaging this impersonalist theory of 
language by resorting to the analyses of Buehler and Popper on language. Buehler 
distinguishes three functions of language, namely: expression of a state, stimulation 
of a response, and description of a state of affairs. To these three, Popper adds a 
fourth which he describes as being eminently human: argumentation and 
explanation. Musgrave, and Popper before him (1963, pp 180-181) purports to 
show that in argumentation and explanation, what is taking place is a mere logical 
comparison of positions. This understanding of argumentation downplays the 
personal element. But something motivates the discussants to take their respective 
positions, even when they cannot articulate their position clearly enough in objective
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propositions. There is a tacit background even to an articulate discussion on abstract 
subjects. The intellectual passion that drives the discussion is eminently personal.
4.3.4 Musgrave's understanding of language and logic as an 
illustration of objectivism
Musgrave holds a naive objectivism in regards to the way language conveys
scientific truth. According to him, “language ... intuitively speaking, transcends the 
personalistic, subjectivist framework. It is through the use of language that subjects 
communicate theories ... argue ... explain problems ... in short, share their 
knowledge. Language enables subjects to go beyond their own knowledge, a private 
and personal affair, and to participate in public knowledge.” (1968, p. 38) In 
contrast to this impersonal understanding of language, Polanyi proposes that there is 
a personal element -  an element of judgment in the use of language. Whenever a 
person uses a word in a new context, she adds a new meaning to the word provided 
by her interpretation of the new context, while still remaining connected to the use 
of the word in the language until then.
Musgrave insists on there being ‘fundamental objective properties of the 
content of a belief. To him, these properties are: “its truth or falsity and its logical 
relations with other contents (or theories).” (1968, p. 48) Thus far, according to 
Musgrave, argumentation and explanation introduce autonomy to language, 
autonomy from the subject or user of the language. According to Musgrave:
“For if we use a language to describe and to argue, then we can consider these 
descriptions and arguments independently of the user of the language, and his 
state of mind. This is connected with the fact that the fundamental properties 
of descriptions and arguments (the truth or falsity of a description, the validity 
or invalidity of an argument) are objective properties which can, and should be 
discussed independently of the psychology of the describer or arguer.” (1968, p.
76)
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But the same arguments can be used to arrive at the opposite 
conclusion, namely, that the personal element of language cannot and should 
not be ignored. Two adjustments need to be made. First of all, it should be 
pointed out that Musgrave is laying emphasis on the activity of argument. 
Polanyi’s position on argumentation (as already discussed) is that something 
more than just the logical syllogism motivates the argument.
There is an intellectual passion behind the most abstract argumentation 
-  the passion to arrive at the truth and to convince others about the attained 
truth. The second adjustment to be made to Musgrave’s argument is a 
correction. It should be pointed out that the personal is different from the 
individual or idiosyncratic. The personal lends itself to the objective while the 
individual and idiosyncratic is in the domain of the subjective. And so, both 
Musgrave and Polanyi would agree that language is the vehicle of scientific 
theory. But while Musgrave holds on to a naive objectivist understanding of 
language, Polanyi holds that language is a tool in the hands of the user, and as 
such there is a demand on the personal skill of the user and an allowance for 
personal modifications in the use of the language.
On this point, Dewey holds a position that agrees with Polanyi’s on language 
and logic and goes against the position held by Musgrave. Dewey argues that 
practice is inextricable in the articulation of scientific theory, as it is in a richer or 
more complex treatment of language. Thus for Dewey a logicist/objectivist view of 
language:
“...reduces a proposition of practice to a formal combination of a singular and 
general proposition ... [and] applies only to ex post facto linguistic analyses of 
either an act performed from habit without the intermediation of judgment or
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else of a judgment that has been completed. If deliberation and appraisals 
involving propositions actually intervene in reaching the decision ... then a 
judgment of practice is a factor in the ultimate determination of the existential 
material which the preliminary judgments of appraisal are about." (1939, pp. 
165-166)
And as I have shown earlier in the discussion of the nature of tacit 
knowledge, the way scientific positions are arrived at is by means of such appraisal 
and deliberation. Further, Dewey’s view goes directly against Musgrave’s position. 
We can validly exemplify Dewey’s ‘propositions’ with ‘scientific theories’. In that 
light, Dewey observes:
“When either facts [e.g. scientific theories] or conceptions are taken to be 
completely assured (whether because of earlier successful use or for any other 
reason), direct action, not judgment, ensues. It is a matter of great practical 
convenience that many facts and ideas may be so taken and directly used. But 
conversion of this practical value into assured logical status is one of the 
commonest ways of establishing the dogmatism which is the great enemy of 
free and continued inquiry.” (1939, p. 169)
This view by Dewey shows the problem that faces Musgravean objectivism. 
Dogmatism thrives on such a mistaken assurance of ‘objectivity’ which does not 
take into due account the actual, often messy, means by which scientific ‘truth’ is 
arrived at.
4.4 Musgrave's tempered objectivism and its persistent 
inconsistencies
Towards the end of his thesis, Musgrave tempers his objectivism. He points
out that when it comes to understanding ‘truth’, objective, timeless truth is a 
standard. Individual theories deal with truth as a public, interpersonal reality. On 
this tempered tack, there are possibilities of reconciling Musgravean and Polanyian 
epistemologies. But I argue that Musgrave does not go far enough, and even his
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tempered position contains some inconsistencies. I will look at a number of 
quotations in which Musgrave both tempers his objectivism to some extent but still 
incurs a few inconsistencies. To begin with a lengthy quotation that lays the ground 
for Musgrave’s later tempered position is the following:
“So much for my first point, that there is no complete and foolproof criterion of 
truth, and therefore that the objective theory of truth cannot be criticized 
because it does not provide one. But if this is so, what is the importance of the 
objective idea of truth? Do not the really important problems lie, after all, in 
trying to determine truth and falsity in particular cases? Why bother with truth 
as an objective notion, if it contributes nothing to a solution of these problems?
.... I can sympathize with the attitude behind these questions. And they bring 
me to my second point, the importance of the objective idea of truth. Consider 
all our techniques for determining truth and falsehood, enshrined in the 
procedure of the law, the technique of experimental scientists, or of 
mathematicians, and so on. All these techniques are incomplete, more or less 
difficult to apply, and fallible, and are not recognised as such. This means that 
all these methods operate with objective truth as a standard, they are all used 
under the understanding that the truth of a statement is something more than 
any property which use of a method allows us to identify in that statement.”
(1968, pp. 177-178)32
Musgrave acknowledges that there is a problem with an objectivist idea of 
truth. It is removed from the reality of the activity of seeking truth (e.g. in science). 
The compromise he proposes is to view objective truth as a standard while the 
efforts to arrive at it are fallible and incomplete. Already at this stage, Musgrave’s 
position is problematic. First of all, it is not clear how an individual scientist 
working on a particular theory is to be guided by this abstract standard of objective 
truth. How is this standard epistemically or logically related to the theory under 
investigation? Unless this and similar questions are answered, Musgrave’s 
suggestion of objective truth as a standard remains vague and unhelpful in the search
32 Emphasis in the original.
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for scientific truth. Secondly, and more important given Musgrave’s effort to avoid 
psychologism, the nature and source of this standard is not clear. Is it a private 
inspiration of the individual scientist? Is it written in some text that is accessible to 
all scientists? Is it a Platonic recollection from a world of forms?
All these questions can end up suggesting a psychologistic source or nature 
of the standard of objective truth. I can already point out here that Polanyi has a 
more economical solution when faced with the same problem of objectivity on the 
one hand and the findings of an individual scientist on the other. Polanyi admits of 
the role of tacit knowledge and thus of personal knowledge. The individual scientist 
working within a social framework is convinced of the ‘truth’ of her positions, and 
she remains committed to these positions being corroborated later by yet other 
findings. That is to say that the scientist is committed to the discovery of the truth 
by means of a given theory she has arrived at. At the same time, she is open to the 
truth as generated by this theory unfolding in unforeseen ways in the future or even 
being replaced by a better theory. This is a more economical approach because it 
does not necessitate the positing of a standard outside the work of the scientist. 
Further, it is more representative of the way the scientist works.
Musgrave’s further argument on the standard does not make the position less 
inconsistent. He holds that:
“Thus, one who believes in rational argument must reject subjectivist theories 
of truth. Adherence to the objective or absolute notion of truth is part of the 
faith of the rationalist. According to this notion, truth is above human control, 
and independent of psychological feelings (of certainty, doubt, commitment, or 
what you will) possessed by any person whose belief we consider. Tmth thus 
becomes a regulative standard to which we can try to conform, admitting our 
fallibility, and that we may always fall short of this standard.” (1968, p. 181)
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This description of how the knower is to relate to truth as a standard is 
clearly psychologistic in a way that contradicts the efforts of Musgrave to get rid of 
psychologism in epistemology. He uses terms like ‘faith’ and the knower’s ‘trying 
to conform’, which are in the realm of attitudes (similar to the ones he dismisses as 
being psychological: certainty, doubt, commitment ...). And still to preserve the 
objectivity of truth as a standard, Musgrave asserts that such truth is of timeless 
abstract entities while our attitudes towards these entities are transitory. He holds:
“Now an important point about the objective properties of truth and falsity is 
that they are timeless. If something is true at time t, then it is true at all 
times.... Since truth and falsity are timeless relationships between ‘something’ 
and the facts, the ‘something’ cannot consist merely of psychological entities or 
inscriptions. For states of mind and inscriptions are transitory things, which 
can be forgotten or erased, while the truth or falsity of an inscription or a belief 
is eternal. To do justice to the eternal character of objective truth and falsity, it 
seems that we are driven to acknowledge timeless abstract entities as that which 
is, in primary sense, true and false.” (1968, pp. 275-276)
This position may seem to resolve the quandary of having fallible means at 
our disposal while seeking objective and timeless truths. But in order to see the 
inconsistency in Musgrave’s position, we need to remember that he is dealing with 
knowledge. He has insisted on objectivity of knowledge, rid of psychologism. But 
when he reflects on timeless truth, the objectivity of knowledge seems to pale given 
our fallible means to arrive at timeless truths.
Intent on preserving the objectivity of truth, Musgrave adopts the Fregean 
and Popperian concept of the ‘third world’. In the same argument, he makes his 
biggest concession to Polanyian epistemology. Musgrave holds:
“Once we have recognized the existence of the objective contents of our 
thoughts or beliefs (spoken and written) utterances, then it becomes possible to
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regard our knowledge as inhabiting a sort of ‘third realm’ or ‘third world’, 
distinct from both the mental world and the physical world. And human 
knowledge as a psychological phenomenon consists then in the attempts of 
human beings to participate in this third world of objective knowledge. The 
objective or third-world properties and relationships of knowledge serve as the 
standards to which human beings try to conform when they participate in the 
third world. The idea of the third world, metaphysical though it sounds, is 
basically an attempt to do justice to the objective, inter-personal, and public 
aspects of human knowledge.” (1968, p. 286)33
This is a big concession to Polanyian epistemology because Musgrave admits 
that knowledge is after all a psychological phenomenon. It is only in this light that 
Musgrave also admits that objectivity of knowledge, the intGT-personal nature of 
knowledge, and its public aspect are not mutually exclusive. Yet again, the 
inconsistency persists on the notion of the third world as Musgrave explains it. The 
question is: How does this third world, made of an accumulation of human and 
animal experience which has evolved to some kind of autonomy from individual 
human minds (Musgrave, 1968, pp. 287-288), concur with the timeless entities of 
truth and falsity? How do the two entities populate the third world? How do 
empirical, contingent, and fallible methods of seeking truth accede to timeless 
truths? And in fact, the third world is populated among other things by problems, 
theories and arguments. Musgrave argues that:
“To speak of undiscovered problems, theories, and arguments, may be perfectly 
in order if we wish to emphasise the objective aspects of these things; but it 
should not be seen as attempting to play down the fact that it is human beings 
who create knowledge, discover problems, and propose arguments. The ‘third 
world’ does not, so to speak, possess a ‘life of its own’: it does not, for 
example, evolve in some impersonal way independently of the contributions 
made to its evolution by human beings.” (1968, p. 288)
33 Cf. also K. Popper, “Epistemology without a Knowing Subject”, Sections 2-4 (1972, pp. 112-122) 
and K. Popper, “Of Clouds and Clocks”, sections xiv-xvii (1972, pp. 235-241) as well as “A Realist 
View of Logic, Physics and History” (1972, pp. 285-289) especially the Introduction.
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This, I argue, is a concession by Musgrave of the personal nature of 
knowledge. This personal nature of knowledge persists even in such an abstracted 
realm as the third world. Here, once again, Musgrave seems to be coming around to 
a position similar to Polanyi which reinstates the human person at the centre of the 
whole scientific project, and not subjecting her to a secondary position before 
detached ‘objective’ entities like theories etc. He further asserts that: “Human 
knowledge, then, inhabits the third world, but it remains human knowledge, which is 
created, discussed, and developed by human beings.” (1968, p. 28 8)34 While 
Polanyi does not go as far as posit a third world, his position is reconcilable to that 
of Musgrave. Polanyi’s advantage is that he arrives at the same conclusion more 
economically.
4.5 Conclusion: The resultant nature of scientific objectivity 
according to Polanyi
In a word, ‘scientific objectivity’ is for Polanyi of a personal nature. Polanyi
sets out to counter both ‘objectivism’ that misrepresents scientific knowledge, and 
‘subjectivism’ which leads to relativism. He comes with personal knowledge. 
Musgrave, in his criticism of Polanyi, is dealing with a misrepresentation of 
Polanyi’s notion of personal knowledge. But other philosophers like Dewey have 
supported a Polanyian view. Dewey holds, for example that the scientist:
“... has to decide what researches to engage in and how to carry them on -  a 
problem that involves the issue of what observations to undertake, what 
experiments to carry on, and what lines of reasoning and mathematical 
calculations to pursue. Moreover, he cannot settle these questions once and for 
all. He is continually having to judge what it is best to do next in order that his 
conclusion, no matter how abstract or theoretical it may be as a conclusion,
34 Other concessions to a Polanyian view that scientific objectivity has got a social, inter-subjective 
regulating aspect as well as a scientific tradition can be found in Musgrave. (1968, pp. 338-339) 
Musgrave cites from Popper. (1945, p. 217)
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shall be grounded when it is arrived at. In other words, the conduct of 
scientific inquiry, whether physical or mathematical, is a mode of practice; the 
working scientist is a practitioner above all else, and is constantly engaged in 
making practical judgments: decisions as to what to do and what means to 
employ in doing it.” (1939, p. 161)
To this position by Dewey, Polanyi would add that commitment in scientific 
statements binds the scientist to both their belief and to a reality outside their minds. 
Polanyi is not subjectivist, he is personal. As long as science continues to examine 
its claims, none of its statements could qualify to be objective in the sense that 
Musgrave stipulates. On the other hand, the kind of objectivity proposed by 
Musgrave is at best merely methodological. “Objectivity” in this sense is a category 
in hindsight, useless both for the actual doing and describing of science. The 
personal element advocated by Polanyi ensures the responsibility that binds the 
scientist both to their beliefs and to a universal intent to arrive at the truth of the 
reality they are researching.
Science then seeks to describe reality. It does so only partially. But the 
expectations on science are sometimes misplaced or misleading, with the example of 
the kind of traditional objectivity foisted on it in Musgrave’s thesis. Science 
proceeds rather by trial and error, building up a picture of reality only gradually. On 
this point, the emphasis by Popper to situate falsification at the heart of the 
“rational” is a misrepresentation of the way science works. Rationality is actually 
personal -  manifested in commitment to the discovery of the truth, and in the 
universal intent to remain open to richer expressions of the truth initially only 
partially arrived at. And hence Polanyi’s attempt can be understood as giving the 
philosophy of science grounds wider than the objective/subjective ones which fail in 
traditional epistemology by not being able to withstand the onslaughts of scepticism.
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The attempts by the CR-ists exemplified in this section by Musgrave are 
aprioristic, idealistic and a-historic (in the sense that they actually ignore the history 
of science). This is a weakness that springs from the objectivism that is 
characteristic of the CR-ist position in the philosophy of science because this latter 
position does not succeed in furnishing us with an accurate account of how science 
works. The CR-ists seem to present a workable logical justification of their account 
of how science works. But this account is at the expense of the accurate story of 
how science works. On this point, Dewey has made a pertinent plea: “In substance 
... logical theory [should] be made to conform with the realities of scientific practice, 
since in the latter there are no grounded determinations without operations of doing 
and making.” (1939, p. 180) In similar fashion, Feyerabend criticises Popperianism 
on these grounds. He holds:
“... Popper and his pupils ... developed and now defend a more technical 
version [of a methodology or philosophy of science]. By now this technical 
version has become a veritable malaise. The aim is no longer to understand 
and, perhaps, to aid the scientists; nor is there any attempt to check the version 
by a comparison with scientific practice. The aim is to develop a special point 
of view, to bring this point of view into logically acceptable form (which 
involves a considerable amount of rather pointless technicalities) and then to 
discuss everything in its terms... Not the ever-changing demands of scientific 
research but the rigid requirements of an abstract rationalism decide about the 
form and the content of the principles accepted.” (Feyerabend, 1981, p. 21)
In other words, the CR-ists together with Musgrave have sought to approach 
scientific activity with a rigid mould to which scientists must conform rather than 
remain objectively open to the methods, however novel, by which science actually 
proceeds. On this note, I argue, Polanyi’s notion of tacit or personal knowledge is 
more accurate and more economical. It does not have to deal with the question of 
how the scientist adjusts her personal and committed attitudes to accommodate a
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version of ‘objectivity’ (or objectivism) that is imposed from areas of research 
external to science. In Polanyi’s tacit or personal knowledge, commitment to the 
current position or theory is bound to future revelations of the reality under study. 
Personal knowledge is wider than subjective knowledge. It cannot be accused of 
solipsism because it remains open both to richer expressions of the truth and to the 
scrutiny of the scientific community and its experts.
At the end of his work, Musgrave shows that his goal of objectivity (i.e 
objectivism) is actually less ambitious and more qualified than it is initially 
expressed. He points out that “I have certainly not shown that science is nowadays 
objective in the way I have explained it...What has been shown, I hope, is 
something more limited; that it is at least possible for science to be objective even 
though scientists are not objective in the traditional sense.” (1968, p. 343) This 
remains a merely logical possibility scant on historical examples, and not showing 
how science actually works. Its attention to Polanyi’s positions is inadequate and 
misled. However, there is a qualification of the CR-ist position that is more 
sophisticated than Popper’s falsificationism. It is developed by Lakatos and Zahar, 
and it is the methodology of scientific research programmes (MSRP). Can MSRP be 
interpreted to represent a more robust critique to Polanyi’s epistemology?
188
Chapter Five: A critical comparison of Lakatos/Zaharian and 
Polanyian methodologies
5.0 Introduction
Imre Lakatos, in his methodology of scientific research programmes, offers a
more sophisticated Popperian position than does Musgrave’s objectivism. Lakatos 
deals with what he calls Popperian problems and how they form a whole research 
programme. But he points out that he arrives at solutions that may not concur with 
Popper’s solutions. (Lakatos, 1974) Ellie Zahar has helped to give MSRP a more 
robust grounding. Still, MSRP has itself failed to assert itself as the mainstream 
view in methodology. Using Lakatosian terms, it seems to have been abandoned as 
a research programme. I claim that Polanyian methodology supersedes Lakatosian 
MSRP, and the test case is the treatment the latter gives to our understanding of the 
Copemican Revolution.
5.1 Drawing comparisons between Lakatosian and Polanyian 
approaches to methodology
Lakatos’ general approach is in at least two phases, and in one phase it is not 
in direct contradiction to Polanyi’s tacit or personal.35 It is argued in both systems 
(i.e. the Lakatosian and the Polanyian as in Popperianism) that the logic of scientific 
discovery e.g. as proposed by logical positivism, specifically in verificationism, is 
misleading.36 Ironically, both of them parted ways with naive Popperian
35 The two philosophers of science share much more than a national background (as Hungarians) and 
still much more than what they ended up being -  Hungarian intellectuals in the Diaspora. Both of 
them have had firsthand experience of the dire effects that accrue from the interference of ideology 
with science. Both are witnesses to the serious consequences of curtailing academic freedom. Both 
of them set out to argue against the logical-positivist approach to science.
36 In his doctoral thesis, appearing later as Proofs and Refutations, The Logic o f Mathematical 
Discovery (1976) Lakatos expresses that: “According to logical positivists, the exclusive task of 
philosophy is to construct ‘formalised’ languages in which artificially congealed states of science are
189
falsificationism as a viable alternative, although to differing degrees.37 Neither of 
them thinks that there can be deductive rules on heuristics. The interesting 
paradox is, I argue, that even given such common ground, the two systems do have 
crucial differences that would put the Polanyian system ahead of the Lakatosian 
(and ahead of the Lakatos/Zaharian system). The two systems begin to show 
marked difference in their approach to the role of psychology in the methodology of 
science.
Lakatos, under a strong influence of the Popperian focus on the demarcation 
problem, underplays the role of psychology (simply understood as psychologism in 
scientific methodology) to the point of denying that it does contribute to the 
rationality of science. (1978, pp. 112-115) Polanyi, on the other hand, is not averse 
to psychology and as is shown already in the discussion of the nature of tacit 
knowledge, he shows that it is key to understanding the rationality of science. He 
embraces the results of experiments in psychology contemporary to his time and on 
investigating the role of psychology in a methodology of science, concludes that 
psychology does indeed contribute in important ways to the rationality of the 
scientific method.
expressed .... Science teaches us not to respect any given conceptual-linguistic framework lest it 
should turn into a conceptual prison ...” (1976, fii 1, p. 93)
37 Already in his doctoral thesis, Lakatos argues against the identification o f mathematics with formal 
abstraction which in turn leads to the replacement o f the philosophy of mathematics with 
mathematical logic. This, to Lakatos, is pernicious. It leads to a philosophical neglect of all that is 
not formalised or formalisable in mathematics. As an example, formalism in mathematics would lead 
to a rejection of Polya’s concept of ‘plausible reasoning’ in mathematics, a key role in Polya’s 
mathematical heuristics. Such a rejection leads to a marginalization of the study of the development 
of concepts and the growth of knowledge, according to Lakatos.
38 It must be noted, however, as Brendan Larvor points out that Lakatos used the term ‘heuristic’ in 
different senses at different stages of his philosophical development. His use of the term in his 
doctoral thesis on the role of heuristics in mathematics is idiosyncratic and different from his later 
common English use of the same term. In his later development, his use of the term has 
psychological meaning. (Larvor, 1998).
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To follow the apparent mutation of Lakatos’ thought from being tolerant and 
even defensive of psychology, in as far as heuristics is understood as a psychological 
endeavour in his Proofs and Refutations, (1976), to a harsh critic of psychologism 
in his later philosophy, e.g. in Mathematics, Science and Epistemology, (1978), it is 
informative to distinguish a Lakatos who agrees with Polanyi in the fundamentals 
from a Lakatos who basically disagrees with Polanyi and only incidentally agrees 
with Polanyi in the fundamentals. I look only briefly at the early Lakatos who 
agrees with Polanyi and concentrate on the Lakatos who disagrees with Polanyi.
5.1.1 Lakatos in agreement with Polanyi
Early in his intellectual development, influenced by his work on
mathematical heuristics as treated by Polya, Lakatos argues that the way 
mathematical conjectures are produced by individual mathematicians is rational 
even though the conjectures are fallible. Polya calls these techniques ‘plausible 
reasoning’. Lakatos takes this position on the rational nature of the production of 
conjectures in a more general bid to argue against the separation between the 
context of production of conjectures, deemed philosophically irrelevant and to be 
left to psychologists and sociologists, and the context of evaluation of the 
conjectures, which is supposed to be philosophically relevant, because it is a rational 
process -  a subject of epistemology and logic properly understood.
On this point, Lakatos holds that the separation between production and 
evaluation of conjectures is artificial, impoverished and not helpful. In fact, the two 
processes interpenetrate. “Even when a conjecture seems to have come from a flash 
of genius, it is unlikely to be sheer good luck. Even the greatest leaps of insight 
need some logical scene-setting.” (Larvor, 1998, p. 20) Larvor reports that Lakatos’ 
study of the philosophy of mathematics is in the hope of depicting mathematics as a
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rational, objective process. (1998, p. 21) Unfortunately, even when he rejects the 
separation of the two contexts, Lakatos does not make a concession to a certain 
epistemological trend he calls ‘psychologism’, which he finds irrational and to be 
excluded from the epistemology of science.
I argue that in the long run, Lakatos’ effort to dissociate (or demarcate) 
science from psychologism/irrationalism leads him into a predicament similar to the 
one he is seeking to resolve i.e. methodology as viewed by the logical positivists. In 
this predicament, philosophers of science end up propounding a theory of how 
science works, which is out of touch with the actual practice of scientists. The 
logical positivists narrowed themselves to the final products of science in order to 
avoid psychologism (as explained earlier). In this way, a certain understanding of 
how science works (i.e. science viewed from its successes) was considered by them 
to be the ideal of inquiry. A certain form of rationality was deemed by them to be 
the rationality. In the case of Lakatos, similarly, science distilled of irrational 
elements (e.g. psychological processes) is ideal and attainable.
5.1.2 Lakatos in disagreement with Polanyi
5.1.2.1 Correcting psychologistic justificationism
In introductory fashion in a paper drafted by Lakatos, and brought to
completion by later editors of his work, Lakatos addresses ‘psychologistic 
justificationism’.39 He does not give a precise definition of this phrase, but the 
closest I come to a description is the following: psychologistic justificationism is 
the epistemological process in which the justification of a scientific statement or 
position is sought in the state of the mind of its proponent at the moment the
39 The paper is entitled “Newton’s Effect on Scientific Standards”. Lakatos himself is reported as 
having been dissatisfied with the paper and considered that it needed substantial revision. It was 
edited and completed by J. Worrall and G. Currie. (Lakatos, 1978, pp. 193-222)
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statement is made or the position is taken. (1978, pp. 196-197) So, to check a 
statement would involve finding out die state of mind of the knower -  whether the 
knower was in ‘healthy’, ‘normal’, ‘right’, or ‘scientific’ state of mind. And so, 
basic propositions (i.e. “anchors of Truth”, something similar to erstwhile Euclidean 
axioms) are held as proven as long as such a mind holds them to be true. For 
Lakatos, the concern to find or prepare the right mind preoccupies those that he calls 
psychologists and the concern is not new in epistemology. Thus:
“There were many different theories of the criterion of the right mind. Aristotle 
-  and the Stoics -  thought that the right mind is simply the medically healthy 
mind; according to Descartes the right mind is primarily the one [that has been] 
steeled in the fire of sceptical doubt and [has] then [found] itself -  and God’s 
guiding hand -  in the final loneliness of pure thought. According to Baconians, 
the right mind is the tabula rasa, devoid of all content, so that it can receive the 
imprint of nature without distortion, etc. All schools of dogmatism can then be 
characterised by a particular psychotherapy by which they prepare the mind to 
receive the grace of proven truth in the course of a mystical communion.”
(1978, p. 197)
That brings to greater light what Lakatos has in mind when he refers to 
psychologism. There is a link between psychologism and dogmatism in the sense 
that the quest to find the right mind leads to dogmatic declarations about what the 
right mind is supposed to be. And consequent to psychologistic justificationism, are 
two other problematic epistemological attitudes, namely: apriorism and elitism. 
(1980, pp. 112-116) According to Lakatos, Polanyi’s epistemological approach is an 
example of psychologistic justificationism and elitism. Lakatos interprets Polanyi’s 
methodology as claiming that only the experts with tacit knowledge have the 
capacity to vet scientific truths. But this interpretation is not accurate because it 
does not take into account the main point that Polanyi makes, namely that scientific 
knowledge is a skill that sets its own standards. Apprentices can have access to it
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with the guidance of experts, yet the experts themselves, by the very nature of tacit 
knowledge, remain open to surprising ways in which hitherto upheld ‘truths’ will 
unfold to reveal even deeper unknown ‘truths’. A closer look at Lakatos’s 
epistemology of science is warranted in order to give a Polanyian response to it.
5.1.2.2 MSRP as the solution to the problem of psychologistic justificationism
As a solution to the problems cited above as brought about by psychologistic
justificationism, Lakatos proposes a reconstruction of the history of science in such a 
way that justification of scientific positions is grounded in the facts independently of 
minds. The end result should be a viable methodology of science. As a background 
to the whole effort by Lakatos, I note that in a published conversation, Lakatos 
reconstructs the history of epistemology. According to Lakatos, classical 
epistemology (onwards from Descartes, through Kant and Russell to Carnap) with 
its sceptical criticism fails because it uses a content-reducing heuristic.
No knowledge can withstand the withering justificationist criticism of such 
scepticism. Unlike the heuristic of classical epistemology, Lakatos proposes a 
Popperian scientific heuristic which accepts criticism from refutation by hard facts. 
The scientific heuristic is thus content-building: it works towards the growth of 
knowledge. With the scepticism of classical epistemology comes dogmatism, and 
the two operate like two poles of the same dialectic. There is then a stalemate in 
classical epistemology between scepticism and dogmatism. Lakatos thus proposes 
that learning from the success of science, the sceptico-dogmatic heuristic which 
ensues from a justificationist epistemology should be replaced by a new dialectic: 
“the rational and irrational, where ‘rationality’ would stand for a generalized logic of 
scientific discovery.” (Richard Popkin, ‘Scepticism and the Study of History’, p.
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222, also Larvor, 1998, p. 24) This spells out the goal towards which Lakatos 
strives when he propounds a methodology of science.
As noted earlier, Lakatos purportedly deviates to some extent from the 
Popperian programme. But I argue that overall he remains faithful to the core 
principle of Popperianism. Lakatos holds that the “central problem in philosophy of 
science is the problem of normative appraisal of scientific theories; and in particular, 
the problem of stating universal conditions under which a theory is scientific”. 
(1978, p. 168) This, according to Lakatos is properly speaking the demarcation 
problem. And so Lakatos agrees with Popper on the global level of the central 
problem of the philosophy of science being demarcation.
It follows then, from Lakatos’s Popperian demarcationist background, and 
from the ideal that he sets himself to propound a methodology that will help resolve 
the sceptic-dogmatic dialectic, that Lakatos is opposed to the Kuhnian idea of 
normal science being uncritical. In the Popperian tradition, criticism, constant and 
mutual among scientists and communities of scientists, is what ensures the 
advancement of science. Criticism, as opposed to dogmatism, is the mark of 
rationality. But for Kuhn (and in some sense to Polanyi), a certain unquestioning or 
fiduciary stance is necessary for new and upcoming scientists vis-a-vis established 
positions within their scientific communities.
Lakatos concedes some of this Kuhnian unquestioning stance, given that it 
was more faithful to the history of science.40 But still, Lakatos wants to map out a 
system that remains close or faithful to the history of science and still remains
40 These comments are deliberately very general at this stage in order to simply indicate possible 
points of discussion. Engaging in those discussions would draw us away from the point I am arguing 
on the one hand, and I think I will have argued a way around them by the end o f the chapter, on the 
other hand.
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sufficiently rational (in the above objectivist sense). (Lakatos, 1974, p. 148) And 
so Lakatos takes a step away from falsificationism, because this latter has to distort 
history in order to find ‘crucial’ experiments whenever a theory is rationally 
discarded. In this context, Lakatos suggests his own ‘methodology of scientific 
research programmes’ (MSRPs).
5.1.2.2.1 Overview of MSRP
In this new view (i.e. MSRP) the unit of appraisal is neither a theory (as in
Popperian falsificationism) nor a proposition (as in logical-positivistic 
verificationism). It is neither a hypothesis nor a conjunction of hypotheses, but a 
problemshift i.e. a developing series of theories or a focus on examining sequences 
of historically related theories. Once a central idea has been developed, 
modifications made to it should not lessen its empirical content. Rather than 
concentrate on purely logical features of scientific points of view, the focus should 
be on the manner in which clusters of thoughts are developed over time. And thus 
the unit of appraisal is the research programme. The research programme is a sum 
of various stages through which a leading idea passes. MSRPs have three main 
features. First is the hard core, tenacious and unchanging. The leading idea 
provides the hard core of the research programme -  a set of commitments, the 
abandonment of which would entail the abandonment of the programme. An 
example of a hard core in the Newtonian Programme is the collection of the three 
laws of motion plus the law of gravitation.
The second feature of MSRPs is the heuristic. This is a set of problem­
solving techniques. In the Newtonian programme, it consists in mathematical
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apparatus e.g. differential calculus.41 The third feature of MSRP is the protective 
belt. These are auxiliary hypotheses. They protect the hard core from refutations. 
The hypotheses are constantly modified, increase in number, and are complicated. 
Questions are directed towards the protective belt rather than directly questioning 
the hard core. In the case of the Newtonian research programme, the protective belt 
would be geometrical optics or atmospheric refraction. If predictions are not 
empirically corroborated by observations, then the problem should be sought in 
geometrical optics or the interpretation of the data. The protective belt changes, as 
guided by the heuristics of the programme -  a set of problem-solving techniques.
Overall, there are two ways in which a programme can be progressive: a) 
theoretically, i.e. if “each modification leads to new, and unexpected predictions, 
and b) empirically, i.e. when at least some of the novel predictions are corroborated. 
(1978, p. 179) So called “refutations” are always there in each programme. It is 
enough to have a few dramatic signs of empirical progress for a programme to be 
considered still viable. A programme is heuristically progressive if successive 
modifications in the protective belt are within the spirit or tradition of the heuristic. 
A programme supersedes a rival programme if it has an excess of truth content over 
its rival, i.e. it predicts what the rival programme predicts and even more. On the 
other hand, this is the way a programme degenerates. The heuristic is faced with 
problems that the protective belt cannot keep away. Ad hoc measures are then taken 
(i.e. ad hoc adjustments to the programme) to protect the hard core, using devices 
foreign to the programme. The adjustments they make are at best geared to
41 In a footnote Lakatos remarks: ‘The demarcation between ‘hard core’ and ‘heuristics’ is frequently 
a matter of convention ...” This is interesting, because it seems to establish conventionalism right at 
the core of his programme or methodology. (1974, fn. 1, p. 181)
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resolving the specific problems without making any predictions. And when the 
heuristic cannot solve the problems, degeneration sets in.
Thus far, in terms of the wider underlying Popperian demarcationist 
programme, Lakatos appears to have set a more stringent principle of demarcation. 
Briefly, he suggests that bad science is synonymous with pseudo-science. In turn, 
the distinction between science and pseudo-science is that in the ongoing war of 
attrition between different (and competing) research programmes in both science and 
pseudo-science, in which some are progressing and some degenerating, the 
progressive ones should triumph over the degenerating ones in science.42 That is the 
mark of scientific discipline and of rationality. Thus far, ‘progress’ is when change 
in a programme is a result of the inner logic of the programme, whereas 
‘degeneration’ is when change is brought about within the programme due to 
criticism from sources external to the programme.
5.1.2.2.2 Crucial similarities between Lakatos and Polanyi
A number of points of convergence between Lakatos and Polanyi are
important. First of all, in Lakatos’s MSRPs, empirical progress is achieved when 
new and undreamed of facts are predicted and corroborated. Theoretical progress 
occurs when modifications lead to unexpected predictions. Polanyi too makes a lot 
of capital out of this undreamed of or unexpected element in scientific progress. To 
him, what is objective is what remains open to revealing unexpected truths about a 
phenomenon under investigation. Through tacit knowledge, the scientist remains 
attached or committed to the findings of a branch of her research and these may 
reveal further truths which end up corroborating what the scientist held as ‘true’ in
42 He holds: “The term ‘demarcationism’ stems from the problem of demarcating science from non­
science or from pseudoscience. But I use it in a more general sense. A (generalized) demarcation 
criterion, a methodology or appraisal criterion, demarcates better from worse knowledge, defines 
progress and degeneration.” (1980, p. 108)
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the first place. Secondly, it is clear that the heuristic of a programme provides two 
things: a logic of discovery for the scientists who research within a given research 
programme, and the standard upon which the programme itself is supposed to be 
evaluated. Thus far, a research programme which remains faithful to its heuristic is 
judged to be progressive. (Larvor, 1998, p. 55) Polanyi emphasises the need for the 
scientist to remain faithful to the traditions within which she is researching in her bid 
to learn the skill of knowing within that tradition.
The application of ‘heuristic’ in both Lakatos and Polanyi is thus 
comparable. For both of them, the heuristic is central to their systems. The 
heuristic, for Polanyi is central to discovery and discovery is the driving force in 
scientific progress. For Lakatos, the heuristic is central to the research programme. 
Besides this, in his interpretation of Lakatos’ MSRP, Larvor picks out another 
element which to my understanding is a similarity between Lakatos and Polanyi on 
the concept of the heuristic.
Larvor points out that the concept of a heuristically driven programme is an 
explanation both to why some expert and experienced scientists can act in cavalier 
fashion to anomalies and to the relative autonomy of theory to experimentation e.g. 
when theory seems to surge ahead of experimentation. (1998, p. 56) However, the 
difference between the two systems is that while Lakatos hopes to be able to locate 
the heuristic objectively or externally (in order to avoid what to him is the pitfall 
psychologistic justificationism), Polanyi sees it as part of the tacit coefficient of 
knowledge that is personal without thereby being objective in a Popperian 
objectivist sense. For Polanyi, the skill possessed by the individual scientist and 
leamt within the tradition, which skill brings with it commitment to the tradition, 
contributes to the scientist’s insistence on a new idea by a so-called cavalier
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scientist. Polanyi’s explanation is thus more economical and because it is richer, it 
supersedes or is more progressive than the Lakatosian project. Yet the Lakatosian 
project has more weaknesses, a number of which I now examine below.
5.1.3 The circularity of Lakatos's reconstructivist strategy
Lakatos divides intellectual history into two: internal and external history.
Internal history consists in a history of ideas, (i.e. the internal skeleton of rational 
history) while external history is social history. (1978, pp. 102ff., 190ff.) He goes 
on to divide historical writing into a normative-rational part and a socio- 
psychological part. The normative part supplies a rational reconstruction of the 
growth of objective knowledge. That is, it presents the development of some body 
of learning in a way which explains why it counts as knowledge. The other kind of 
historical writing, the socio-psychological part, is there to fill in the gaps. It is the 
non-rational part of a history-driven account seen as a methodology. And so 
Lakatos rewrites history in such a way as to bring out the rational nature of the 
activity of science.
A critical look at Lakatos’s effort to reconstruct history, proposed as a 
solution to what he calls the problem of psychologistic justificationism, reveals two 
interconnected flaws. First of all, Lakatos fallaciously assumes that the mass of 
historical facts provides evidence that can sustain a normative rational approach to 
scientific methodology. To begin with, and in line with Polanyi’s notion of tacit 
knowledge, Laudan agrees that we may have pre-analytic intuitions (Pis) about 
scientific rationality, which intuitions help us to appraise and evaluate various 
normative models of rationality from given instances. He holds:
“...[T]here is, I shall claim, a subclass of cases of theory-acceptance and
theory-rejection about which most scientifically educated persons have strong
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(and similar) normative intuitions. This class would probably include within it 
many (perhaps even all) of the following: (1) it was rational to accept 
Newtonian mechanics and reject Aristotelian mechanics by, say, 1800; (2) it 
was rational for physicians to reject homeopathy and to accept the tradition of 
pharmacological medicine by, say, 1900; (3) it was rational by 1890 to reject 
the view that heat was a fluid; (4) it was irrational after 1920 to believe that the 
chemical atom had no parts; .... What I shall maintain is that there is a widely 
held set of normative judgments similar to the ones above. This set constitutes 
what I shall call our pre-analytic intuitions about scientific rationality  (or “PI” 
for short) ... [T\he test o f  any putative m odel o f  rational choice is whether it 
can explicate the rationality assumed to be inherent in these developments ...
[and\ the degree o f  adequacy o f  any theory o f  scientific appraisal is 
proportional to how many o f  the P is  it can do ju stice  to.” (Laudan, 1977, pp.
160-161)43
Now, Lakatos hopes to give a theory of rationality which would be based in 
history (albeit reconstructed) in his MSRP. The question is whether his model of 
rationality does actually explicate the rationality in the instances he reconstructs. To 
examine this question, let me first note together with Brown (who agrees with 
Laudan, 1977) that history is important for the philosophy of science, specifically in 
helping to make explicit the complex relationships between the two. However, 
Brown notes that “... it is surprising to find that most o f history will be evidentially 
neutral to normative philosophy o f science.
The reason for this is very simple. The set of historical episodes is large 
while the set of Pis is rather small. “Since ... it is only the Pis which matter ..., most 
of history is evidentially irrelevant.” (Brown, 1980, p. 240)44 So, a history that is 
specific to science needs to be written. But even such a history would invoke a 
methodology of science. And that is the second flaw with Lakatos’s strategy -  it is 
circular. The reconstructed history that Lakatos uses presupposes a methodology,
43 Emphasis in the original.
44 Emphasis in the original.
201
rather than the methodology being a consequence of the reconstructed history. And 
so Brown argues:
“A theoretical reconstruction is a description of some historical episode using 
the concepts of some methodology. For example, should we describe some 
episode using Popperian methodological concepts, the account will be in terms 
of “crucial experiments”, “basic statements”, “falsified theories”, etc. If we 
were using the concepts of the so-called “methodology of scientific research 
programmes” then the history would be written in terms of “research 
programmes”, “heuristics”, “hard core”, etc. These terms ... are theoretical 
terms. Any written historical episode must be a theoretical reconstruction; that 
is, it must invoke such concepts, concepts which owe their being to some 
methodology of science. This is because our histories are explanatory and they 
appeal to reasons as the causes of events. This requires an account of what 
good reasons are.” (1980, p. 242)
But in the case of Lakatos, the question goes beyond a theoretical 
reconstruction. Lakatos engages in a reconstruction that is normative in the 
sense that it is meant to point the way for a rational methodology and out of 
the predicament of psychologistic justificationism. Lakatos is involved in 
describing how history ought to have gone according to his proposed 
methodology. (Brown, 1980, p. 242) This involves the strategy of Lakatos in 
a circularity problem as described by Laudan. Laudan holds:
“If the writing of history of science presupposes a philosophy of science and if 
philosophy of science is then to be authenticated by its capacity to lay bare the 
rationality held to be implicit in the history of science, how can we avoid 
automatic self-authentication, since the history of science we write will 
presuppose the very philosophy which the written history will allegedly test?
(1977, p. 157)
In my view, Lakatos’s strategy of resolving what he calls the problem of 
psychologistic justificationism suffers from this problem of circularity pointed out
202
by Laudan. And linked to the problem of circularity is yet another. The proponents 
of any given methodology that claims evidence in history may choose only those 
episodes in history which support their methodology. Now, some philosophers of 
science focus on controversy, some focus on change. But each of them selects 
supporting episodes in the same history of science. As a remedy I suggest an openly 
pluralistic approach in which the particular nature of each candidate epistemology is 
explicit about the fact that it is only one of many possible methodologies.
But such an approach is not favoured by methodologies influenced by 
Popperian objectivism. And Lakatos’s methodology, with its insistence on a 
specific type of rationality and normativity is itself objectivist in a Popperian way. 
Any approach to the history and philosophy of science that is exclusivist rather than 
pluralist is bound to leave out an aspect of how the complex system of science 
works, for it would be aprioristic. As argued earlier in the discussion of the nature 
of tacit knowledge, more about science is being understood as science is done. 
Marga Vicedo argues that logical positivists have since long left the centre-stage of 
the discipline of the philosophy of science i.e. their research programme was 
abandoned, not only because of its inadequacies, but also because their views of the 
philosophy of science have been found to be too restrictive. (Vicedo, 1992, p. 490) 
The same evaluation befits this particular form of a Popperian programme when it 
purports to be too restrictive, excluding those methodologies it finds ‘psychologistic’ 
without giving convincing reasons why psychology should be ruled out of the 
epistemology of science.
In comparison, Polanyi’s system offers a way out in two ways. First of all, 
tacit knowledge avoids the homs of the dilemma in not putting too much (almost 
exclusive) emphasis on the history of science on the one hand or on objectivist
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rational methodologies on the other. There is a dilemma here as seen above because 
too much emphasis on the historical approach would be oblivious of the under- 
determination of the ‘facts’ by the chosen methodology. On the other hand, too 
much insistence on objectivity or objectivism would ignore often contrary evidence 
that history offers. The middle ground proposed in Polanyi’s notion of tacit 
knowledge is to approach science more from the point of view of the person and the 
tacit knowledge. Rather than have a normative system (whether historically based 
or based in objectivism), Polanyi’s system builds up an understanding about how 
science works that is accumulated from the experience of individual scientists and is 
as a principle open to modification in its understanding of what is true/objective and 
what is rational in science. Thus far, Polanyi’s notion of tacit knowledge includes 
the actual experience of the scientist both in the process and in the products of 
science.
The second way Polanyi’s approach gives a way out is when he emphasizes 
that scientists should be left as much autonomy as possible, even if science should 
be organized. Polanyi is combating the central planning of science. In Logic o f 
Liberty, he argues that when science is polycentric, and when the scientists are given 
as much liberty as possible to pursue their branches of science, there are more 
chances for it to advance than when it is centrally planned. I extend this central 
planning here to include a single objectivistic rationality that is centrally proposed at 
a meta-level of a normative methodology.
And so, Polanyi does make a diagnosis of the problems facing the 
methodologies of his time similar to the one by Lakatos. He notices that there is a 
tension between historical accounts and objectivist accounts. Polanyi does resort to 
history in his construction of the notion of personal and tacit knowledge. However,
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he does not propose a reconstruction of history, be it theoretical or normative. 
Rather, he fills in some details of history that are usually left out in standard histories 
of science that are governed by some objectivist/aprioristic methodology or other. 
After that, he re-interprets the same history to show the role that personal and tacit 
knowledge play. A few examples of this have been discussed in the section on 
elaborating the nature of tacit knowledge. His approach is more representative of 
the activity of science, and it is more economical and less ambitious than re-writing 
history. I substantiate my claims by looking critically at the treatment of the 
Copemican Revolution by Lakatos and Zahar. In this treatment, Lakatos applies his 
approach of rewriting history in a way that illustrates MSRPs at work.
5.2 Lakatos/Zahar's on the Copernican revolution: MSRP
Lakatos/Zahar observe that theories (e.g. Popperian demarcationism, 
Kuhnian and Polanyian elitism, as well as Feyerabendian relativism) of how the 
Copemican Revolution can be rationally explicated have failed. Nevertheless, “the 
Copemican Revolution can be explained as rational on the basis of the methodology 
of scientific research programmes” MSRP. (Lakatos, 1978, p. 178) He has two 
objectives. First of all, he seeks to save the rationality of science within the context 
of historical fact. Secondly, he hopes to demonstrate the descriptive superiority of 
MSRP over the descriptive aspect of other methodologies. (Lakatos, 1978, p. 180)
Lakatos/Zahar claim that Copernicus realized the heuristic degeneration of 
the Platonic programme at the hands of Ptolemy and his successors. Copernicus 
then levelled three charges of ad hocness against Ptolemy. (Lakatos, 1978, pp. 181- 
182) First, the introduction of equants is ad hoc because it goes against the heuristics 
of Ptolemy; second, giving the stellar spheres two distinct rotations went against
205
Ptolemy’s paradigm/hard core, namely that stars being perfect bodies would have at 
most one uniform motion; and third, that in spite of all these charges, the Platonic 
geostatic heuristic remained ad hoc. And so, remaining within the Platonic 
programme, Copernicus sought to revitalize its Aristarchan version.
The hard core of this programme is that stars are the frame of reference for 
physics.45 With this (hard core) Copernicus employed a revived Platonic heuristic, 
which was that stars -  being the most perfect bodies -  should have the most perfect 
motion. To Lakatos’ interpretation of the Platonic heuristic, uniform circular motion 
is most perfect because it is akin to rest. In contrast, Ptolemaians had attributed 
double motion to the stellar spheres -  i.e. a daily rotation and another about the axis 
of the ecliptic, itself irregular due to erroneous astronomical data. (1978, 183) 
According to Lakatos/Zahar, Copernicus seeks to restore the Platonic heuristic.
But one may ask: If the earth is imperfect and thus perfection must be other 
than terrestrial, and if perfection must be similar to or approximate the heavens (for 
that was the prevailing Judaeo-Christian theological position that propounded a 
fallen world), how come the only perfect body, i.e. the static body in this programme 
was the earth? How could Ptolemy have gone so decidedly against the very hard 
core of the programme to which he belonged and still remained Platonic? Do 
Lakatos/Zahar overlook this important detail in their reconstruction of history 
because it does not depict the rationality of science? Lakatos/Zahar situate the 
‘revolution’ in the Copemican Revolution other than in an isolated hypothesis. 
(1978, pp. 169-170) To them, there is no such thing as an isolated hypothesis -  it 
always fits in some kind of context, it brings with it a whole world view.
45 It is not trivial to note that in the reconstruction of history, Lakatos overlooks the evolving meaning 
of ‘physics’, if this term was used in the said context. The basis o f this objection will be treated in the 
objections to MSRP.
206
Nevertheless, Lakatos actually points out the Copemican Revolution, and it is 
in one thesis: “Copernicus ... fixed the stars, thus making them genuinely 
immutable. It is tme that he had to transfer their motion to the Earth; but in his 
system the Earth is a planet and planets are anyway less perfect than stars, if only on 
account of their multiple epicyclic motion.” (Lakatos, 1978, p. 183) Lakatos/Zahar 
mitigate the importance of this change in which motion is shifted from the stars to 
the Earth. But it is not clear why such a change is small even when Lakatos/Zahar 
point out that such multiple epicyclic motions were common currency between the 
Ptolemaists and the Copemicans.
In my view, such change as distinction between the two systems, is 
revolutionary enough. The fact that the epicyclic motions were common to both 
may obscure the fact that the starting points of the two systems are in fact very 
different. Lakatos/Zahar wish to show that both the Copemican and the Ptolemaic 
systems were within the same Platonic programme. In that light, all that the 
Copemican Revolution effects, is to save the Platonic system.46 Pushed to its limits, 
this position by Lakatos/Zahar claims that the programme is robust enough to 
contain a revolution. There is enough room within the same programme to 
accommodate revolutions. Only in this light can Lakatos/Zahar claim the following:
“But the phases of Venus prediction was not corroborated until 1616. Thus the 
methodology of scientific research programmes agrees with falsificationism to 
the extent that Copernicus’s system was not fully progressive until Galileo, or
46 On a similar note of criticism, Thomason points out: “Lakatos and Zahar’s history raises two 
questions: First, when assessing ‘the Ptolemaic programme’ to whose theory construction should we 
apply Zahar’s criterion: Plato, Eudoxus, Aristotle, Apollonius of Perga, Ptolemy? Second, were 
Ptolemy or Apollonius of Perga even working in the Pythagorean-Platonic programme at all, if  their 
theories ‘ran counter to the Platonic heuristic? ... Was Ptolemy (roughly 100 to 165 AD) working in 
the ‘Pythagorean-Platonic research programme’, defined by Lakatos and Zahar in terms of ‘uniform 
circular motion’ or a post-Platonic research programme?” (1992, p.170)
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even Newton, when its hard core was incorporated in the completely different 
Newtonian research programme which was immensely progressive. The 
Copemican system may have constituted heuristic progress within the Platonic 
tradition, it may have been theoretically progressive but it had no novel facts to 
its credit until 1616.” (1978, p. 184)
Yet this citation illustrates how Lakatos was not consistent in his use of the 
terms “system”, “tradition”, and “programme”. It appears that Lakatos/Zahar use 
these terms interchangeably. But in my view, the terms should be used precisely if 
the whole MSRP approach is to be useful. The importance of using the terms 
precisely is borne out, for example in the following citation. Lakatos/Zahar hold 
“From the point of view of the methodology of scientific research programmes the 
Copemican programme was not further developed but rather abandoned by Kepler, 
Galileo and Newton. This is a direct consequence of the shift of emphasis from 
‘hard core’ hypotheses to heuristic.” (1978, p. 184)
I find it surprising that Lakatos/Zahar are willing to see more affinity and less 
change from Ptolemy to Copernicus, than from Copernicus to Kepler, Galileo and 
Newton. This view is so unique to MSRP that it goes against the very objective of 
MSRP in replacing elitism. The view leads to the abovementioned counterintuitive 
positions, which in turn is a direct result of a counterintuitive re-writing of history. 
This view goes even as far as appearing rather ad hoc in the Lakatos/Zaharian 
meaning of the term for it is an example of a ‘parameter of adjustment’ approach to 
dealing with the problem of explaining the Copemican Revolution within MSRP.
Polanyi did not directly address Lakatos/Zahar on this elaboration of MSRP. 
But Millman gives due consideration to the Lakatos/Zahar view and suggests a 
Polanyian alternative, without resorting to rewriting history. He holds that:
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“At the time of its initial introduction and for long after, the Copemican theory 
as a whole was not superior to the Ptolemaic theory as a whole, considering all 
criteria of choice. Indeed, it was inferior in that it seemed to be refuted by the 
absence of stellar parallax and was more fundamentally in conflict with the 
accepted theory of motion. Nevertheless, the Copemican “harmonies” did 
provide arguments which gave the early Copemicans good reasons for 
entertaining the Copemican theory and trying to develop it further.” (Millman,
1976, p. 143)
This view by Millman is akin to Polanyi’s view in the emphasis it puts on 
harmonies.47 These harmonies are akin to the element of elegance and beauty that is 
picked out by tacit knowledge in the Polanyian system. Milliman makes a simple 
statement of the basic hypotheses in both the Copemican and the Ptolemaic systems 
as they are generally accepted in standard histories. According to him, the basic 
Copemican hypothesis is that the earth and the other planets move in orbits around 
the sun. In contrast, the basic Ptolemaic hypothesis is that the seven Ptolemaic 
planets (Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, the sun, and the moon) move in 
orbits around the earth. Each of them, except the sun and the moon, moves on a 
major epicycle whose centre rotates on another circle (the deferent) whose centre in 
turn is close to the centre of the earth. And so, while the basic Ptolemaic hypothesis 
accounts for the existence of retrograde planetary motions, there remained an aspect 
that demanded explanation.
47 In a further explanation of the reasons why the Copemicans preferred their system to the Ptolemaic 
system, Millman proposes three reasons: (a) The fundamental principles o f  the new theory provide a 
simpler explanation o f an important qualitative phenomenon than do the fundamental principles o f  
the established theory, (b) The fundamental principles o f the new theory explain a qualitative 
phenomenon which the fundamental principles o f the established theory cannot explain by themselves 
without the aid of further ad hoc assumptions, (c) The fundamental principles o f  the new theory 
enable measurements to be made o f certain properties or relations which either could not be 
measured on the basis o f the established theory or could be measured only with the aid o f  additional, 
arbitrary assumptions. (1976, pp. 145-146) I object to this explication o f ‘harmonies’ as long as they 
are a post factum interpretation of history and are thus not so helpful in terms o f a forward looking 
methodology. Fortunately, Millman apparently changes his stand further on.
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Millman makes a very fitting and Polanyian criticism of Lakatos’ approach 
when he observes that Lakatos’s restricted meta-methodology or what Millman calls 
‘methodology of historiographical research programmes’ omits an important sphere 
of rational appraisal of scientific theories. In that sense, he infers, it is inferior to, 
and must be replaced by a modified methodology which also includes plausibility 
appraisals. (Lakatos, 1978, p. 146)48 I agree with Millman’s conclusion about 
Lakatos/Zahar’s approach when he points out that the discussion of Lakatos/Zahar’s 
treatment of the Copemican revolution “has shown that rational plausibility 
considerations exist and are appealed to by ‘leading scientists’ in the course of doing 
‘great science’. Any methodology which ignores them is incomplete.” (1976, p. 
147) That is precisely my argument against Lakatos/Zahar’s rewriting of the history 
of the Copemican Revolution. But Lakatos/Zahar have made an attempt to save 
their position by introducing the notion of ‘novel facts’.
5.3 A critical examination of Zahar's criterion of 'novel facts'
An outstanding question that arises from Lakatos/Zahar rewriting of the 
history of the Copemican Revolution is: Was Copemicanism actually progressive? 
As I have already remarked, MSRP accommodates revolutions within a single given 
research programme. One way to resolve this conflict is to argue for a synthesis 
between the change that comes with revolution on the one hand, and the static or 
stable nature of a research programme on the other hand. What could result is an 
evolution. Thus far, MSRP could be an argument for evolution in science. To 
achieve this goal, Lakatos/Zahar introduce an element (originating in Lakatos and 
modified by Zahar) of ‘novel facts’. By this notion, Lakatos/Zahar hope to show
48 Wesley C. Salmon argues along similar lines when he points out the role o f “plausibility 
judgments” in rationality and objectivity in science. (Salmon, 1998)
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that Copemicanism was actually progressive. Thus, the redefinition of ‘novel facts’ 
by Zahar included ‘dramatic’ so that facts which may not already be known and 
therefore not strictly ‘novel’ as such, can lend new or immediate support to a 
position -  being an unintended, unforeseen by-product of a programme -  a ‘present’. 
A novel fact gives unexpected dramatic corroboration to a theory within a 
programme.
An example of a novel fact given by Zahar is the way the explanation of 
Mercury’s perihelion was not intended by Einstein’s theory, but was a present from 
Schwarzchild. In this line, Lakatos goes on to show that there was a series of 
conclusions -  facts predictable before any observation, rooted in the Copemicans’ 
position. (1978, pp. 185-186) In my view, here again is an attempt to patch up an 
inadequate methodology, namely MSRP, in an ad hoc manner. Novel facts 
described this way can only be recognized in retrospect. They are not useful in a 
methodology, especially not in a normative methodology in which we are trying to 
demarcate between good and bad science.
I point out here that Polanyi’s system is a more economical expression of a 
similar idea. According to Polanyi, the novel ideas of a scientist are proven in their 
novelty in time, when they are confirmed in ways not thought of before. At the 
moment of their conception, the only claim they may have to such confirmation is 
their elegance (in the eyes of the intellectually passionate scientist who is in the 
process of acquiring the skill of how to know in science) and their openness to 
universal intent. The novelty is thus sustained all through the Polanyian system, and 
not only in dramatic appearances of it.
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The importance of Zahar’s rendering of novel facts to Lakatos is further 
manifested in the latter’s interpretation:
“Zahar’s account then explains Copernicus’s achievement as constituting 
genuine progress compared with Ptolemy. The Copemican Revolution became 
a great scientific revolution not because it changed the European 
Weltanschauung, not -  as Paul Feyerabend would have it -  because it became
also a revolutionary change in man’s vision of his place in the Universe, but
simply because it was scientifically superior. It also shows that there were 
good objective reasons for Kepler and Galileo to adopt the heliostatic 
assumption, for already Copernicus’s ... rough model had excess predictive 
power over its Ptolemaic rival.” (1978, p. 188)
But again, the reason given in conclusion for the Copemican Revolution to 
be revolution is inadequate in two ways: first: Lakatos does not explain what he 
means when he introduces another term: ‘scientific superiority’. It is not clear when 
and how superiority is established, given a set of competing ideas. On this point, 
Lakatos seems to be begging the question, for when he sets out to set a more 
stringent standard of demarcation, he is meant precisely to provide a criterion for 
such superiority. A second reason why Lakatos’s position is inadequate is that now
he is forthright in declaring the revolutionary nature of Copemicanism. It was
apparent in his earlier position discussed above that Copemicanism was not so much 
of a revolution and that there were greater revolutions in other periods of history 
than in Copemicanism. Arguing in this line, Lakatos/Zahar hold a difficult position:
“It was also shown that Galileo and Kepler rejected the Copemican Programme 
but accepted its Aristarchian hard core. Rather than initiating a revolution, 
Copernicus acted as a midwife to the birth of a programme of which he never 
dreamt, namely the anti-Ptolemaic programme, which took astronomy back to 
Aristarchus and at the same time forward to a new dynamics.” (1978, p. 189)
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Now this introduces an epistemological quandary. To claim that the 
Aristarchan hard core always existed in some kind of epistemological limbo or 
womb during the time that the Ptolemaic system held sway raises too many 
questions. Among other questions: Where was this hard core stored or preserved? 
How was it used? Who used it and to what effect? What is the relationship between 
this Aristarchan hard core and the Ptolemaic system? What are the epistemological 
advantages of this view over the view that takes the Copemican position as a 
revolution? This is a high price to pay just in order to preserve the stability of the 
Platonic research programme over the ages and to mitigate the revolutionary 
character of Copemicanism. It is true that ideally no question is closed once and for 
all in science, but again for the progress of science, scientists are willing to consider 
certain positions as standard and the competing ones that have gone ahead of them 
as having been replaced.
Further, let us grant for the sake of argument that Copernicus ‘unconsciously’ 
performed the role of midwife, helping the deliverance of the Aristarchan hard core. 
Then the question remains: Why does the same have to be the case for Galileo and 
Kepler? Galileo and Kepler may actually have considered themselves (or could 
have been conscious of) being part of the ‘Copemican programme’, and this as a 
revolution (given the opposition they faced and how they stuck to their positions) 
and not merely working within the Aristarchan hard core. Lakatos/Zahar needs to 
show where Galileo and Kepler actually reject the Copemican system and prefer 
instead to work with the Aristarchan hard core.
5.3.1 Thomason's critique of Lakatos/Zahar's notion of'novel facts'
Thomason argues at length against the position of Lakatos/Zahar on novel
facts, namely that these latter in the Copemican system show that it was objectively
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scientifically superior to the Ptolemaic system. In the first place, Thomason points 
out that Lakatos/ Zahar apply their new principle of a ‘novel fact’ to fictional history 
rather than to actual history. And linked to this, they compare Copernicus to 
Eudoxus rather than to Ptolemy, they ignore Tycho Brahe, and do not take into 
consideration facts that could have been novel within the bounds of geostatic 
theories. Thomason’s criticism on this point merits citing at length. He holds:
“In brief, on Zahar’s criterion, to determine if a fact is a novel fact or a theory, 
one must look at the origin of that theory. In particular, one must answer a 
historical question: whether that fact played a role in the scientist’s construction 
of the theory or the problems it was designed to solve? ... So, to be a novel 
fact for heliostatic theory, a fact must not have played a role in its construction.
It must not have been one of the problems Copernicus was trying to solve. To 
apply Zahar’s criterion, one needs a detailed history of the heuristic reasoning 
Copernicus used in arriving at his theory. ... Unfortunately, we have nothing 
approaching Copernicus’s private correspondence or diaries from the crucial 
period.... There is certainly no document clearly showing Copernicus’s 
problem situation or his heuristic reasoning.... Thus, an application of Zahar’s 
criterion must rely on historians’ reconstructions of Copernicus’s reasoning. If 
there were a consensus among historians, this would not pose a problem. But, 
despite considerable and very sophisticated historical research, there is no such 
consensus.” (1992, p. 163)
Secondly,, Thomason points out that Lakatos/Zahar do not cite any historical 
account according to which the list of novel facts they give, although it did not 
belong to the problem situation that governed the construction of the Copemican 
hypothesis, was nevertheless predicted by heliostatic theory. Instead, the two draw 
the list independently and speculatively. Their response to this objection may be 
that they are aware of the novelty of their point of view and their objective is to 
show that science is objectively rational. Yet such an effort would be similar to 
what MSRP is meant to correct in verificationism and falsificationism, namely the
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lack of historical content. And in connection with this problem, Thomason raises a 
third criticism about novel facts. He holds that leaving such fictional history aside 
and looking at real history, there is a lack of consensus among historians that would 
make it difficult to determine which facts are ‘novel’ in Ptolemy, Copernicus, or 
Brahe. It was even more difficult for earlier historians to determine which of the 
theories held by these scientists were actually progressive. Those earlier historians 
would need the private correspondence of the scientists. (1992, p. 167)
Fourthly, and closer to my position of proposing a whole new epistemology 
along the lines of Polanyi’s notion of tacit knowledge, Thomason cites and agrees 
with Bochner’s observation:
“For my part I would not discard the possibility that Copernicus may well have 
started nurturing his heliocentric proclivities long before he had the specific 
knowledge by which to support them. Thus his dissatisfaction with Ptolemaic 
assertion that the huge sphere of stars performs daily rotations need not have 
come about at all by the knowledge of specific astronomical detail from 
specific astronomical works. It may have been simply the expression of a 
meta-physical malaise.” (Thomason, 1992, p. 176)
The appealing point in this observation is that it shows the weakness in 
Lakatos/Zahar deliberately rewriting history to suit a given idea of rationality which 
may itself be partial or mistaken. The question is: Why is such a motivation as 
resolving a metaphysical malaise not part of a full account of how science is 
rationally carried out? I have discussed this matter earlier in the chapter that deals 
with the incomplete definition of knowledge. A more complete approach to 
knowledge and by extension to rationality, should embrace the way of acquiring 
knowledge that is proposed by Bochner above. That is more economical and less 
counterintuitive than rewriting history to suit a selected kind of rationality. And
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linked to this criticism is a sixth one. Thomason argues that historically, scientific 
communities do not first consider the origins of a theory (i.e. using Zahar’s criterion, 
of the way a theory is built and the problems it is designed to solve) before they 
accept or reject it. In the case of the Copemican system in the 16th century, the 
arguments of the scientists were a mixture of all kinds of considerations ranging 
from explanatory power, to simplicity, to Neoplatonism, mathematical models, 
biblical quotations, citations of the Church Fathers, contemporary aesthetics, etc. 
(1992, p. 194) In other words, more than use Zahar’s criterion, scientists rely on 
their considered judgments.
And finally, Thomason makes a seventh and more global criticism to 
Lakatos/Zahar’s MSRPs. History may furnish us with the facts of who, when and 
what was done in science. But deciding on the research programme within which 
the scientist was working, among many contemporary and competing programmes is 
an arbitrary decision. So is it an arbitrary decision: to distinguish a widely held 
background belief from a given programme’s hard core; to decide even with the help 
of Zahar’s notion of novel facts, where one research programme actually ends and a 
new one takes over.49 He asks quite pertinently: “Was Einstein working in Lorentz’s 
programme? In Mach’s? In Poincare’s? Hull’s history of recent systematic 
zoology has so many scientists combining, refining, and separating ideas from so 
many sources that the reader can plausibly conclude that their theories do not have 
Lakatosian hard cores”. (1992, pp. 193-194)
49 Thomason gives an example: “.. .How is one to distinguish a new research programme from a 
variant on an old one? How does one tell if Brahe’s geo-heliocentric theory is a different research 
programme from Martianus Capella’s quasi-geo-heliocentric theory? Did Copernicus and 
Aristarchus work on the same programme? Copernicus and Kepler?” (1992, pp. 193-4)
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5.3.2 Attempts to salvage Lakatos/Zahar's notion of'novel facts'
Thomason points out that there have been attempts to modify and perhaps
salvage Zahar’s criterion. But most of them cannot stand up to criticism. Gardner 
(1982, p. 10) suggests that novel facts are only unknown to the scientist who 
constructs a given theory at the time she constructs it. But the problem is that 
historically, such ignorance is rare among truly innovative scientists. “Einstein 
knew about the orbit of Mercury and Copernicus knew that the superior planets 
retrograde only when in opposition.” (Thomason, 1992, p. 196) Another attempt to 
modify Zahar’s criterion is by Frankel (1979, p. 25). For Frankel, a fact is novel 
“with respect to a given research programme ... if it is not similar to a fact which 
already has been used by members of the same research programme to support a 
hypothesis designed to solve the same problems as the hypothesis in question.” 
(1979, p. 25) So Frankel extends the constraint to the whole research programme 
where Zahar stopped at a particular theory. The problem with this modification is 
that the task for establishing the novelty of a fact becomes more difficult with 
Frankel’s modification. As Thomason further notes:
“...Frankel’s criterion entails that every fact used or explained or predicted by 
every creator of every research programme is a novel fact. This is true 
regardless of however intuitively ad hoc the use of such facts may have been.
For example, Copernicus’s proposal that we do not detect stellar parallax 
because the fixed stars are so far from the earth would, on Frankel’s criterion, 
count as a novel fact.” (1992, p. 197)
Another attempt to rehabilitate or modify Zahar’s criterion can be detected in 
Nunan. (1984, p. 279) Nunan builds on Lakatos’ idea of competition between 
research programmes. He proposes that a fact is novel, “... if it has not already been 
used in support of, or cannot readily be explained in terms of, a hypothesis 
entertained in some rival research programme.” (1984, p. 279) But this rendering of
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the criterion excludes the Copernicus’s theory from having had novel facts, since the 
Ptolemaic theory had already explained the phenomena that Copernicus is dealing 
with. And as Thomason points out, Nunan’s criterion does not distinguish between 
ad hoc and genuine explanations. (1992, p. 197)
Other failed attempts to modify Zahar’s criterion include one by Musgrave, 
who finds that a strictly temporal understanding of novelty would be too austere on 
the one hand, and Zahar’s view is too relativistic on the other hand. Yet when he 
proposes a new criterion, it is problematic. His proposed criterion is that a fact is 
novel for a given theory if the theory predicts the fact without a background theory 
being able to predict the same fact. And vice versa, should a fact be confirmed both 
by a new and an old theory, then it is not novel. The problems with his criterion are: 
First of all, the radical novelty of novel facts that Musgrave is proposing would 
narrow such novel facts to a very small number, if any at all. Musgrave’s 
modification of Zahar’s criterion restricts scientific progress to radical revolutions in 
science. I find that this is a very complicated way to point out that novel facts are 
very rare, and that evolutions rather than revolutions are the norm in scientific 
progress. There is certainly a less restrictive way than to look out for revolutions. 
Polanyi’s epistemology of science offers that way, in my view.
5.3.3 Lakatos's own concessions
Lakatos/Zahar and more specifically Lakatos may be insistent on MSRP as
the solution to the problem he calls psychologistic justificationism. But he is not 
oblivious of the internal weaknesses therein. On scattered occasions in his writings, 
he points them out even though he does not give viable solutions to the weaknesses. 
He admits, first of all, that rival rational reconstructions of history are similar to 
research programmes, each with a different normative appraisal as hard core and
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psychological hypotheses as the protective belt. Thus far, such historiographical 
research programmes are to be appraised or evaluated on how close they remain to 
the actual historical account. And as such they are appraised like any other MSRP 
on progress and degeneration. (Lakatos, 1978, pp. 191-192)
Further, Lakatos admits that theories of rationality, just like scientific 
theories, “remain for ever submerged in an ocean o f anomalies.” (1978, p. 134)50 
Unfortunately, this admission is short lived as Lakatos quickly resorts to prescribing 
ever better rational reconstructions or external empirical theories to explain the 
anomalies. Lakatos is thus caught in a regression to ever more abstracted meta­
methodologies, from which only a concession precisely to the rationality of what he 
dismisses as psychologism and as expressed in Polanyi’s approach is the economical 
solution. Elsewhere I have argued that the Popperian (and in that case Lakatosian) 
preoccupation with ‘psychologism’ as being outside the boundaries of rationality is 
self-defeating and is reminiscent of the exclusivism characteristic of positivism.
And finally, more hope to resolving the problems of Lakatos’s MSRPs in the 
direction of Polanyi’s approach is given by an interpretation of Lakatos by Larvor. 
According to that interpretation, in answering the question why scientists stick to 
their apparently falsified theories, Lakatos is interpreted as answering:
“... research programmes supersede each other by attrition, and there is rarely a 
unique moment at which a programme dies ... [A] methodology [e.g. 
Lakatos’] must agree as far as possible with the settled judgments of the elite as 
to which episodes in the history of science were rational and which not, without 
recourse to ad hoc devices.” (1998, p. 61)
The hope is that the elite being referred to here will include the scientists. As 
long as the judgment is left to philosophers only, there is bound to be room for error
50 Emphasis in the original.
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in the sense that methodologies are proposed which may not be representative of 
scientific activity. Such judgment is what Polanyi’s notion of tacit knowledge 
appeals to.
5.4 Conclusion: Why Polanyian tacit knowledge supersedes 
MSRP
Lakatos’s demarcationist bid to depict the rationality of science has been 
occupied by two notions: rewriting history and changing the unit of appraisal from 
individual theories to entire research programmes. My investigation and discussion 
has shown that the emergent picture still leaves out an element of rationality, which 
element Lakatos forecloses as being part of psychologism/elitism. This element, I 
suggest, is the Polanyian personal judgment of individual and collective judgment 
also described as tacit knowledge.
A close and critical look at the attempt by Lakatos/Zahar to change the unit 
of appraisal from theories and clusters of theories to research programmes shows 
that what they intend to save is the driving force of scientific progress, i.e. 
discovery. Lakatos/Zahar would like to preserve the rational nature of this driving 
force without at the same time succumbing to an aprioristic approach (as is seen in 
verificationism and falsificationism). But in the end, what Lakatos/Zahar achieve is 
a system that is so stable and so inflexible that it includes revolutions under the same 
research programme (e.g. the Copemican Revolution within the Aristarchan/ 
Platonist programme) on the one hand, and cannot account for progress on the other 
hand.
In contrast, Polanyi’s notion of tacit knowledge offers the needed resolution 
to the problem. On the one hand, Polanyi’s tacit knowledge remains in touch with
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history because it gives room to the personal rational experience in an account of 
how science works. On the other hand, rather than make of the driving force of 
science (namely discovery) a rarity that occurs only during a revolution, Polanyi’s 
notion of tacit knowledge generalizes this driving element and finds it at work in the 
day to day scientific solution of problems. There is a smooth continuity between 
such daily discoveries and revolutions when these occur. Lakatos had set out to 
tackle psychologistic justificationism and its child, the polarized pair of scepticism 
and dogmatism. I find that Polanyi’s notion of tacit knowledge gets rid of the 
polarized pair (as I have discussed earlier on in treating the nature of tacit 
knowledge) in an economical way.
Every application of a formula in the solution of a problem involves the 
originality of the scientist. She uses the formula as a tool and is able to use it to 
solve the problem at hand. Thus far, every arrival at a solution is a discovery of 
some kind. In the meantime, the gap is bridged between a critical attitude on the one 
hand, and dogmatism on the other. The scientist is open to innovation when she 
employs the given laboratory practices and methods. She makes them her own 
within the tradition in which she researches. What drives her activity is a 
commitment to discovering the true nature of the world. Her innovativeness is open 
to being tested and perhaps proved in time. She has got universal intent in each of 
the scientific activities she is involved in day to day in the laboratory.
Further, it has been seen how Lakatos abandons Popperian falsificationism 
because it distorts history when it tries to come up with crucial experiments. He has 
introduced MSRPs which propound clusters of theories to which a given community 
of scientists is committed. Thus far, Lakatos admits of the element of commitment. 
But he makes two errors after that. First of all, he is involved in a tension between
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holding on to commitment across the clusters of theories (e.g. in defending the hard 
core, etc.) on the one hand, and maintaining the hope that the commitment is rational 
because of novel facts that are inherent in the hard core.
The error in this position is that Lakatos depersonalizes commitment (in a bid 
to de-psychologize methodology) and appeals to a deductive mechanism that 
underlies the commitment and makes it rational. He is then hard pressed to show 
why shifts from one programme to the next are rational i.e. why commitment could 
ever change from one programme to another. This again springs from a 
misunderstanding by Lakatos of the nature of personal commitment. The kind of 
psychologism that Lakatos combats is one in which the personal commitment is to a 
programme regardless of the possibly contradicting facts. But the personal 
commitment that Polanyi’s notion of tacit knowledge advocates is commitment to 
reality as it unfolds. Such commitment is aided by a research programme, but it 
goes beyond the programme and opens up to future corroboration or 
disconfirmation.
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Part Four: Conclusion - an evaluation
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Chapter Six: The virtues of the theory of tacit knowledge
6.0 Introduction
An evaluation of the theory of tacit knowledge is due, having propounded it, 
discussed it, defended it from criticism and compared it to current methodologies of 
science. I begin by showing the virtues of the theory of tacit knowledge and then I 
outline the areas where the theory can be further developed -  the weaknesses of the 
theory.
6.1 The virtues of Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge
6.1.1 A critique of objectivism
Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge is a constructive criticism to objectivism
as promoted by the CR-ists. The theory shows the incompleteness of objectivism 
and proposes an alternative approach to science which, I have argued, is more 
plausible. H. Prosch makes a critical study of the theory of tacit knowledge. (1986) 
According to Prosch, such philosophers of science as Norwood Hanson, Paul 
Feyerabend, Thomas Kuhn and Stephen Toulmin raised objections to the objectivist 
drive in the philosophy of science and even proposed radical new ways to look at the 
methodology of science.
But even these critics seem (to Prosch) to have left the ideal of objectivism 
intact. Their criticism does not go far enough to dislodge objectivism, in fact they 
seem to take objectivism in scientific knowledge for granted as a given. Frederick 
Suppe, according to Prosch, recognizes that he is in a minority when he abandons 
the K-K thesis. According to the K-K thesis, knowledge is conditioned on the 
knowledge by the subject that she knows and that what she knows is correct. In 
other words, there is only knowledge where the knower can articulate what she
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knows and when what she knows is objectively correct. The K-K thesis is central to 
objectivism. To Prosch’s understanding, Suppe is of the opinion that even such 
philosophers of science as Kuhn and Feyerabend, contemporaries of Polanyi, either 
explicitly or tacitly endorse objectivism because they leave the K-K thesis intact.
And so Suppe criticises and then dissociates himself with such objectivism. 
But this attempt by Suppe to dissociate himself from objectivism is not successful 
for he still seeks as an ideal: “to allow the canons of rationality for assessing 
knowledge claims to evolve without compromising the objectivity of knowledge.” 
(1977, p. 723, also Prosch, 1986, p. 31) Suppe’s goal is to leave objectivism or 
objectivity as an ideal (in a way similar to Musgrave’s approach), safe from the real 
life contingencies of scientific activity in history. Prosch points out more evidence 
that shows that Suppe does not really abandon objectivism: “Epistemic relativism ... 
wherein changes in canons of rationality amount to changes in what counts as 
knowledge, making knowledge be whatever a science accepts and allows to enter its 
domain, [must be avoided]... since it destroys the objectivity of scientific knowledge 
in precisely the ways that Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s accounts do.” (1977, p. 724, 
also Prosch, 1986, p. 31) And so in as far as the methodologies proposed by Kuhn, 
Feyerabend and Polanyi allow for actual scientific process to influence what 
qualifies to be knowledge, Suppe departs from their methodologies. He maintains 
what would qualify as an objectivist view in the understanding of Polanyi and 
Prosch. Given this position by Suppe, which position is nuanced but still fails to 
detach itself from the ideal of objectivism in science, Prosch’s observation about 
mainline philosophies of science in general is plausible:
“The notion that ‘what counts as knowledge’ must be true and detached
objectivity seems to be ... still very much the basic creed of epistemologists and
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philosophers of science, whatever their critiques of each other. Therefore 
Polanyi’s contention that the modem mind is fatefully enamoured with such an 
ideal is not at all pass£. It was not merely the positivists of his day and those 
who espoused the ‘received view’ who were so enamoured with detached 
objectivity. It is still our own contemporaries in the natural sciences, the social 
sciences, psychology, and philosophy who have these ideas entrenched in their 
thinking. The philosophers, it is true, are having difficulty showing to each 
other’s complete satisfaction just how objectivity is involved in the knowledge 
claims in science; but the ideas that science is, in fact, a source of objective 
knowledge and that what ‘knowledge’ means is strict objectivity, they 
apparently do not dream of giving up.” (1986, pp. 31-32)
Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge is a way out of objectivism. It accounts 
for the commitment with which a scientist or a group of scientists who make a novel 
contribution or discovery to science remain open to the possibility of their 
tenaciously held view being proven wrong in time. Thus far there is a personal 
aspect to knowledge in science which is not in opposition to an objective pole, this 
latter being the way currently held ‘facts’ may reveal themselves in deeper and 
unforeseen ways in the future. Examples of this phenomenon are the way Kepler’s 
views are deeper manifestations of the Copemican position.
To resolve the persistent objectivist tendency, Polanyi goes back to the very 
way we perceive, in order to come up with a theory of how we come up with 
scientific knowledge. The way we perceive, according to him, is active. As Prosch 
points out, in Polanyi’s rendering of perception, “... we create a tacit integration of 
sensations and feelings into a perceived object that then gives meaning to these 
sensations and feelings which they had not previously possessed”. (1986, P. 53) 
Now, it happens that the activity of perception is to be learnt and it becomes a skill -  
one of knowing how to feed in the apparently missing links in order to complete a 
pattern (rightly or wrongly). Prosch interprets Polanyi’s position to the effect that
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the ability to see objects is a result of learning the skill of attaining meaningful (even 
when non-explicit) integration of sensory clues. This is by a sustained, conscious 
effort which is itself aimed at perceiving. It is thus far neither exclusively a subject 
of formal inference from sense data, nor is it a direct and unmediated perception of 
the objects. (Prosch, 1986, P. 54) The clues that are spoken of do not all have to be 
used consciously. The perceiver may not be explicitly conscious of some of the 
clues, and yet she does use them -  she perceives objects focally while relying on 
these clues subsidiarily. And for some clues still, even if she tried to know them 
explicitly, they would forever remain non-explicit.
Added to these clues which are immediate to the act of perception, some of 
the components of tacit knowledge are memories of ‘normal’ perceptions -  past 
experiences we have absorbed into the back of our mind as being normal or 
standard. We bring these too to an act of perception. And further, some of the clues 
remain in the mechanics of perception, e.g. eye muscles and their adjustments, etc. 
These too influence our perception in ways we can neither totally ignore nor fully 
explicate or articulate. All the while, there is a conscious effort to organize the 
objects of our perception into meaningful wholes. We are trying to make sense of 
what we actively perceive. Some of perception necessarily remains at a subliminal 
level.
It is thus plausible to hold that we know more than we can actually ever 
explicate or articulate. It is akin to the knowledge of a skill e.g. the skill of riding a 
bicycle or swimming, which may not be fully articulated, yet it is knowledge. It is 
thus tenable on strictly epistemological grounds that the various factors that go into 
the formation of our perceptions have a subsidiary role to play as we make the 
integrations towards knowledge. They do not automatically, impersonally or
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‘objectively’ cause our knowledge, even when they are completely subliminal. 
(Prosch, 1986, pp. 58-62)
6.1.2 A promisingly more robust epistemology and more versatile 
metaphysics
With the theory of tacit knowledge, Polanyi introduces a personal 
epistemology as opposed to an objectivist epistemology on the one hand and outright 
skepticism on the other hand. A central feature of this new epistemology is that all 
cognitive judgments are personal. This in turn is based on the fact that there is a 
tacit or inarticulate element to all knowledge. And the nature of tacit knowledge as 
discussed earlier is that it involves commitment. Thus far, even abstract proofs are 
in fact personal, for none of them can be made wholly explicit -  there is a tacit 
dimension to them, e.g. the agreement on the meanings of the symbols used, the idea 
of proof, etc. Their meaning and acceptance is founded in or depends upon elements 
known only tacitly by a given mind in the action of judgment.
It is a valid objection to point out that there is an endless regress or 
reflexivity about personal judgment that seems to recede into infinity. When we 
focus our attention on the clues that help us to hold a personal judgment, those clues 
rely on other clues that must remain implicit for us to focus on the first set of clues. 
This recedes into infinity. I understand Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge as a way 
to account for the reflexivity without slipping into skepticism on the one hand, or 
into dogmatism on the other hand. (Prosch, 1986, p. 7) I have pointed out together 
with Lakatos that the bipolar pair of skepticism/dogmatism is mutually dependent -  
where the one thrives, there thrives the other too.
Within the epistemology of science as proposed by Polanyi’s theory of tacit 
knowledge, there is a way to avoid relapsing into dogmatism or scepticism. The
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scientist has learnt the skill of dwelling in the clues, formulae and theories she is 
using to access reality the way a blind person dwells in the tip of his cane or the way 
a researcher dwells in a tip of the probe she uses to access a hidden region. The 
theories, formulae, etc, the tools she has leamt to use to access reality through 
experimentation, observation, etc. are always personal because the world is 
presented to her, not in detached manner, but in the clues in which she dwells to be 
able to perceive the world.
The scientist dwells in the clues skilfully and personally. The resulting 
scientific knowledge is therefore also skilful and personal knowledge. On the one 
hand, she is thus shielded from skepticism for scepticism would be an absurd 
position to hold in the face of personal knowledge (as opposed to objectivist, 
detached knowledge). On the other hand, the scientist is constantly open to the 
possibility of her scientific knowledge being either confirmed in unforeseen ways, or 
even disproved as false altogether. She holds on to what may eventually be proved 
wrong. She is thus protected from dogmatism, which would be a contradictory 
position to hold in the context of personal knowledge.
A different metaphysics relates to this kind of epistemology. Without 
pronouncing himself specifically on the matter, Polanyi comes up with a 
metaphysics that helps avoid the horns of the realist/antirealist dilemma that grows 
in importance soon after Polanyi. In various places, Polanyi proposes that an entity 
is real for science just in case it can be expected to reveal itself in an indeterminate 
range of future discoveries or manifestations. (Polanyi, 1967, pp. 32-33)51 And 
thus, if what we have grasped or what we know about an entity is true, our 
knowledge will be confirmed in unexpected ways in the future. In this sense, the
51 Also argued by Polanyi. (1969, pp. 119-120,135, 168; 1958, p. 147)
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‘realism’ that Polanyi subscribes to is one in which minds, problems and skills are 
more real than cobblestones even though the latter are more tangible. The 
significance of an entity is of more importance than its tangibility in this case.
This kind of metaphysics expands ‘reality’ to entities that are still only clues 
that could lead to discovery. We can thus know such clues, i.e. tacitly. And as 
discussed earlier, tacit knowledge does not stop when we eventually know the entity 
more than just tacitly. Further, such a metaphysics is useful in understanding 
heuristics. Discovery is then a process rather than a jump or broken step from 
knowing nothing to knowing something suddenly. Rather, as the scientist draws 
nearer to making a breakthrough, she knows the entity towards which she is 
heuristically moving closer. And finally, such a metaphysics accounts for the 
epistemology of tacit knowledge in the sense that there is room for the active (and 
therefore fallible) participation of the perceiver, which is in turn an antidote to 
objectivism.
Thus far, the ingenuity of this metaphysics is that it avoids being bogged 
down in the realist/anti-realist debate. Polanyi is thus a realist in a way that is useful 
for a scientist. When Polanyi describes himself as a realist, he is not taking sides in 
the realist/anti-realist debate as it rages now. What the scientist is busy discovering 
is reality, but the search for discovering reality continues in open-ended fashion, 
guided along by an intellectual passion which is in turn guided by commitment and 
perception of beauty or elegance. Problems set are solved intermittently while these 
solutions remain to be tested against future discoveries. The scientist values the fact 
that she latches onto some aspect of reality, answers a given question, but she does 
not become dogmatic about the solution. The contentment of the scientist is a 
straightforward experience that does not necessitate positing or justifying a world
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external to the experience of the scientist (e.g. Plato’s world of forms or ideas or
even a ‘third realm/world’ as Frege does and is followed by Popper and Musgrave).
The functions of such a world (if it exists) are accounted for economically or in 
straightforward manner in the theory of tacit knowledge as part of the active 
imagination and experience of the scientist.
To illustrate this point on how there is no need for positing or justifying 
another world (e.g. a world of forms or a third world) I turn to an example given by 
Prosch. Prosch holds:
“Present-day scientific taxonomy continues to order species in this manner [of 
natural classification -  as propounded by Linnaeus and resumed fifty years 
later by A. P. de Candolle for plants and by Lamarck and Cuvier for animals] 
and is able to fit in new species when they are discovered. The number now so 
catalogued makes it ... a ‘grandiose achievement’ [and]... illustrates the most 
striking powers of tacit knowing. [We can] focus our attention on the joint 
meaning of particulars, even when the focus upon which we are attending has 
no tangible centre.... [Thus], through tacit knowing, we are able to know
realities that are other than tangible objects. For surely the classes developed
by the biologists, although not tangible objects, are as real as rocks, inasmuch 
as they have manifested themselves in their own future and have proven able to 
surprise us with even deeper meanings as time has passed. ... Thus... the 
conception of a real class is built up from our integration of tacitly known 
instances of this class, and it continues to be built up and modified ... by our 
continually noticing such instances.” (1986, pp. 82-83)
And so past successes confirm the usefulness of the skill and in turn the 
discoveries made by using the skill show that the entities guessed at or surmised 
using the skill are actually real. All this happens within the tacit knowledge and the 
experience of the scientist without there being a necessity to posit an external world
52 Plato’s theory of ‘a world of forms or ideas’ is scattered over diverse writings including: Meno (71- 
80), Parmenides (129-135), Phaedo (73-80), Republic (i.e. Allegory o f the Cave, 500-517), etc. I do 
not wish to go into details of it here, but would only like to mention that he posits this world to solve 
epistemological and metaphysical puzzles. (Plato, 1997/347)
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of forms or a third world. In sum, the theory of tacit knowledge opens up a new 
epistemology and with it a more versatile metaphysics.
6.1.3 A more fruitful and more representative methodology of 
science
Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge sketches a methodology that 
complements other methodologies in the sense of providing ways out from their 
quandaries. On top of that, his theory remains relevant to actual science rather than 
promote an aprioristic structure (e.g. objectivism). In these two ways, the theory of 
tacit knowledge keeps the debate on methodology open and fruitful in the sense that 
we can follow up on the debates on falsificationism, Kuhn’s paradigms and 
revolutions, incommensurability, Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research 
programmes, and Feyerabend’s Dadaism.
In my opinion, none of these methodologies (or denials thereof) gives a 
satisfactory answer to how science works. Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge 
shows that the difference between the way science works and the way perception 
works (and with that the learning of skills, recognition of physiognomies, use of 
tools, and the use of speech etc.) is one of degree and not in kind. Thus the crucial 
aspects of scientific knowing (e.g. induction of classes and concepts, etc.) are linked 
to tacit knowledge as seen in the above areas of knowledge and skills. The crucial 
aspects of science are only a more complex integration of less familiar clues, but this 
integration demands the skills of performance. The clues are in turn provided both 
implicitly and explicitly by the scientific community in which the scientist works 
and learns the tools of her trade. (Prosch, 1986, p. 93)
What many other methodologies had sought to brush aside as belonging to 
the realm of psychology as opposed to methodology and the philosophy of science,
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Polanyi brings back in the centre of scientific methodology. As Prosch points out, 
many other methodologies could not deal with the proper problem of induction, 
namely the true origin of the hypotheses that the said methodologies 
(verificationism, falsificationism, etc.) claimed were put to an explicit and objective 
test. Many of the said methodologies relegated this question to psychology. But 
Polanyi sought to restore it to the formal structure of science. Prosch observes:
“Polanyi thought that it was rather such a rational or logical account of the 
origin of hypotheses which was the crucial problem. For, as he said, 
hypotheses (particularly those created by good scientists) proved to be on the 
right track far too often to be the results of mere chance trial and error or the 
nonheuristically oriented, nonrational psychological or sociological factors.”
(1986, p. 94)
Thus, for Polanyi, heuristic processes (as discussed above in the treatment of 
the nature of tacit knowledge) should form the basis of the methodology of science. 
In other words, methodology of science should engage itself primarily with the 
process of discovery. Even if the nature of these processes led away from formal to 
informal methods, philosophy of science should pursue them there too, rather than 
set out to establish an aprioristic and rigid formal structure (e.g. objectivism). 
Unlike such aprioristic methodologists of science (e.g. forwarded by objectivists), 
the theory of tacit knowledge maintains that at the core of scientific knowledge was 
the knowledge of a good problem. This is as much tacit knowledge as is the 
knowledge of a face or a taxonomical class. In both of these examples, the 
knowledge is unspecifiable, yet it exists. The theory of tacit knowledge propounds 
that such knowledge, rather than a posited world/realm of real ideas is the solution to 
the paradox of how science actually keeps on track through the surmises of its 
experts.
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As to the truth of such knowledge, it depends on whether or not the putative 
knowledge makes contact with reality (as defined above). This ‘knowledge’ is false 
if it does not continue to reveal itself in the same or unforeseen ways that reveal 
aspects that were not known before, and the contrary holds if this knowledge reveals 
itself in unforeseen ways. It is not entirely a question of consensus or being backed 
by others seeing the world in the same way. Nor is it definitively negated when it 
does not receive backing from other scientists. It is personal, bearing the conviction 
of a given scientist or scientists, and has an external pole of universal intent. What 
we hold with universal intent to be true, we hold to be knowledge. (Prosch, 1986, 
pp. 97-98) Given this structure, there is no longer a dichotomy between objective 
and subjective knowledge. The personal element bridges the two extremes. The 
scientist is committed to her view about the world and yet remains open to the 
confirmation or discontinuation of her position.
As the scientist comes closer to a discovery, she engages her imagination on 
the one hand, and her intuition qualified by Polanyi as interpreted by Prosch, not as a 
“... supreme immediate knowledge a la Leibniz or Spinoza or Husserl... [but rather] 
... it is a skill for guessing with a reasonable chance of guessing right, a skill guided 
by an innate sensibility to coherence, which can even be improved by schooling.” 
(1986, p. 102) This intuition is set spontaneously in motion on the other hand. The 
intuition senses the nearness of a solution to the set problem. The same intuition 
launches die imagination and organizes the evidence that may be useful in the 
integration that leads to a solution. (Prosch, 1986, p. 101) In the end, the intuition 
points out the feasible answer to the problem and puts on hold the process of 
discovery. Creative imagination works hand in hand with creative intuition. A 
viable and representative methodology cannot overlook this central activity in
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science in the name of objectivism or any aprioristic formal account. The theory of 
tacit knowledge shows that there is a way of accounting for intuition and 
imagination within the methodology of science. Thus far, as Prosch points out:
“Our creative imagination is ... ‘imbued’ with our creative intuition. 
Imagination stimulates and releases the powers of intuition by imposing upon 
intuition a feasible task. Still, imagination is guided by our intuition in its 
intimation of the feasibility of a problem and in its engagement in pursuit. So 
imagination sets actively before us the focal point to be aimed at, but it is 
intuition that supplies our imagination with the organization of subsidiary clues 
to accomplish its focal goal, as well as the initial assessments of the feasibility 
of this goal. Intuition thus guides our imagination. Sallies of the imagination 
that have no such guidance are ... idle fancies.” (1986, p. 103)
As discussed earlier, intuition plays a further role in guiding the 
scientist to know when to stop the search and settle on a result, at least for the 
time being. Thus, shunning a philosophical reflection on the 
intuition/imagination in methodology would only weaken the accounts of 
methodology. The argument that this area of the scientist’s activity is to be 
left to psychology is not adequate, as I have argued in my response to 
Musgrave and those who argue like him above.
An objection to this approach may point out that advocating for such an 
account disenfranchises the methodologist of science and makes her totally 
dependent on the biographical accounts of scientists. I will deal with this weakness 
of tacit knowledge below, but a preliminary response to the objection is that as I 
have discussed above, Lakatos/Zahar present a robust methodology of science 
whose major weakness is how to explain the central notion of novel facts. One 
remedy for this weakness as pointed out earlier is the need to have access to the 
biographical accounts of the scientists. That is the right direction to go, but
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unfortunately it is not practicable for the history of science. What the theory of tacit 
knowledge does is to save the methodologist from having to account for the 
biographical details and provide a more general picture of how such details remain 
rational rather than idiosyncratic.
6.1.4 A richer account of scientific change
Mainline methodologies do not account adequately for change in science.
Such methodologies include verificationism, falsificationism, paradigm shifts and 
revolutions, and the idea that anything goes. The theory of tacit knowledge offers a 
richer account of scientific change. Within the theory of tacit knowledge, scientists 
do not go out deliberately to abandon one paradigm or research programme for 
another startlingly different one. Rather, just as their clues remain inarticulate and 
inarticulable their reasons for choosing the new paradigm or programme remain 
inarticulate and inarticulable.
The scientist who spearheads the change (or in other words the paradigm 
shift, revolution, or change of research programme) has actually taken an already 
accepted theory more seriously, concretely or literally than any other scientist. The 
said scientist proceeds to expand on an already existing position in bolder and more 
revolutionary manner than others of the same interpretative framework. The 
transition from one interpretative framework to the next is not always clear cut or 
deliberate, even though it may appear discrete and even revolutionary in hindsight.
As an example, Polanyi points out that one of the greatest and most 
surprising discoveries was one in which von Laue discovered the diffraction of X- 
rays by crystals. He made the discovery simply by believing more concretely in the 
theories of crystals and X-rays current at his time. In similar fashion, when Einstein 
produced a theory of Brownian motion in 1905, he came to it by making a very
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literal articulation of the then current kinetic theory of gases. (1961, pp. 378-379) 
Thus far, the scientist who spearheads the change is guided by criteria of scientific 
merit and by plausibility. Criteria of scientific merit, together with plausibility, 
require the personal judgment of scientists with knowledge of the area of science 
concerned. Plausibility has to do with soundness within the limits of prevailing 
science.
Unlike a few other mainline accounts, this account of change in science 
provided by the theory of tacit knowledge avoids introducing a new (and ad hoc) 
element to explain a discrepancy. Kuhn introduces quasi-religious conversion, and 
Lakatos/Zahar, for example, introduce the notion of ‘novel change’. Neither of 
these new elements helps the respective accounts in the long run. The theory of tacit 
knowledge, on the contrary, remains within the notions already provided.
Further, the theory of tacit knowledge is economical in resolving some of the 
discrepancies that mainline methodologies fail to resolve. First of all, Popper’s 
methodology of (naive) falsificationism cannot make room for the apparent 
stubbornness of scientists who stick with their otherwise falsified theories as often 
good practice. Polanyi’s solution to this problem is that the scientist spearheading 
change has widened the meaning of key concepts within the theory (e.g. by taking 
on a very literal interpretation of the key concepts hitherto used only as models, e.g. 
in the case where Einstein takes a literal meaning of Brownian theory). The scientist 
is not consciously abandoning the first theory for a totally different second one. 
When a theory is apparently falsified, the scientist may still be able to perceive 
(inarticulately) the validity of the ‘falsified’ theory. She then holds on doggedly to it 
in the face of the odds raised by objectors. In some instances in the history of 
science such apparently untraditional views have been vindicated with time.
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Likewise, Kuhn’s theory of the incommensurability of paradigms could be 
resolved by Polanyi’s account of change. Briefly, Polanyi shows that the view of the 
changes as radical revolutions is only partial, selecting only some elements of the 
change. In the same selectivity, the persisting elements between paradigms are lost 
sight of and then we have a problem of incommensurability between paradigms. 
Polanyi’s approach makes the Kuhnian quasi-religious conversions from one 
paradigm to the next irrelevant.
Finally, Lakatos too has problems with demonstrating the objective grounds 
on which scientists abandon a non-productive research programme for a more 
fruitful one. In the final analysis, the decision to change to a new research 
programme seems to be based on reasons other than ones strictly objective in the 
objectivist Lakatosian sense. I have discussed earlier how the introduction of the 
notion of ‘novel facts’ does not resolve the problem of how a research programme is 
abandoned for a more fruitful programme. I have shown how the Lakatos/Zahar 
methodology would include revolutions within one and the same research 
programme.
But there is actually a place for a real break with tradition when we look at 
events with hindsight. We call these developments revolutions. An example of such 
a break with tradition is when Copernicus chooses the heliocentric over the 
geocentric world view. We cannot appraise all the clues that Copernicus uses to 
arrive at this ‘decision’ any more than he could have articulated all of them. 
Another even more dramatic example is the way Einstein comes to the idea of 
relativity. Prosch reports that the account on how Einstein comes to the idea of 
relativity is fraught with clashing thoughts:
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“Einstein tells in his autobiography that it was the example of the two great 
fundamental impossibilities underlying thermodynamics that suggested to him 
the absolute impossibility of observing absolute motion. But today we can see 
no connection at all between thermodynamics and relativity. Einstein 
acknowledged his debt to Mach and it is generally thought, therefore, that he 
confirmed Mach’s thesis that the Newtonian doctrine of absolute rest is 
meaningless; but what Einstein actually proved was, on the contrary, that 
Newton’s doctrine, far from being meaningless, was false. Again, Einstein’s 
redefinition of simultaneity originated modem operationalism; but he himself 
sharply opposed the way Mach would replace the conception of atoms by their 
directly observable manifestations.” (1986, p. 89)53
And so an objectivist methodology that hopes to put a finger on and 
eventually render articulate (and perhaps manipulable) the creative process through 
which the scientist goes, is mistaken. The theory of tacit knowledge acknowledges 
that such lack of articulation can be included in a methodology and thus keep the 
methodology true to the activity of science. Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos (among 
others) encounter a problem in their account of how science works because they 
have overlooked the fact that some knowledge in science is tacit and inarticulable 
and that this is not a problem for methodology. The clues that the ‘revolutionary’ 
scientist uses to undertake a seemingly brand new position, or the clues that she uses 
to stay with an otherwise ‘falsified’ theory, are not articulable by her or anybody. 
But looking back, accounts may seem to make the choice of the clues look like a 
deliberate activity. Prosch explains:
“The subsidiary presence of the principles entailed in a discovery show us how 
change in our standards (in our paradigms) [occurs]. In solving a problem our 
intuition may respond to our efforts with a solution entailing new standards of 
coherence, new values. In affirming the solution we may find we have also 
affirmed the new standards as binding upon us. The new values have entered 
subsidiarily, embodied in a creative action. After this subsidiary entry, these
53 Prosch citing Polanyi. (Polanyi, 1966)
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new standards can come to be spelled out and professed in explicit terms. This 
may make them seem to have been chosen by us. But actually they never were, 
as such. They were only covertly adopted. Concrete commitments we make to 
our perceived coherences do bear witness to values -  sometimes new values -  
but the grounds for these values were hidden in the subsidiary clues when these 
were integrated through our creative action into our perceived coherences.”
(1986, pp. 104-105)
This explanation by Prosch shows how the theory of tacit knowledge is 
both consistent and richer than the alternatives. It is consistent and rich 
because it encompasses the way new values are introduced in science, in the 
arts and even in human relations. (Prosch, 1986, p. 105) It is consistent with 
the way language functions and grows as I have discussed earlier in treating 
the nature of tacit knowledge.
6.1.5 Including the indeterminacy of science
The theory of tacit knowledge does not shy away from indeterminacy in
science, for such indeterminacy forms an essential part of how science works. 
Rather than consign indeterminacy to other areas of research outside the philosophy 
of science or methodology, the theory of tacit knowledge provides an 
epistemological structure that can include indeterminacy. Within the theory of tacit 
knowledge, the mechanism of interpretation that is necessary in order to recognize 
and understand what goes on in the results of an experiment is not explicit. It is 
dwelt in, or assumed, in order to focus on the problems or scientific task at hand. 
This mechanism is not in one scientist’s mind. Rather, it is a shared patrimony 
among the scientists of the same area of science. It gets passed on implicitly as the 
scientists become members of the scientific community. It also gets changed 
implicitly as it is constantly applied to changing situations.
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What Polanyi holds here applies to Kuhn’s paradigms and Lakatos’ MSRPs. 
Scientists do not externally and deliberately set out to adopt or to change the 
paradigms or MSRPs of the scientific communities to which they belong. This is at 
one and the same time the way in which science protects itself from cranks and 
charlatans, even though in the process it is a way in which truths can be repressed by 
a system. But perhaps that is the price that must be paid if there is to be science at 
all. (Prosch, 1986, pp. 108-109)
It should be noted, that the theory of tacit knowledge is neither against nor 
oblivious of the logical relations between hypotheses and theories, or between 
theories and methods of measurement, and the whole formalization process of 
computation, algebra, and instrumentation. These, it must be acknowledged, are 
important for the sharing of information between scientists. Nevertheless, even in 
order to interpret these aids to communication, there is a tacit component that 
scientists bring into play, without which all this structure of formalization and 
communication would remain meaningless. Their meaning, in other words, is given 
them by a mind -  the mind of a given scientist at each time. (Prosch, 1986, p. 110)
In this sense, science must remain subject to the scrutiny of observational 
evidence. But again, when evidence is contradictory, science does at times exercise 
judgment or discretion. As examples, the periodic table of elements and the 
quantum theory of light were held on to in spite of contradicting evidence. And so 
at times apparent exceptions to a general mle in science may serve to elucidate 
rather than refute the rule. In this way, a deeper meaning of the general rule is 
arrived at with the help of contradicting evidence. At times such contradictions are 
ignored as mere anomalies that cannot in the moment be accounted for. (Prosch, 
1986,p. I l l )
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In summary, indeterminacy expresses itself in at least five ways. First of all, 
the affirmations we make about the real in nature (i.e. as defined above as what will 
reveal itself in unforeseen ways in the future) must always remain indeterminate for 
the real we seek to affirm is always richer than the contents of our affirmations. We 
cannot totally explicate the full extent of the meanings of our present affirmations 
about the real in nature.
Secondly, there are no explicit rules for deciding whether a perceived pattern 
in nature is a result of chance or a manifestation of the way nature behaves. The 
judgment on such a phenomenon is arrived at by a skilful application of values learnt 
within the scientific community. Thirdly, we may not know the grounds on which 
we hold our knowledge to be true, when we refer to knowledge of skills and 
performances. And science is, I argue, in many ways one such kind of knowledge. 
Fourthly, in order to focus on a given coherence in nature, we must necessarily keep 
elements of our knowledge (or clues) in the subsidiary realm. Whenever we switch 
to these subsidiary elements themselves, we lose sight of the coherences. And so the 
subsidiary elements must remain unspecified in the act of focusing on the goal of our 
knowledge at each time.
And lastly, the existential elements involved in helping us to modify the 
grounds of scientific judgment remain unspecifiable. We dwell in the methods i.e. 
we incorporate them in our being as we change the grounds for making scientific 
judgments. And so, as we change the grounds, we change ourselves. We are 
personally involved in the process. And so, for the theory of tacit knowledge as 
explained by Polanyi, logic has to be understood as going beyond merely explicit or 
propositional logic. It should include the logic of tacit inference by which a mind 
dwelling in subsidiary clues crosses a logical gap in discovery and in the
242
justification of discoveries. The same logic of tacit inference operates in perception 
and in the use of language (for example), even though these two are not explicit or 
propositional, but skills.
6.1.6 Grounds for answering to skepticism
The theory of tacit knowledge is central to Polanyi’s response to the critical
and sceptical trends in philosophy as a whole. I argue that his theory of tacit 
knowledge does lay grounds upon which the problem of persistent skepticism can be 
addressed and perhaps resolved. The subject of skepticism is much broader than I 
can attempt to discuss here. But in the theory of tacit knowledge I see a new way 
out. Polanyi describes his work as ‘post-critical’.
Polanyi holds that whenever we say of something that we know it (i.e. in 
propositional knowledge), we cross a logical gap between our stated belief (i.e. what 
we know) and the entity itself. Now, this is an indeterminacy we cannot reduce in 
our activity of knowing if we are to say we have propositional knowledge at all. 
There is no explicitly or objectively logical way to bridge this gap. There are two 
ways left. We can either acknowledge that our best knowledge about an entity is in 
fact true of the entity, or we can assume a sceptical posture and point out that our 
knowledge is merely what our epistemological apparatus constrains us to say we 
know. The latter posture is also shared by the critical approach to epistemology. 
(Prosch, 1986, p. 223)
An objection to Polanyi’s view here is that the gap persists between the 
epistemological and the ontological. But within the theory of tacit knowledge, 
Polanyi provides a persuasive answer to this objection which gives the details of 
how the logical gap is bridged. Tacit knowledge provides a relationship of meaning 
between two phenomena or entities, i.e. what we know in terms of the internal
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processes of knowing and the entity out there towards which our knowledge is 
directed.
Now tacit knowledge goes beyond the internal processes by which we know 
the entity towards which we direct our attention. Experiments in subliminal 
perception alluded to by Polanyi have shown that humans are capable of responding 
to stimuli in ways they cannot articulate. Polanyi speaks in particular about an 
experiment in which spontaneous muscle twitching that is unfelt by the subject and 
seen by great visual amplification can be affected through a medium e.g. noise. The 
twitching could be increased or decreased if it is followed by the silencing of an 
unpleasant noise. (Polanyi, 1967, p. 14)54
Tacit knowledge helps to form the bridge between our internal processes and 
the stimulus, organizing or integrating them into a meaning that we can perhaps 
articulate. The way the meaning is organized is from our internal processes to the 
stimulus or entity out there. The qualities of the entity do make an impact on our 
internal processes by the help of tacit knowledge. (Prosch, 1986, p. 224) In the 
meantime, the idea of the real -  i.e. as what may reveal itself in unforeseen ways in 
the future -  should be kept in mind. Also, it should be noted that this explanation 
allows for fallibility of the process of perception at various points, e.g. in the 
organisation of the internal processes. And so the theory of tacit knowledge is not 
replacing skepticism with dogmatism by the use of tacit knowledge. Rather, the role 
of tacit knowledge is shown to be one of reassurance to the would-be sceptic that we 
can rely on a part of our knowledge -  an important part of our knowledge -  to 
furnish us with information concerning the world out there.
54 The subject of subliminal perception has been controversial in the circles o f psychology from its 
inception. But Dixon argues that something about it persists through the controversy, and that 
perhaps this is a pointer that it ought to be given attention. (Dixon, 1971)
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In perceiving a cat, for example, we see many parts which we integrate 
epistemically (i.e. with the help of tacit knowledge) to come up with the entity we 
call a cat. But in the meantime, the same entity -  the cat -  is at the ontological level 
an aggregate, an integration of the parts that form the entity that is the cat. We dwell 
in the various acts that help us form the epistemic integration in order to see the cat. 
We then hold on to this position, namely that we have seen a cat that is out there in 
reality, with universal intent and in the hope that this vision of the cat is going to 
confirm itself more meaningfully (e.g. through cat-like behaviour and all else we can 
study or research to better understand the cat) in the future.
In the same way, scientists who come up with various theories take them to 
latch onto reality out there -  reality as explained in the theory of tacit knowledge. In 
this sense, Newton believed in the existence of gravitational force and in the view 
that there are atoms whose only power is inertia. He chose not to suspect his ideas 
of being mere conceptual constructions -  figments of imagination or illusions. 
Likewise, Einstein believed that his theories were describing the world as it actually 
is and that quantum mechanics is not correct. For these and similar scientists, their 
views were believed to describe the world and the scientists remained committed to 
universal intent -  that future manifestations of their views could either confirm or 
disprove their theories. (Prosch, 1986, p. 232)
6.2 Appraising the weaknesses of the theory of tacit 
knowledge
6.2.0 Introduction
The main thrust of my argument has been a defence of the theory of tacit
knowledge as propounded by Polanyi, against insignificant opposition (i.e. 
opposition based on misunderstanding of the theory of tacit knowledge) from
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significant comers (i.e. established or mainline philosophical positions). As Prosch 
points out, “the only critics [of Polanyi] who I have discovered take issue with his 
most basic positions do not seem to me to understand these positions, and so are all 
but worthless in providing any telling objections to his fundamental principles.” 
(1986, p. 9) It is plausible to say that Polanyi’s position is complicated but in the 
main plausible and it opens up new opportunities. What then is significant and fair 
criticism to the theory of tacit knowledge?
6.2.1 Lack of precision
Polanyi’s central concept of tacit knowledge is vague or imprecise on two
levels -  the micro-level and the macro-level. On the micro-level, Polanyi does not 
come up with a clear definition of the concept as he applies it in various contexts or 
to explain the various stages in the activity of science. I have discussed and laid out 
Polanyi’s rendering of the role of tacit knowledge right from the conception of a 
problem through the discovery of a solution and into the inclusion of the solution or 
forms of it in the body of scientific knowledge. Coming up with a precise definition 
or definitions of tacit knowledge would help clarify the debate on its characteristics 
and its functions. Little wonder that apparently none of his most audible critics have 
understood the notion. Much of the criticism has thus ended up being irrelevant to 
the notion and it has further entrenched the critics of tacit knowledge in their attitude 
of ignoring the notion outright, or only paying it lip service.
A response to this criticism of vagueness at the micro-level can be found 
from a charitable reading of the theory of tacit knowledge. One of the main 
objectives in underlining the role of tacit knowledge has been to broaden the concept 
of knowledge beyond the merely objective (i.e. against objectivism). And in the 
process, it has been proved that even the most formal knowledge is based on some
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tacit components that must be assumed in order for the formal knowledge to be held. 
Seeking to define each element of a formula in physics, for example, would lead to 
an infinite regress of definitions.
In acknowledging the role of tacit knowledge, we come to a rational way of 
ending the infinite regress. Tacit knowledge is appraised in such moments not as a 
notion that explains everything that we fail to explain at the moment, but as a not 
totally irrational area of knowledge to be left to other areas of research (e.g. 
psychology as understood by the critical rationalists). I have discussed and agreed 
with Polanyi that tacit knowledge makes sense and acknowledging it in accounts of 
how science works is an essential part of methodology. Seen in this light, there is a 
consistency in not insisting too much on a precise definition of tacit knowledge in its 
various manifestations in the activity of science. Tacit knowledge defies an 
objectivist definition and it is thus internally consistent in showing the limits of 
objectivism. It is enough for the notion to perform a persuasive role in our 
understanding of the activity of science.
The criticism of vagueness could be raised at the macro-level. So far, the 
question remains open: Does Polanyi’s notion of tacit knowledge reduce tacit 
knowledge to one single phenomenon? What evidence is there to show that the kind 
of tacit knowledge that operates in heuristics is the very same tacit knowledge that is 
at work in the organisation of a scientific community? These seem to be intuitively 
very diverse forms of epistemic activity -  the one being at the individual level and 
the other being at the social level. This is a valid objection. In fact even when we 
admit the role of tacit knowledge in the activity of science, it does not follow that we 
have one form of tacit knowledge. The various forms may be irreducible to one 
another.
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In response to this criticism of vagueness at the macro-level, I will borrow 
the analogy of the idea of objectivity. Heather Douglas has written about the 
irreducible complexity of the various meanings of the word ‘objectivity’ as used by 
philosophers and scientists. (Douglas, 2004)55 She argues that there are at least 
eight different categories of ‘objectivity’ that can be classified into three different 
modes. The three different modes and their categories are as follows. Douglas 
isolates objectivity! in which we look at processes by which we interact with the 
world (e.g. experimentation, observations, etc.). The categories of objectivity that 
fall under objectivity] are: a) where manipulable processes produce reliable results 
(and this goes in the direction of realism which Douglas admittedly avoids); b) 
convergent objectivity whereby various processes end up giving the same durable 
results.
The second mode of objectivity, objectivity2 focuses on the individual’s 
thought processes or reasoning processes and picks out the values in the processes. 
The categories Douglas includes in objectivity2 are: c) detached objectivity2 and this 
is rapidly expanded to d) value-free objectivity2 which makes an effort to hide or 
deny values that are considered non-epistemic, since these may distort knowledge. 
The preoccupation of holders of this mode of objectivity would look out for and 
weed out psychologism from epistemology. Linked to (d), Douglas points out 
another category of objectivity e) value-free objectivity2 . In this kind of objectivity, 
one takes a balanced position about the various values that go into arriving at given 
results, e.g. when reporting on current peer-reviewed literature. Such value-free 
objectivity2 can thus mean being reflectively centrist.
551 go into the article to some detail, while avoiding a discussion, because it ties in well with my 
treatment o f objectivity as understood in the Polanyian theory o f tacit knowledge.
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The third mode of objectivity that Douglas proposes is objectivity3 in which 
we focus on the social processes that engender and structure epistemically important 
procedures and show us how agreement is reached. The categories included in 
objectivity? are the following. There is f) procedural objectivity3 in which the same 
procedure produces the same result regardless of who uses it, and regardless of their 
idiosyncrasies. An example of this could be a rigid quantitative process that 
eliminates the need for personal judgment. Related to procedural objectivity3 is g) 
concordant objectivity? in which agreement is sought not through the elimination of 
individual judgments, but through agreement of such individual judgments. And 
finally, she proposes h) interactive objectivity? in which agreement among the 
individual judgments is sought through discussion of the points of difference (e.g. at 
conferences, etc.).
Objections to Heather’s position can be raised by philosophers who argue for 
a single or unified meaning of ‘objectivity’ to which all other variations of it can be 
reduced. Among these are Nozick (1998) and Nagel (1986). Against these, other 
arguments are raised in support of objectivity as a complex notion with several 
interconnected and sometimes overlapping meanings, are raised. Among holders of 
the latter view are Lloyd (1995) and Megill (1994).
This detailed treatment of objectivity by Douglas is useful for analogical 
purposes. Her discussion shows that although there are many different (and perhaps 
irreducible) meanings of one central epistemological term of ‘objectivity’, the term 
retains a unity of coherence. (Douglas, 2004, p. 465) I suggest that tacit knowledge 
should be approached in a similar way. The way it is propounded by Polanyi shows 
that the notion of tacit knowledge has got conceptual coherence, even though a 
further study may show that the various expressions of tacit knowledge are logically
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irreducible to one another. They are all interconnected and they sometimes do 
overlap. Yet the task still remains of classifying the various forms of tacit 
knowledge and showing the relationship between them.
6.2.2 Insufficient attention to foregoing philosophical thought
I have argued that Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge promises a new
epistemology. But the price for this novelty is that Polanyi has only paid passing 
attention to areas of traditional or mainline philosophy like the philosophy of 
language and post-Cartesian critical thought. This is in an effort to propound a post- 
critical philosophy. Even within the philosophy of science, Polanyi labels most of 
the philosophy of science and methodology as marked by positivism and 
objectivism.
One may object to this Polanyian approach and point out that in fact it 
breaches the precepts he himself sets out to propagate -  namely the precept of 
abiding as much as possible by the traditional position (i.e. as held by the scientific 
community) as a measure against charlatans. Polanyi himself makes a late entry into 
philosophy. This criticism may go on to point out that there is little wonder that 
mainline philosophers have ignored Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge. But 
Polanyi makes a choice to ignore mainline philosophy in his analysis of the malaise 
of philosophy, for as Prosch points out, Polanyi traces the problem of objectivism in 
Western philosophy as far back as Plato. (1986, p. 51) He thus wishes to make a 
fresh start, based on what he himself would discover. And thus:
“His eventual discovery of what he believed to be the true epistemology 
became in his own eyes a totally new philosophical beginning, a backing off 
from the current ways of going at the problems of knowledge in order to see 
them from a truly new perspective. His philosophy owes its freshness ... 
largely to the fact that he did not labour explicitly upon the particular problems
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of knowledge with which most Anglo-American philosophers have been 
concerned, nor upon those that classic philosophers have worked with either.
He tended to outflank these problems and to raise somewhat different ones 
upon grounds on which many contemporary philosophers have difficulty 
finding a footing.” (1986, p. 51)
Polanyi approaches the entire epistemological enterprise from the point of 
view of skilful knowledge and practice of science. He hopes that philosophy, one 
area of cultural endeavour, could learn from the apparent advancement of science, 
another area of cultural endeavour. In the meantime, science itself is not totally 
detached from other cultural endeavours like art. (Polanyi & Prosch, 1975)
6.2.2.1 Relating to Thomas Kuhn
Some have conflated the methodology of Thomas Kuhn with Polanyi’s
theory of tacit knowledge. Recent comparative research on the thought of the two 
philosophers has shown that even when the two were still alive and in 
correspondence, they were aware of and expressed the fundamental differences there 
are between their philosophies of science. Archival research has shown that Kuhn 
was aware of Polanyi’s thought.56 Polanyi saw in Kuhn a philosopher with whom he 
could join forces and together they influenced each other’s thought. It is important 
to draw the differences between the two in order to answer to the tendency of 
conflating them.
Moleski has done considerable research on the life and work of Polanyi. He 
notes that there are important similarities between Polanyi’s notion of “interpretative 
framework” and Kuhn’s wider or later notion of “paradigm”. He notes:
56 Some (e.g. Moleski, 2007) carry this relationship to the extent of Kuhn being indebted to Polanyi 
for his understanding of paradigms and how they operate in science. But I skirt this controversy here 
because it is still under investigation.
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“In the larger sense of the word, “paradigm” covers much the same ground as 
“interpretative framework”; both of them: create jargon; identify significant 
data; suggest canonical interpretations of the data; divide one school from 
another; define formal operations for practitioners; are surprisingly fruitful, 
even when wrong; explain the history of science in a satisfying fashion; depend 
on commitment; exhibit a tacit/articulate structure.” (Moleski, 2006-2007, p. 8)
Given these similarities, the conflation of the two approaches is 
understandable. But the differences are significant. First of all the two differ in 
metaphysical vision. According to Moleski, Polanyi’s understanding of 
‘interpretative frameworks’ offers a richer metaphysical view than Kuhn’s notion of 
‘paradigm’. The reason he advances is that everything Kuhn understands about 
paradigms can be mapped into Polanyi’s notion of interpretative frameworks, 
whereas not everything in Polanyi’s position finds a correlative structure in Kuhn’s. 
(Moleski, 2006-2007, p. 9) For Moleski, Polanyi is obviously a metaphysical realist 
whereas Kuhn is still stuck in the positivistic resistance to metaphysics. Without 
going into the realism debate, I do not think that Moleski raises enough reasons to 
situate Polanyi among the metaphysical realists. It seems to me that Polanyi does 
take metaphysics seriously -  he believes that what scientists are concerned to 
discover is the truth about the world. But Polanyi can still hold his position validly 
without thereby becoming an obvious realist. His view of reality has been shown 
earlier. What is real is tied to what is meaningful and promises to reveal yet 
unforeseen aspects and meanings of itself with time. That is not strictly entity 
realism.
Even then, the difference Moleski points out is important, for even though 
Polanyi cannot be categorized among the realists, he is not averse to realism in 
principle. Kuhn is reluctant to be classified among realists. When Kuhn tries to
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extricate himself from the metaphysical problems caused by his notion of paradigm 
that avoids metaphysics, he resorts to the view of truth in science as comparable to 
adaptability in species in the Darwinian concept of evolution. The evolved species 
have neither necessarily arrived at the ‘truth’, nor at the ‘way to be’.
Yet the later results of evolution are meant to bring up more adaptable 
species. Kuhn points out: “I would argue very strongly that the Darwinian metaphor 
at the end of the book is right, and should have been taken more seriously than it 
was; and nobody took it seriously. People passed it right by.” (Kuhn, 2000, p. 307) 
It is curious that a methodology that places a lot of significance on revolutions and 
incommensurability (i.e. Kuhn’s methodology) should resort to an evolutionary 
approach. This is an inconsistency in method. In contrast, Polanyi’s theory of tacit 
knowledge does not face such a problem of inconsistency.
A second major difference between Kuhn and Polanyi that should stop us 
from conflating the two is the object towards which scientists are committed. Both 
methodologies have a place for commitment on the part of the scientist. Kuhn 
himself points out that there may be differences between his and Polanyi’s position 
on the matter of what scientists are committed to. According to Moleski, Kuhn 
holds in a paper entitled “The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research” (1961)57 
that “The discussion which follows this paper will indicate that Mr. Polanyi and I 
differ somewhat about what scientists are committed to, but that should not disguise 
the very great extent of our agreement about the issues discussed explicitly below.” 
(2006-2007, p. 10) In Kuhn’s notion of the paradigm, scientists are committed to 
the beliefs of the scientific community. Truth is arrived at by consensus among the 
experts in a field in a given paradigm. Moleski points out that the way Polanyi
57 Moleski cites from footnote 347 of Kuhn’s paper.
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perceives Kuhn is such that “Kuhn’s concept of paradigm means ‘a commitment to a 
framework of accepted beliefs’.” (2006-2007, p. 11)
This view is partially responsible for the quandaries that Kuhn later faces in 
the incommensurability of paradigms, and the need for quasi-religious conversion 
for scientists who have to give up one paradigm for a new and better one. There is 
necessity for revolution at each change of a paradigm. But in the view of Polanyi, 
the scientist is committed first of all to the beauty of the reality she is discovering. 
She passionately shares her findings in the scientific community, with some room 
for dissent. The scientist is committed to universal intent -  that her theories will be 
brought to bear on reality in so far unforeseen future instances. In the view of 
Polanyi, there is no need for incommensurability between interpretative frameworks. 
There is hardly a need for a religious conversion, as changes take place within a 
context of discovery that consistently runs through the whole scientific enterprise. 
Hence, revolutions have a place, but they do not have to be the norm in scientific 
progress from one paradigm to the next.
And so overall, Kuhn started out by turning his attention to a faithful 
representation of science in history. He set out to provide a methodology that would 
be in congruence with the history of science. He did make some interesting 
observations and he brought some details to clearer light. But somehow, Kuhn 
appears to introduce an element of irrationalism within his account of the 
methodologies of science. While his notions of paradigm shift and scientific 
community were taken up especially by sociologists of science, the wider framework 
could not withstand criticism. And so Kuhn does not deliver a decisive blow or 
overall better solution to the problems posed by Popper’s approach of
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falsificationism. In contrast, Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge, as I have 
discussed, offers a more tenable position.
Thus far, there are similarities, and an emphasis on the differences is meant 
more as a clarification of the possible misunderstanding that comes with the 
conflation of the two. And where there are similarities, Polanyi’s treatment of the 
area of similarity is richer, more far reaching and raises fewer questions than Kuhn’s 
alternative. Polanyi himself comments about the efforts by Kuhn: “I can accept the 
excellent paper by Mr. Kuhn only as a fragment of an intended revision of the theory 
of scientific knowledge. Otherwise it would not only fail to answer the questions it 
raises, but appear altogether to ignore them” (Polanyi, 1963, p. 380)
6.3 Conclusion
Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge fits in a wider programme in which
Polanyi sets out to find a solution to a general social malaise in the way society 
thinks and acts. The malaise, according to Polanyi and as interpreted by H. Prosch, 
is responsible for intellectual, moral, social and economic dysfunction of society, 
especially his contemporary European society. The theory of tacit knowledge is 
therefore a segment, albeit a key segment, of a more complex whole. Polanyi sets 
himself this goal (reminiscent of the way ancient philosophers like Socrates set out 
to be physicians of society) while being in correspondence with other scientists 
including Fritz Haber, Erwin Schroedinger, Max Planck, and Albert Einstein. As 
Prosch points out:
“Polanyi had long been critical of the extreme positivistic view of science, a 
view most popular in his younger days, but which even now exerts influence 
upon modem thought, not only as a philosophy of science but in many other 
ways as well. The intellectual connection of positivism with nihilism and of
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nihilism with the ruthless political movements of the left and the right in his 
day became ever clearer to him. As they did, the importance and intellectual 
respectability of holding firm beliefs on the ideals essential to science and to a 
free society -  and an acknowledgment of their interconnection -  also became 
ever more clear to him ... No one seemed to see the extent to which not only 
the existence of a free society, but also the existence of this presumably 
verifiable science itself rested upon freely held beliefs in ideals and principles 
that not only could not be proved, but could not even be made wholly explicit.
It seemed to him that no one saw that the unprovability of these beliefs did not 
render them intellectually unrespectable or unworthy of being held. It therefore 
appeared to him necessary to show people, philosophers included, why and 
how this was so.” (1986, p. 5)58
Polanyi was consciously carrying out a complete overhaul of a whole way of 
thinking in order to preserve freedom as a whole, and the freedom of science in 
particular. But Polanyi has largely been ignored in philosophical circles. Some 
recognition has been rendered him in other intellectual circles, e.g. among 
sociologists, economists, psychologists, scientists and theologians.
An overall advantage of Polanyi’s approach is that it helps us to avoid the 
seemingly unavoidable choice between subjectivism and objectivism. Instead, we 
have an analysis of perception by a combination of subsidiary and focal awareness. 
This analysis is supported by the example of how science works. We as persons are 
involved. We thus avoid such reductionism. We also avoid skepticism by avoiding 
the positivistic revulsion of referring to the ‘real’ and to replace this ‘real’ by an 
ersatz objectivistic and logical purity. (Prosch, 1986, pp. 272-273)
With this new approach proposed within the theory of tacit knowledge, a 
number of epistemological problems can be tackled anew with commitment and in 
hope. And Polanyi has not been alone in this effort. In the same bid to find a
58 Emphasis in the original
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middle ground between rival approaches to the philosophy of science, Ronald Giere 
proposes a combination that ‘gives up the search for criteria of scientific rationality, 
abandons the attempt to separate the content and methods of science from 
psychological and sociological reality, but preserves the view of science as a 
representational activity’. (Giere, 1999, p. 44) Other philosophers who have 
advocated for a combinatorial approach include: Boyd (1980), Churchland (1989), 
and Giere (1988).
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